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For over two decades, mathematicians and cryptologists have evaluated and
presented the theoretical performance of Elliptic-curve scalar point-multiplication in
projective geometry. Because computation in projective domain is composed of a wide
array of formulations and computing optimizations, there is not a comprehensive
performance comparison of point-multiplication using projective transformation available
to verify its realistic efficiency in 64-bit x86 computing platforms. Today, research on
explicit mathematical formulations in projective domain continues to excel by seeking
higher computational efficiency and ease of realization. An explicit performance
evaluation will help implementers choose better implementation methods and improve
Elliptic-curve scalar point-multiplication. This paper was founded on the practical
solution that obtaining realistic performance figures should be based on more precise
computational cost metrics and specific computing platforms. As part of that solution, an
empirical performance benchmark comparison between two approaches implementing
projective Elliptic-curve scalar point-multiplication will be presented to provide the
selection of, and subsequently ways to improve scalar point-multiplication technology
executing in a 64-bit x86 runtime environment.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
For over two decades, mathematicians and cryptologists have evaluated and
presented the performance of Elliptic-curve scalar point-multiplication in projective
geometry using two basic quantitative metrics: the total number of multiplications (M)
and squarings (S). Although these two single-digit mathematical operations are necessary
to complete the multiplication of a scalar value k and a point p with coordinates (x, y) on
an Elliptic curve, the question remains whether they are really sufficient to provide
proper selection between projective Elliptic-curve scalar point-multiplication. Such
questionable sufficiency in evaluating performance using single-digit M and S metrics,
without accounting for optimizations and the cost of modulo arithmetic, will remain
theoretical and unrealistic. Therefore, the performance result will not reflect the true
figure between different projective transformation technologies.
This research will center on the performance comparison between two Projective
Elliptic-curve Point Multiplication Agents (PEPMA) software: One was implemented in
Network Security Services (NSS, 2013) and the second in (OpenSSL, 2013). Both NSS
and OpenSSL have been deployed in the field to target a wide range of applications.
Nevertheless, given the variety of projective transformations, diversity of underlying
arithmetic optimizations (NIST, 2010), and different computing platform architecture, an
unanswered question is whether there is a way to select a faster one, or to improve
PEPMA’s efficiency based on an empirical comparison.
This chapter provides an introduction to research involving the evaluation of performance
and the performance comparison of projective Elliptic-curve Point Multiplication in a 64-
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bit x86 run-time environment (Kasper, 2012; Levinthal, 2004). This research contains the
most relevant information which supports the preparation of essential evaluation software
tools to address the unanswered questions (BOCHS, 2013; PAPI, 2013). It further
elaborates the significance of research and provides a discussion of the issues. The
investigation advocates the need for research on an enhanced-accuracy performance
comparison of Projective Elliptic-curve Point Multiplication Agent, or PEPMA.
The goal of this investigation is to develop a formal evaluation methodology which
will provide a practical approach to selecting higher-performance based on precise and
accurate quantitative computational metrics. This research will address implementation
differences between NSS and OpenSSL, present connectivity between mathematical
modules (Blake, 2001), and explore weaknesses with current performance evaluation
methods. Subsequently, the selection approach based on a formal evaluation
methodology will provide definitive, repeatable and quantitative means to improve new
designs or existing implementations of PEPMA.
The principles discussed below will provide a means to achieve formal evaluation
methodology.
Projective Elliptic-curve Point Multiplication Preliminary
PEPMA is an efficient mathematical procedure (NIST, 2010) to compute a product
of a scalar k with an affine coordinate (x, y). In order to produce the result k×(x, y),
PEPMA must take into its functional equations several additional parameters besides k, x,
and y (Koc, 2009; Certicom Research, 2009; ANSI, 2005; ANSI, 2001). Additional
parameters include, but not limited to, Elliptic-curve coefficients a, b, and the modulus m
for modular arithmetic. PEPMA normally works under a Public-key Exchange protocol
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(PKE). One available PKE protocol is Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), where
most parameters required for PEPMA are usually taken from a public certificate,
subcategory "domain parameters". The ECDH Public-key Exchange protocol processes
the scalar product k(x, y) outputting from PEPMA to generate cryptographic private keys
for data encryption or decryption (IASE, 2013; NIST, 2007). Typically, PEPMA will
position itself in a cryptographic service hierarchy as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Position of PEPMA in a Cryptographic Service Hierarchy
Performance comparison and improving PEMA efficiency begins with a root
understanding of point-multiplication in the projective domain (NIST, 2010; Hankerson
et al., 2004; Menezes et al., 1996). In Figure 2, the scalar value k and the affine
coordinates (x, y) of an Elliptic-curve point p enters

. These entrant parameters to the

projective transformation Elliptic-curve Point Multiplication (EPM) are 521 bits in
length. At

, the affine input parameters (k, x, y) are transformed into the projective
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coordinate system simply by attaching Z=1 to the coordinates x and y. Chapter two will
further explain why this attachment is valid in a finite field.
For representation purposes, the coordinates are designated as (X, Y, Z), and the
first projective coordinate to enter the computational loop

has a value of (X = x, Y = y,

Z = 1). A more detailed discussion can be found in Chapter two.

Figure 2. Projective Elliptic-Curve Point-multiplication Agent
and point-adding

The scalar k will control the number of point-doubling
in the computation loop

. Operations in

operations

are commonly designated as exponentiation

procedures for PEPMA. The computation looping
hundred times to produce the final result (X, Y, Z) at

will call functions

and

a few

.

Efficiency in terms of how many times point-doubling or point adding is required to
execute depends on the exponentiation algorithm used: left-to-right binary-shift, right-to-
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left binary-shift, left-to-right fixed-base windowing-shift, or right-to-left fixed-base
windowing-shift (Brown et al., 2001). Both NSS and OpenSSL use the right-to-left
fixed-base windowing-shift exponentiation method. These methods have been frequently
discussed (Saldamli et al., 2009; Avanzi, 2004; Koblitz, 2000; Cohen et al., 1998).
At

, the "Projective to Affine Transformation" procedure converts the final

projective coordinates (X, Y, Z) back to the affine coordinates at

. The result k(x, y)

will be the multiplication of a scalar k with an Elliptic-curve point p having two affine
coordinates (x, y).
All mathematical routines shown in

,

, and

call for multi-digit modulo

arithmetic with the chosen field-modulus m (NIST, 2010). The Elliptic-curve Point
Multiplication (EPM) mathematical services recommended in the NIST Suite B
cryptography prime field suggests that a complete 521-bit big-number in a 64-bit system
can be efficiently stored in nine 64-bit registers using 9 × 64 = 576 bits (NSA, 2013).
However, both NSS and OpenSSL represent the big-numbers differently from the nine
64-bit registers with arithmetic carry bit. The notation of big-numbers in Chapter two will
further describe the format, differences, advantages, and disadvantages between the NSS
and OpenSSL representation of multi-digit numbers.
At the multi-digit arithmetic

, six big-number arithmetic operations are required

to support PEPMA: adding, subtracting, modular reduction, squaring, multiplication, and
inversion (Certicom Research, 2009). Except for modular inversion, all five operations
are necessary for point-doubling and adding in the computing loop

. To convert

projective coordinates back to affine coordinates, one or two modular inversions along
with adding, modular reduction, and squarings are required in block

. Since block
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"P to A Transformation" is located outside of the loop and executed only once at the end,
its computing cost is low compared to the cost of point-doubling and adding while in the
computational loop

.

All arithmetic in block

will be compiled into machine codes, as shown in block

. Computational costs of projective EPM at block

can be documented by examining

the assembly codes produced by the target C compiler. The NSS code in Appendix A
further details this process.
Point Doubling and Point Adding
The Elliptic-curve Point Multiplication procedure (EPM) requires two functions
working together in the exponentiation loop: point-doubling of a point and point-adding
of two different points (Certicom Research, 2009; Cohen et al., 2006; Connel, 1999). For
example, let p(x, y) be an affine point on an Elliptic curve. Let k be a scalar multiplied
with point p. If k = 5, then to obtain 5 × p efficiently, two point-doublings and one pointadding are applied:
k(x, y) ≙ 5 × p ≙ [2 × (2 × p)] + p

Figure 3. Elliptic-Curve Point-multiplication in Affine Coordinate
The efficient affine-coordinate mathematical operations above require exactly two pointdoublings and one point-adding, while k controls which function to use and how many
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times to call them. In other words, the exponentiation of p has occurred 2 times in the
exponentiation loop [2 × (2 × p)] while the adding of p has occurred once.
There are several ways to construct software servicing the scalar product k(x, y) in
64-bit computing platforms (Avanzi et al., 2006; Fong et al., 2004; Koblitz, 2000). One
method applies the time-domain computation to affine coordinates in a finite field (Koc,
2009). Based on algebraic laws, 2 × (x, y) is equivalent to the point-doubling of point p(x,
y) on an Elliptic curve (EC). Point-doubling arithmetic will produce a result in another
point p3(x3, y3). The coordinates of this resultant vector are precisely defined by two
Cartesian coordinate equations in the Euclidian plane. A derivation of these formulas can
be found below, and in (Blake, 2001):
2

 3x 2  a 
  2 x ,
x3  
y
2



 3x 2  a 
   x  x3   y

y 3 
2
y



The parameter "a" is defined as a domain coefficient of an Elliptic curve. The selection of
"a" has been chosen carefully by cryptologists for computational ease, and at the same
time, to satisfy important security criteria. Coefficient "a" is set to –3 per NIST
recommendation for implementation of a P-521 curve. NIST defined and explained these
settings in (FIPS PUB 186-4, 2013) and (NIST, 2010).
Precise modulo arithmetic must be applied after each arithmetic operation whenever
there is an arithmetic overflow beyond the chosen boundary of finite field F. In
calculating coordinates x3 and y3, take the inverse of 2y
r

1
2y

mod m

by following the inversion rule (Ciet et al., 2006):

y r



1 mod m

(1.1)

8
To derive the inversion of y, PEPMA might need to search for one unique value of r
in the entire finite field having 2521 – 1 elements for which equation (1.1) is satisfied. This
operation will be computationally intensive (Ciet et al., 2006; Itoh et al., 1988). However,
the calculation of the scalar product 2 × p(x, y) will be faster if the inversions of y can be
eliminated, or at least significantly reduced from a few hundred to one or two times in the
k×(x, y) loop.
Despite the power of modern-day computing platforms, the current embedded
processors and RISC in tablets have limited arithmetic capabilities to process Elliptic
Curve Point Multiplication in a timely manner (ARM, 2013; ZigBee, 2010; Jennic
JN5184, 2010). Computation using affine coordinates will require significant longer time,
due to the lengthiness to compute inversions. Therefore, realization of time-domain EPM
in these limited arithmetic capability processors will not be practical. Under the finite
projective theory, the elimination of inversions can be realized by transforming the affine
coordinates (x, y) into projective coordinates and processing the computation of scalar
product k(x, y) entirely in the projective domain. Computation in projective coordinates
found in Chapter two will further explain this realization.
When a projective transformation is activated, a forward Affine-to-Projective
Transformation (APT) converts affine input parameters k, x, y to parameters with their
representations in projective domain. After point-adding or point-doubling functions
complete their mathematical operations entirely in projective domain, the reverse
Projective-to-Affine Transformation routine (PAT) converts the result back into its
equivalent affine coordinates, k(x, y). This concept is recorded in Figure 4, and in (NSS
PEPMA, 2013; OpenSSL PEPMA, 2013; Cohen et al., 2006).

9

Figure 4. Elliptic-Curve Point-multiplication in Projective Coordinate
When implementing PEPMA to work efficiently under weighted projective
transformation, also known as transformation of variables into Jacobian's domain (Koc,
2009), there will be exactly one 521-bit inversion in the PAT and none in the APT. The
repetitive mathematical operations in point-adding or point-doubling functions do not
have any inversions. The point-adding and point-doubling functions described in Figure 4
above will be processed entirely in the projective domain. Their mathematical operations
will no longer be associated with affine coordinates after an Affine-to-Projective
Transformation (Bernstein et al., 2007; Ryabko et al. 2005).
There are different ways to compute projective point-doubling or point-adding
functions; but yet, the product k(x, y) will be the same at the end (Cohen et al., 2006;
Brown et al., 2001). This raises an issue of interoperability between these computing
approaches. Can point-doubling or point-adding functions be mixed and matched? Which
one is better in terms of efficiency? An immediate question is whether the performance of
PEPMA is unknown based on existing theoretical work.
Associated Environments of PEPMA

The environments surrounding PEPMA will potentially affect the runtime
performance of PEPMA. These environments include system architecture, compiling
options, and runtime domain parameters.

10
System Architecture

The chosen system architecture for PEPMA will limit how a big-number or MultiDigit Number (MDN) can be represented efficiently. Testimony from researchers
indicated several ways to represent an MDN contained in a finite field F (GNU-MP,
2011; SEC 1, 2000). However, only two types of representations are commonly used in
the industry: Prime field Fp and exponential prime field Fps.
If prime p is set to 2, then the exponential prime field Fps becomes F2s, or an
exponential binary field. Moreover, if the MDN is implemented using a two-bit field F2,
then NSS or OpenSSL PEPMA can represent an S-bit Multi-Digit Number as a finite
discrete polynomial along with a sign indicator
MDN  ( sign ) bS 1 (2 S 1 )  bS  2 (2 S  2 )  ...  b1 (21 )  b0 (20 ) 
Each arithmetic digit in 64-bit system architecture can hold 64 bits plus a carry bit.
Effectively, a full digit contains 65 bits. Since NSS uses a half-digit representation (32
bits) and OpenSSL uses a 58-bit representation (also called field element or felem)
instead of 64 bits architecture, a question that comes to mind is which method would be
more efficient.

11
Compiling Options

Users compiling options have several levels of optimization to choose from (GCC,
2013). For example, optimization switch –O0 in a GCC compiler will turn off all
optimizations while an –O1 option will turn on some optimizations. Another facet to
explore is whether optimizations affect the cost index and what setting would work best
for computational efficiency.
Run-time Domain Parameters

The binary content of vectors coming from domain parameters is expected to
contribute to the performance evaluation of PEPMA. Both NSS and OpenSSL PEPMA
work under an Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Public-key Exchange protocol to
generate cryptographic keys for data encryption and decryption.
The ECDH cryptography protocol used for exchanging private keys is believed by
researchers and industry professionals to provide a secured transaction under an
unsecured communication channel. One area of concern in evaluating PEPMA's
performance is why, where and how domain parameters affect the assessment. A further
examination of ECDH protocol might help in this regard. For a more detailed transaction
of ECDH protocol and associated domain parameters, readers are referred to the contents
of Appendix B and Appendix C.
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Under public viewers and on an unsecured communication channel, the calculations
calling for PEPMA's services in transaction sequences

to

are summarized in Figure

5 below. More details descriptions of the Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange
protocol (ECDH) are found in (NIST, 2007), NIST Special Publication 800-56A.

Figure 5. Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Used with PEPMA
The Client's ECDH procedure initiates transaction

starting with Client's domain

parameters (p, a, b, G, n, h) 1 . Subsequently, the scalar product calculations of k(x, y)
provided by PEPMA occur at the computations of sG, cG, csG, and scG, where G(x, y) is
the generator 2 for the cyclic subgroup within the chosen finite field. At transaction

, the

Server receives Client's key and is ready for data encryption using Advanced Encryption
Standard, AES (FIPS-197, 2001), or Data Encryption Standard, DES, or Rivest Cipher 4
(RC4) encryption algorithm for streaming data.
1

The ECDH transaction with numerical details and definitions of domain parameters are
recorded in Appendix B.
2
The generator for the cyclic subgroup is a point on Elliptic-curve where the result of the
product nG(x, y) equals to a point at infinity. This generator is also known as the base
point of the cyclic subgroup.
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The Empirical Performance Evaluation

To acquire parametric pertaining to performance and to compare the computational
efficiency of PEPMA in a 64-bit x86 run-time environment, two optimizing codes will be
selected for investigation: one made in Network Security Services (NSS, 2013) and the
other from the OpenSSL Project (OpenSSL, 2013). Both projects have core
implementations of PEPMA recommended in the NIST Suite B cryptography under
prime field (NSA, 2013). The NSS and OpenSSL PEPMA are among the first industry
open-source applications to implement and deploy an NIST public key exchange with
521-bit Elliptic-curve cryptography. In order to achieve higher efficiency, both NSS and
OpenSSL 521-bit prime-field implementations applied the weighted projective
transformation, or the transformation of variables into Jacobian's domain.
The NSS and OpenSSL provide free source codes of cryptographic low-level
implementation, along with high-level implementation protocols. The NSS libraries
currently service cryptographic functions for Firefox, Android, and other applications that
require Public Key Exchange services. The OpenSSL currently serves a majority of
consumer products, such as embedded TCP/IP cameras, home desktop videos, and smart
TVs.
Both NSS and OpenSSL have received a variety of FIPS-140-2, security level 1, 2
or 3 certifications indicating that the implementations are adequately stable (FIPS-140-2,
2001). The codes can be applied to Elliptic-curve public key exchange cryptography to
ensure authenticity in the public-key infrastructure.
Open-source projects can offer an exceptionally important role in benchmarking. A
particular FIPS certified implementation that has gone through thorough testing by a
certification and accreditation agent might provide a well-defined baseline for
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comparison. Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP, 2013) also
describes the verification procedures and provides additional information. Without this
reference for comparison, it might be difficult if not impossible to present any valid
performance evaluation by counting the number of mathematical operations as often
claimed in current literature. This is a primary motivation for deriving a comprehensive
performance comparison between NSS PEPMA and OpenSSL PEPMA, all operating in a
64-bit x86 run-time environment.
Additionally, the 64-bit x86 computing architecture available today is becoming
popular computer platform; hence, obtaining comparative performance figures based on
these specific computing platforms with accurate cost metrics will have immediate
commercial benefits. Such explicit performance evaluation will help crypto software
developers to choose an effective projective transformation method which contain
efficient underlying mathematics for the realization of a Projective Elliptic-curve Scalar
Point Multiplication Agent.
It has been suggested by (Pare, 2004; Gillham, 2003; Yin, 2003; Yin 1994) that the
empirical performance evaluation based on case studies will be well suited to answer the
questions on PEPMA's topic such as: "Is performance of PEPMA unknown even based
on existing theoretical work; Or, what are the metrics to truthfully evaluate PEPMA's
efficiency?"
Latency of PEPMA

Many researchers have used the computational unit for multiplication based on a
full-word mathematical procedure. The computational unit does not account for the cost
of a digit-by-digit (or limb-by-limb) operation and is counted as 1M in literature (M =

15
Multiplcation). For example, if an operand Elliptic-curve key length is 521 bits, then a
full-word hardware multiplier operates a multiplication of 521-bit word by 521-bit word
operands simultaneously, and immediately produces a 1042-bit result in a single
multiplication. This 521-bit "single- shot" multiplication is currently not available in any
general CPU. This lack of “single shot” multiplication compounds the latency evaluation.
Thus, in order to practically determine the latency of PEPMA, the measurement unit “M”
should at least be converted to computational cost based on digit-by-digit multiplication.
Furthermore, the latency evaluation becomes even more complicated in NSS and
OpenSSL 64-bit processing where each digit in a target CPU could be any arithmetic
word length: 8, 15, 16, 22, 32, 56, or 64 bits with or without hardware carry bit.
Also, the latency of PEPMA affected not by one, but by at least two hardware
components: Arithmetic unit integer quad-word multiplication with imulq instruction and
memory utilization with quad-word memory move, movq instruction. Both NSS-PEPMA
and OpenSSL-PEPMA executable codes use a significant number of movq instructions
(Intel Latency, 2013). While the latency index of movq and imulq instruction is 6 and 10
respectively, the multiplication routine s_mpv_mul_d_add() in NSS PEPMA executes a
total of 29 movq instructions and only 4 imulq instructions (Intel Latency, 2013). Table
66 in Appendix A lists out the routine s_mpv_mul_d_add().
With the same memory utilization subject, literature from (Singhal et al., 2011;
Levinthal, 2009) provides some guidance for reading and applying memory utilization
factors as an intricate part of the performance analysis. Given these two hardware
dependencies, it is difficult to extrapolate from academic findings. It is exceedingly
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difficult to construct a vector test set without reference implementations because latency
will vary substantially by the test vector's content.
In order to address the complexities of performance improvement of PEPMA, one
needs to determine how academia and industry have tried to evaluate PEPMA in terms of
computing costs.
Coarse Estimates Efficiency of PEPMA

Counting mathematical operations with Multiplications (M) or Squaring (S) at the
top level of PEPMA service routines offer coarse estimates. To address the performance
issues quickly and more precisely than coarse estimates, the researchers often rank
software latency with a single metric using clock() time function (See Appendix I), which
is readily available in common computing platforms (GNU-CPU-Time, 2014).

Figure 6. Performance Measurement Techniques
Although the estimated cost using a computing platform's clock() function offers a quick
evaluation of performance, it lacks insights into the internal structure of PEPMA; thus,
these cost indexes do not furnish any useful information for improvement along the
computational chain. The M, S and clock() metrics for obtaining rough cost indexes are
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shown in Figure 6. Operational difficulty spans from easy on the left to more difficult on
the right.
Ranking the efficiency with a CPU cycle counter clock() under a run-time
environment, as shown in Figure 6, will help approximate the overall performance of
PEPMA. However, the result will not be accurate and precise due to Operating System
(OS) overhead, active running treads, and other processes running in the same runtime
environment.
Academic work comparing PEPMA by the ratio of one processing runtime to the
other runtime in terms of CPU clock cycles appeared in eBACS (eBACS, 2004) and from
researchers (Bernstein, 2007; Somani, 2010). The eBACS performance evaluation was an
eight year European research initiative launched in February 2004. In 2007, the group
posted a web page where it tabulated a processing runtime of an Elliptic-Curve DiffieHellman key exchange procedure (ECDH) 256 key-pair generation without
precomputation over GF(p) (Crypto++, 2007). This evaluation model has since been
popular. If one decided to use PEPMA right out of an open-source repository, he or she
knows right away whether the processing time can fit well into computing architecture.
While such single-unit performance-measurement process is mostly intuitive, there
is an abundance of hidden features in the computing chain that can drastically change this
performance measurement. Several hidden features can be spotted by systematically
examining the NSS and OpenSSL PEPMA codes. Two particular features are noted at the
exponentiation procedure where a number of projective doubling/adding functions can be
reduced by the order of computations. Another hidden property is located in an NSS halfdigit 32-bit numeric representation (NSS-1, 2013). However, the conversion of existing
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codes from a half-digit 32-bit representation to a 58-bit or full-digit 65-bit numeric
representation is possible in a 64-bit x86 system (IA-64-32, 2013, Section 4.2). Such
successful conversion can significantly change the outcome of a single-unit performancemeasurement. Hence, a PEPMA procedure can be improved using better evaluation
metrics.
Fine Estimates Efficiency of PEPMA

Better performance evaluation of PEPMA available in cryptographic communities
can be classified into two categories: performance measurement (PAPI, 2013; Levinthal,
2009; Drongowski, 2008) and program profiling through emulation (BOCHS, 2013;
Code XL, 2013). The instrumentation setup in an efficiency measurement process might
include one or two on-chip machine-code instruction hardware counters counting the
occurrences of instructions. For example, operations MUL, the number of multiply
operations executed by PEPMA, has resulted in an event 0x12, mask 0x00 in
performance monitoring processing unit (IA-64, 2013). The Performance Hardware
Counters sit inside CPU hardware. Their position related to PEPMA code is shown in
Figure 6.
Almost all 64-bit x86 systems, including Intel Pentium and AMD processors made
for PC/Servers, have incorporated two on-chip 40-bit performance hardware counters,
which can be used to collect execution times of cryptographic service routines (Intel
PERC, 2013). The performance program profiling through the emulation of a
cryptographic program like PEPMA is available from Wind River SIMICS (WindRiver
SIMICS, 2013) and from an open-source repository (BOCHS, 2013).
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In 2008, a more elaborate performance comparison between cryptographic algorithms
was performed on Intel XScale architecture (Bartolini et al., 2008). Bartolini et al. used
an XScale computing platform (Intel XScale, 2007) as a reference processor and Multiprecision Integer and Rational Arithmetic (MIRACL, 2013) C library to construct 571-bit
large integers during the evaluation. This signified that PEPMA required more accurate
performance comparison and that coarse estimates will not suffice.
Targeting open-source software like OpenSSL, Google Corporation has been
working on displaying performance tables and charts using a set of metrics such as
benchmark machines, cycles per operation, and iteration counts for algorithms (Kasper,
2010). Kasper targeted the performance evaluation applied toward the Transport Layer
Security (TLS) protocol (NSS-1, 2013) with shorter key-length (224 bits) NIST P-224
Elliptic-curve under prime field. The NIST P-224 mathematical procedure produces 224bit crypto keys versus 521 bits in this evaluation (NIST, 2010). This indicated that
another way to improve measurements is to use program profiling technology.
Program Profiling through Virtualization and Emulation

A virtual machine is a software engine that redirects code and data of an application
and executes it within a newly created and isolated runtime environment. The VMware or
VirtualBox by Oracle performs this function well (VirtualBox, 2014). Thus,
virtualization refers to technology that provides an additional layer of glue-logic and
services between hardware and PEPMA as an application. Different type of technologies
can be used to employ virtual machines. The two most commonly used are direct
execution with CPU instructions for fast speed, and emulation of CPU instructions for
flexibility. Virtualization by emulation of PEPMA coding increases flexibility in terms of
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obtaining computing costs (Mihocka & Shwartsman, 2014) Within the virtual
environment, the emulation of PEPMA codes will allow precise and accurate counting of
frequently used instructions such as imulq or movq (Intel Latency, 2013). Readers are
referred to Appendix A for an accurate counting a small sample of NSS code (actual
count will be in the order of million units). This performance measurement technology is
referred to as program profiling of a PEPMA procedure and the units of measurement
can be any CPU instructions (machine code). As a result of units of measurement like
MULq or MOVq, counting these executing instructions with instruction emulation will
be exact. Subsequently, computational cost equations from these units of measurements
can be made. Under a particular emulation environment with a Community Enterprise
Operating System, CentOS, a Linux OS, PEPMA will position itself in a software service
hierarchy as shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7. Program Profiling and Emulation of PEPMA
Accurate and Precise Efficiency Evaluation of PEPMA

When observing PEPMA as a mathematical solver, one will uncover a number of
performance deficiencies during implementation due to misused algorithms, inefficient
numerical representation, or platform dependency. According to Mittelmann (2004) and
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other professionals (COCO, 2014; BBOD, 2013) in the field of benchmarking of linear
optimization software 3 , comprehensive benchmarking of each part of the solver will help
identify potential efficiency problems, and will lead to software improvements. To
benchmark each part of the solver, metrics M, S, clock(), Performance Hardware Counter
and Software Counter can effectively provide input to the formulation analysis for
verification of the result. More precise and accurate cost index can be derived from
formulas instead of from other coarse cost indexes. The concept for verification is shown
in a diagram in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Accurate and Precise Efficiency Evaluation of PEPMA
Motivation and Direct Application

Of particular interest is the result obtained from applying PEPMA toward private
key generation, specifically the outcome of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Public Key

3

Linear optimization is a method to achieve the best outcome.
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Exchange protocol (IASE, 2013; NIST, 2007). Today in the Public-Key Infrastructure,
these protocols are commonly used in many client-server transactions, and PEPMA may
eventually be the dominant method for public key exchange in cyberspace security in the
near future. This comparison topic was selected because PEPMA's fast response is an
important factor in client-server transactions. Furthermore, obtaining maximum
efficiency offers superior advantages in terms of shorter user waiting times, even in less
powerful processors.
Problem Statement, Goal and Objectives
Problem Statement:

Presenting the computational performance of Elliptic-curve scalar pointmultiplication approaches in projective geometry using:
(a) the total number of single-digit non-modular multiplications (M) metric,
(b) the total number of single-digit non-modular squarings (S) metric,
(c) or executing computations under unspecified underlying arithmetic methods,
(d) or under an unspecified computing architecture
to complete the multiplication of a scalar value k and a point p with coordinates (x, y) is
necessary but insufficient.
Goal:

Given a mixture of projective transformations, diversity of underlying arithmetic
algorithms, and different computing platform architectures, the goal of this research is to
improve the projective Elliptic-curve point-multiplication agent by dynamically or
statically selecting higher-performance arithmetic approaches based on quantitative
computational metrics.
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Objectives:

In order to provide a higher-performance approach between PEPMA, additional
quantitative performance figures of merit will be introduced.
Barriers and Issues
Qualifications of Quantifiable Metrics

Qualifying metrics will be the most difficult part of this research. Challenges come
from determining quantifiable cost indexes for each mathematical procedure in the
computing chain of PEPMA. An initial investigation showed that the contributing
complications to the cost index might include optimizations in selected algorithms,
presentation of big numbers, values of chosen field modulus, test vectors, base points,
and mathematical optimization factors.
Mathematical Optimization Factors

In order to construct accurate metrics, optimization factors must be included in the
equation. The contributing complexities to mathematical optimization include operators
such as bypassing functions based on special vector contents, early exiting executing
loops, modulo reduction methods, and the dynamic selection of computations via other
transformations or dynamic shortcuts such as a function of input vectors.
Selection Criteria

The criteria of selection for better efficiency will pose other challenges as well.
These challenges come from constructing of practical Key Performance Indicators based
on quantifiable metrics of various PEPMAs.
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Mathematical Traceability

There is concern regarding the qualification of cryptographic mathematics and
underlying low-level implementation of mathematical routines. Many original concepts,
underlying theorems, formulations and properties described will be introduced in the
context of Elliptic-curve point-multiplication, finite-field projective geometry, and 521bit prime-field arithmetic. Rigorous proofs for these theorems may be found in Ellipticcurve and projective transformation literature (NIST, 2010; Certicom Research, 2009;
Blake, 2001; Menezes et. al., 1996; Cohn, 1962) and Finite-Field Projective Geometry
(Rosen, 2006).
Research Questions

This research will answer the following questions:
1) Is the performance of PEPMA unknown based on existing theoretical work?
2) What are the metrics to truthfully evaluate PEPMA's efficiency?
3) Are there ways to improve PEPMA’s efficiency based on the empirical comparison?
Relevance, Significance and the Need to Evaluate
Relevance:

In the fast-paced cyberspace security, threats to public key exchange are constantly
emerging. One possible goal of improving security is to maximize the burden for
adversaries in terms of computational costs, such that adversaries will not be able to
retrieve or reveal private keys. According to US-CERT (2014), more than hundred
thousands damaging intrusion attacks to the U.S. military network occurred in FY 2011
(OMB, 2012). This highlights the need for next-generation public-key exchange design to
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have the capability to withstand brute-force cryptanalysis executing under highperformance, but low-cost computing platforms (Intel AVX, 2012).
Naturally, to meet these goals, usage of longer key length is necessary (NIST 800-56A,
2013; Barker et al., 2012). This requirement poses a major challenge to software
professionals who will need to search for an innovative approach to derive private keys as
efficiently as possible. Despite a large working community in cryptology mathematics,
the foundation has only provided limited evaluation techniques for reducing Elliptic
Curve (EC) computation (Hankerson et al., 2004).
In NIST Special Publication 800-57 (Barker et al., 2012), a recommendation of key
size and algorithm was provided for Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) users and
infrastructure components (e.g. X.509, X.509 DoD certificates). Table 2-1 in 800-57 lists
a time period NIST recommended for use of the ECDH PKE class. According to this
table, the ECDH curve P-384 digital signature certificate has expired after 12/31/2010. If
the use of the public key is expected to continue after certificate expiration, then all
certificates should also expire at an earlier date than specified in the table. Since the
ECDH curve P-384 has already expired, this recommendation signifies an urgency to
implement PEPMA P-521 for higher security PKE. This urgency pushes the optimal
design and implementation of PEPMA an immediately valuable tool.
Today, research on explicit mathematical formulations in projective domain
continues to excel by seeking higher computational efficiency and ease of realization
(EFD, 2013). However, because computation in projective geometry is composed of a
wide array of algorithms and optimizations, there are different ways to construct the
arithmetic under projective transformations to produce different results in terms of
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computational efficiency as seen in the literature of (Cohen et al., 2006). Given choices
between selecting a variety of techniques to implement the projective transformations and
the diversity of underlying mathematics, a fundamental issue of software engineering
remains to be the optimum solution to a projective EPM problem. The consideration by
software developers is usually efficient algorithms combine with the ease of
implementation, which can be easily verified through comprehensive quantitative or
qualitative performance figures of merit.
Significance:

The evolution of the Internet toward a vast, ubiquitously connected society is
imminent. Services of large devices, formerly placed on desks, have now become
consumer small parts, providing continuous information, business transactions and
personal entertainment. Thus, efficient PEPMA is a critical technology to ensure that
personal computing devices can deploy security functions as fast as possible. At the same
time, that technology must be operable with existing security certificates. The
comprehensive benchmarking of each computational part, as shown previously, can help
establish precise baseline performance. It’s important to understand the weaknesses and
strengths of each service routine; be able to identify computational efficiency and provide
ways for improvement; and track PEPMA's cryptographic performance over time as
future computing platforms evolve with cryptographic instruction extensions.
The performance comparison of PEPMAs will offer an important role in the EPM
literature pool by uniquely comparing two reference implementation codes. This detailed
evaluation can set a direction for future research in which this field can be built upon for
more efficient PEPMA, and can also be tailored to the underlying computing platform.
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Be able to implement this concept to the entire chain of computing services, and not just
selecting the best PEPMA available and then use it as is, is certainly worth the research
effort. The comprehensive interpretation and analysis of the performance parameters
generated by the benchmarking of each computing process will comprise the main
technical issues addressed in this paper.
The immediate contribution that this study makes to the cryptology field is that the
performance comparison will provide the implementers/technologist of PEPMA with
tools and analysis to select the best methodology in order to minimize development time
and maximize the efficiency requirements in a 64-bit x86 system. If interventions such as
those previously explained were not presented, PEPMA efficiency in implementation
may not be easily realized. Additionally, future research and development directions
pertaining to the NIST 521-bit PEPMA might advance faster as a result of step-by-step
formulations in this research study. Using the same approach as presented, the less
powerful, but ubiquitous 64-bit embedded processor Advanced RISC Machines (ARM),
used mostly in today's tablets and cell phones, might even benefit from the analysis and
formulation with just a few modifications to the approach schematic and metrics. An
ARM architecture description is currently accessible from (ARM, 2013).
After carefully digesting the comparisons between PEPMAs, one should be able to
suggest the first systematic examination of the design, deployment, and operational
challenges encountered by projective transformation over the years. This performance
comparison will reveal a fundamental gap between theory and operational arithmetic
costs particularly with the computing resource-constrained processors. It is believed that
the insights gained from the evaluation can offer valuable input for the improvement of
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the arithmetic chain either dynamically or statically, in the application toward scalar
multiplication kp in 32-bit or 64-bit run-time environments.
The need to evaluate PEPMA with more precision and accuracy:

During reviewing the literature on PEPMA with the intention to investigate where
the validity of this evaluation stands with respect to the current research, one noticeable
point is that benchmarking a complex solver akin to PEPMA technology in the
commercial sector is much different than in academic research, where the primary goal is
to quickly verify a simple computing approach. Although most publications support only
conceptual findings, the importance of academic research is evident. Furthermore,
regardless of what services are required underneath, the efficiency metrics developed
while examining the exponentiation function will provide a speedy gauge between
projective exponent algorithms (see blocks 1-8 in Introduction, Figure 2). However, this
evaluation model resembles the comparison between black-box software, which is not
very meaningful in terms of improving the black-box itself. This situation has likely
arisen due to the fact that PEPMA is a highly intellectual product solely based on its own
multipart arithmetic merits; and thus, it is difficult to evaluate without a complete
solution and additional metrics, or without specifying an exact computing architecture.
As a result of dealing with such complexity, academic researchers tend to publish papers
about efficient ideas, instead of publishing about what is actually required in a full,
practical implementation setting.
Lacking the support of concrete literature in processing PEPMA poses major obstacles in
understanding intricate connections between computing modules; and thus, such dilemma
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prevents improving software implementation or slowing down adapting services to the
target computing hardware.

As of today, an evaluation of 521-bit key-pair generation with pre-computation over
GF(p) with NIST Mersenne prime modulus (Solinas, 1999) is seldom found in academic
literature or any industrial publication. This predicament exists because practical usage of
such technology is just about to begin in both government and commercial sectors after a
lengthy FIPS-140-2 certification and accreditation of the implementation. So far, there
has not been public availability of this comprehensive performance comparison
pertaining to PEPMA in a 64-bit x86 runtime environment. The author's claim was based
on reading through the literatures as listed in the reference section. The completion of this
study is important and necessary to the future construction of a 521-bit projective-domain
Elliptic-curve public key infrastructure.
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Definition of Terminology

The following terms are defined in the context of Elliptic-curve cryptography and
this research. More detailed discussion of these terms can be found in standards (IEEE
982.1, 1988), IEEE Standard Dictionary of Measures to Produce Reliable Software, in
IEEE 610.12, 2002), Standard Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology, in
(ISBSG, 2006), Glossary of Terms, or in (IEEE 1363, 2000), Standard Specifications for
Public-Key Cryptography.
Accuracy: Measurement that is closer to the actual.
Cost: Any measure, such as latency, of quantitative properties that has to be spent to

obtain the result of the product k(x, y).
Cost Index: A value that has been normalized from the cost value.
Homomorphism: Homomorphism allows mapping the numbers back into themselves.

Homomorphism is a structure-preserving map between two algebraic structures of affine
coordinates (x, y) and projective coordinates (X, Y) operable in groups, sub-groups, or
fields.
Group: A group G is defined as a set, in which it is subsequently possible to define a

binary operation that has an identity element, and has multiplicative inverses for each of
its elements. The cryptology PEPMA works with large elements in the group; for this
reason, the properties of the group are enormous and a complete understanding of the
group is impossible. This led to a more practical approach in studying the properties of
smaller groups by looking at a subset of a known group under a specific modulus (e.g.
modulus m). This smaller group is known as cyclic subgroup inside a finite field F.
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Field: An algebraic system consisting of a set S, two operations O1, O2 and their

respective inverse operations, and two identity elements I1, I2, one for each operation.
K = ( S, O1, O2, I1, I2 )
S is a set of integers
O1 is the operation of addition. The inverse operation is subtraction.
O2 is the operation of multiplication. The inverse operation is defined
below.
I1 is the identity element zero (0)
I2 is the identity element one (1)
Inverse: The word “inverse” is used in this context to indicate a numerical inversion of a

polynomial with its presentation as a multi-digit number. Let F be forwarding functions
of the variable x, and x is invertible if there exists a function R in domain X and range Y,
with the following properties:
F ( x )  x iff

1
R( )  x
x

Let r be the inverse of x, then this congruent modulo must be true in domain X and range
[0 ... m–1 ]
x  r  1 mod m
If a multi-digit number, MDN, is invertible, then the inverse of MDN is unique; in other
words, there can be at most one MDN-1 satisfying the inverse properties.
Performance Formula: a mathematical relationship or rule expressed in symbols used

for calculating the performance of PEPMA. Performance formulas are components of
KPI.
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Key Performance Indicator: (KPI). It is an indicator which is used to determine how an

evaluator will apply it against objectives. PKI has the ability to provide recommendation
for course of action. For example, overall performance of PEPMA is a KPI.
Measurement: Measurement provides a single-point-in-space view of PEPMA specific,

discrete factors. Measurement is generated by counting.
Metric: Statement of measurement. Metric is derived by comparison of predetermined

baseline two or more measurements. Metric is generated by analysis. A metric can be
absolute or a ratio. Thus metric can be of type “absolute metric” or “ratio metric”.
Metrics are components of formulas.
Reverse: The word “reverse” does not have the same meaning mathematically as

“inverse.” It is intended to indicate transformation functions that undo other
transformation functions.
Precision: Measurement that is consistent for every reading.
Projectivity: A transformation within and between projective spaces.
Program Profiling: Investigation of PEPMA executing instructions.
Verification: The software engineering activities include testing, inspection, design

analysis, and/or specification analysis to confirm that the performance formulas meet
specifications levied on the design. Verification activities help produce high-quality
performance formulas and metrics.
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Point Doubling and Point Adding Definition:

By algebraic laws, a point-doubling of a point (x, y) on the curve y2= x3 + ax + b
results in a second point (x3, y3) whose coordinates must also be on the curve. This result
(x3, y3) is defined by two Cartesian coordinate equations in the Euclidian plane:
2

 3x 2  a 
  2 x ,
x3  
 2y 

 3x 2  a 
   x  x3   y
y 3  
 2y 

Similarly for point-adding, by algebraic laws, adding point (x1, y1) to point (x2, y2) on the
curve y2= x3 + ax + b results in a third point (x3, y3) whose coordinates must also be on
the curve. This result (x3, y3) is defined by two Cartesian coordinate equations in the
Euclidian plane:
2

 y  y1 
  x1  x2 ,
x3   2
 x2  x1 

 y  y1 
   x1  x3   y1
y3   2
 x2  x1 

Point-doubling of point p (x, y) is defined as adding the same point together
Point-doubling ≙ p + p
Point-doubling is also equivalent to a multiplication of a scalar 2 and a point p
Point-doubling ≙ 2 × p (x, y).
Adding two different points p1 (x1, y1) to p2 (x2, y2) is not the same as point-doubling.
Rather, point-adding is defined as adding two EC points having different coordinates:
Point-adding ≙ p1 + p2
Mersenne prime: a prime of the form 2p − 1 where p is a prime. The NIST P-521

modulus m has a form of a Mersenne prime.
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Mathematical Symbol

≡

congruency

≙

equal by definition

ℤ

integer number set

⇔

transformation

m

spatial modulus

N

digit count in a number, sometime referred to as limbs

⌈x⌉

rounds number to upper integer

⌊x⌋

rounds number to lower integer

mod

remainder calculation

==

equality

=

assignment of value

[]

square bracket, digit index

K

an integer field containing elements of ℤ

F

an infinite field

x, y

variables in Cartesian coordinates, or affine coordinates (lowercase italic)

X, Y, Z

variables in projective domain (uppercase non-italic)

k(x,y)

Elliptic-curve multiplication of scalar k and point p having affine
coordinates (x, y)

≈

approximately equality
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Acronym

ARM

Advanced RISC Machine

CPU

Central Processing Unit

CISC

Common Instruction-set Computer

ECDH

Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman, a protocol to exchange private keys in
public domain

EC

Elliptic curve

EPM

Elliptic-curve Point Multiplication

GF(p)

Galois prime field

MDN

Multi-digit Number, a big-number

NSS

Network Security Services, and open-source of cryptographic library

OpenSSL

Open Secured Socket Layer, and open-source of cryptographic library

PEPMA

Projective Elliptic-curve Point Multiplication Agent

PMS

Performance Measurement System

KPI

Key Performance Indicator

RSA

Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman public-key encryption
algorithm

RISC

Reduced Instruction-set Computer
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Chapter Summary

The beginning part of the introduction briefly presented the problem to investigate.
It is believed that the performance comparison between PEPMAs would be unknown
based on coarse performance metrics M, S, and clock().
The performance comparison of PEPMA in a 64-bit x86 environment has three
important, top-level contexts: (a) the structure of PEPMA, (b) associated environment of
PEPMA, and (c) existing and expected methods for comparison and verification. The top
two contexts were briefly presented in the preliminary section on PEPMA and in the
section on how environmental factors would affect the performance of PEPMA.
To advance the investigation, two optimizing PEPMA codes, NSS and OpenSSL,
will be selected for the empirical case study. These two open-sources, coupled with
methods for comparison and verification, will help answer which metrics will objectively
evaluate PEPMA's efficiency and ways to improve PEPMA’s efficiency based on the
empirical comparison.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
The literature review is a collection of research papers, journals and reports that
have been gathered as a basis for the evaluation and comparison of PEPMA in a 64-bit
x86 run-time environment. The review is to locate a set of widely accepted principles in
the area of concern. Based on this prior research, a common ground for the Performance
Measurement System (PMS) of PEPMA can be characterized. Accordingly, the outcome
of prior research and analysis will be used as a source of input to support the performance
evaluation methods of PEPMA. Critical knowledge and substantive findings include: (a)
performance evaluation using IEEE standards, (b) Elliptic-curve principles and their
components and (c) the concept of point computation in projective geometry. These three
important topics will point out specific formulations, theories, requirements, and
analytical methodology to help evaluate PEPMA’s performance and support the
comparison of performance between NSS and OpenSSL.
PMS principles indicated that when measuring PEPMA, various aspects of
evaluation must be taken into account. Current "state of the art" knowledge includes upto-date evaluation methods. Results and empirical data from these evaluators will
facilitate an understanding of the structures and relationships among various measures of
NSS and OpenSSL PEPMA.
The primary purpose of the arithmetic literature review, including a big-number
representation, is to ascertain whether the proposed metrics can objectively evaluate
PEPMA's efficiency and whether there are effective ways to improve PEPMA’s
efficiency based on the empirical comparison. Subsequently, critical points of knowledge
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about the Elliptic-curve field, projective geometry, and optimization efforts on low-level
arithmetic will provide best practices for determining the optimum computationally
efficient PEPMA under x86 64-bit platforms.
Performance Evaluation Standards

The purpose for reviewing the following standards and sub-components of the
formulas is to assist in developing a formal evaluation methodology that will address
questions from the research. It is important to derive accurate quantitative computational
metrics available from a 64-bit executable environment and provided such measurements
to a performance specialist.
One cannot reasonably evaluate performance accurately without first investigating
the measurement principles noted in Shukri's paper that "software measurement science
should use the same basic principles as physical measurement science, which requires a
reference, measurement method, and an uncertainty statement" (Shukri et al., 1999, p. 3).
While Shukri's measurement method refers to specific formulations recommended in the
NIST standards, PEPMA's key performance measurement method relies on IEEE
standards. Furthermore, while Shrukri requires the uncertainty parametric such that "the
behavior conforming to the chosen reference, and options the reference permits" (p. 4) to
be included in the measurement equations, the efficiency of PEPMA derives its
uncertainty parametric though program profiling and simulation.
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Both IEEE standards 982.1-1988 and 982.1-2005 provide some, but incomplete
measurement references suitable for the Key Performance Indicators of PEPMA.
However, efforts to tailor the efficiency measurements are necessary because no
standards exist in this area. These IEEE standards also offer a recommendation for
continual self-assessment and improvement of the software aspects of dependability.
Within the revision released in 2005, IEEE 982.1 stated its boundary in the scope that
“this standard specifies and classifies measures of the software aspects of dependability.
It is an expansion of the scope of the existing standard; the revision includes the
following aspects of dependability: reliability, availability, and maintainability of
software. The applicability of this standard is any software system; in particular, it
applies

to

mission-critical

systems,

where

high

reliability,

availability,

and

maintainability are of utmost importance...” (p. 2). Under the limited capacity of these
IEEE standards, the terminology and metrical formulations pertaining to the availability
of critical systems are generally applicable to the Key Performance Indicators of
PEPMA.
Specific definitions of primitives and formulations pertaining to software reliability
are found in IEEE Standard Dictionary of Measures to Produce Reliable Software, IEEE
982.1 (1988), which is an older and original version of IEEE 982.1 (2005). Although this
standard was published in the early microprocessor computing era of 1988, it was not
revised until 2005. Regardless of the deficiencies in some areas, there are useful metrics
to evaluate software reliability, which can be applied to ensure that PEPMA’s top-level
software module and some sub-modules exhibit accurate, consistent, repeatable, and
predictable performance under a 64-bit environment.
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In particular, IEEE 982.1 (1988) provides formulations of the following five metrics:
Compliance Metric, Static Complexity, Weighted Information Flow Complexity, Module
Maturity Index and Functional Metric. The methodology chapter will present applications
of these formulas, along with the acquisition of sub-components of the formulas, known
as primitives.
Despite the fact that the performance evaluation presented in the IEEE literature is
incomplete, Herrmann (2007, p. 111) cross-referenced the software and
engineering metrics in her book, as she made an observation that,

security

“Although not

recognized as such, software engineering is also a first cousin of security engineering”.
She also noted that software engineering metrics defined by IEEE standards have been
proven and “passed the accuracy, precision, validity, and correctness test” (Herrmann
2007, p. 120). Although Herrmann did not mention where one can find the origin of
formulations for the Key Performance Indicators and other formulas as she presented,
they were probably derived from the recommendations in standards IEEE 982.1 (1988)
and IEEE 982.1 (2005). Another source that discusses these topics is available from
Keyes (2005).
Efficiency Measurement

Efficiency measurement is one of most significant aspects beside other Key
Performance Indicators in the processing of PEPMA in real-time. The efficiency will be
measured with respect to its main objective, which is a minimization of computing costs
in terms of reducing the number of CPU instructions. To date, there have not been
significant standards available for evaluating the efficiency of Elliptic-curve pointmultiplication in a projective domain. In an attempt to address this issue, general
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discussion of this topic can be found scattered in Keyes's literature (Keyes et al., 2005)
and many other research papers presented in the following review sections. Additionally,
because there is not an absolute reference that PEPMA's efficiency measurement can be
based on, the reference for measuring PEPMA's efficiency will be relative ─ meaning in
between efficiencies of NSS and OpenSSL. Hence, the efficiency metrics are best if the
following attributes are presented: they have ground truth, have a formal technical
approach, are quantitative, are objective, are obtainable, are inexpensive to derive, are
repeatable, and are verifiable. Certainly, the evaluation for efficiency might not be able to
encompass all of those attributes. However, a few important ones – such as the empirical
verification through program profiling and simulation – should be included. Taken from
NSS and OpenSSL C source codes, Table 1 provides an incomplete list of similarities
and differences between NSS and OpenSSL implementations that will potentially
contribute to the point of reference for comparison and efficiency metrics.
Table 1. NSS and OpenSSL Similarity and Difference
NSS Unit of
OpenSSL
Comment
Analysis
Unit of Analysis
APT
APT
APT = Affine to Projective
Transformation
4-bit windows and
5-bit windows and
EF = Exponentiation
pre-comp EF
pre-comp EF
Function
Point Doubling type
Point Doubling type
2
1, (Cohen et al.,
(Brown et al., 2001)
1998)
Point Adding type 1
Point Adding type 2
(Brown et al., 2001)
(Brown et al., 2001)
PAT
PAT
PAT = Projective to Affine
Transformation
32-bit numeric
58-bit numeric
representation
representation

Compared
in between
Similar

Different
Different
Different
Similar
Different
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Elliptic-Curve Principles in PEPMA

One important element of PEPMA pertains to Elliptic-curve Cryptography (EC).
There are many theories in this area since the discussion of EC began early in the Isaac
Newton era. The discussions on this topic are included in several sources (Avanzi et al.,
2006; Burton et al., 2006; Aoki et al., 2001; Brown et al., 2001). In this Elliptic-curve
preliminary, principles closely related to helping the performance comparison of
PEPMA, will be extracted and presented.
It has been shown that many Elliptic curves exist in a three-dimensional torus
(Cohen et al., 2006, pp. 272-273), which is a donut-shaped object shown in Figure 9
below (Hankerson et al., 2004, p. 75-86).

Figure 9. A 521-bit Elliptic-curve Point vs. 15,360-bit RSA Cryptographic Key

Of these curves, the 2D locus of points p on a Cartesian x-y plane must satisfy an
algebraic cubic equation of the form y2 = dx3 + cx2 + ax + b. In contrast with onedimensional RSA cryptography, the distinction between a two-dimensional point p of an
Elliptic-curve residing in a torus and a one-dimensional 15360-bit RSA cryptographic
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key sitting along the x-axis is depicted in the Cartesian (x, y, z) coordinate system on
Figure 9. Hankerson et al. (2004, pp. 15-19) and Certicom discusses this topic (Certicom
Research, 2009; Certicom Research, 2004). Online information regarding key size is also
posted at (RSA Key Size, 2013). Not all Elliptic curves are good for cryptography
because they can be easily exploited or too difficult to manipulate in the forward
direction. Readers are referred elsewhere for discussion on this topic (Bos et al., 2014).
One particular curve P-521 per NIST recommendation has the cubic form:
y2= x3 + ax + b
where the coefficients in a larger curve y2 = dx3 + cx2 + ax + b have been set to d = 1, c =
0, a = –3, and the constant b, known as the domain curve’s parameters, will be selected at
run-time. These coefficients, a and b, are usually stored in an X.509 certificate for publickey management (ITU-X509, 2014). This same curve, P-521, was used in NSS and
OpenSSL implementation; but since b is variable, will its value change the latency of
PEPMA at all? By setting b = 0, the NIST curve's appearance in (x, y) coordinates is
depicted by the blue graphs below.
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The solution associated with NIST Elliptic-curve in equation y2= x3 + ax + b can be
performed in real, imaginary, binary, or prime-field numbers. It is natural to work with
curves within an algebraic closure of real numbers. However, it has been shown that real,
imaginary, and small-value numbers are used mainly for illustrating and understanding
point addition, multiplication, squaring, and inversion, but it has no practical use for
cryptology (Hankerson et al., 2004, pp. 80-82).
Since the NIST P-521 curve has a form y2= x3 + ax + b, by setting b = 0, the EC now
becomes an even simpler equation, y 2  x 3  3 x  0 . Definitions for a family of curves
were established and published in NIST 186-2, or in FIPS PUB 186-4 (2013).





The equation y 2  x 3  3 x  0 can be equivalently written as y 2  x x 2  3 . The
three coordinates and 2D graph of this curve bounded in small real numbers are depicted
in Figure 11 below. The red curve shows another infinite subfield when b = 3. This red
curve will have different base points G(x, y) from the blue curve, although they are in the
same family. By changing the domain parameter b and having different base points G(x,
y), the illustration shows that calculating computational efficiency for the red curve might
not be the same as for the blue curve.
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When y equals 0, then 0  x x 2  3 ; this equality implies that there are, at most, three





distinct roots for the curve. These three roots must all satisfy the equation 0  x x 2  3 :
x  0 , x   3 , and x   3

Thus, three distinct points, p, exist on the curve: p(0, 0), p( 3 , 0) and p(  3 , 0).
Based on algebraic laws, a point-doubling operation of a point p = (x, y) on a P-521 EC
will result in another point p3(x3, y3) that is defined by two Cartesian coordinate equations
in the Euclidian plane (Hankerson et al., 2004, p. 80):
2

 3x 2  3 
  2 x ,
x3  
 2y 

 3x 2  3 
   x  x3   y
y3  
 2y 

By substituting point p(x = 3 , y = 0) to (1), the product of scalar 2 and EC point p yields
k×p = 2 × p ( 3 , 0) = p3(x3 = ∞, y3 = ∞ ).
In the process of calculating the parameters x3 and y3, one needs to take the inverse
of 2y, including when y = 0. This inversion operation will be expensive even with real
numbers, more so if the arithmetic was done with 521 bits in a finite field. In NSS or
OpenSSL, truthful performance evaluation must account for the condition where p3(x3 =
∞, y3 = ∞). It has been shown that both point-doubling and point-adding functions must
handle this peculiar mathematic condition known as the processing of a point at infinity
(Cohen et al., 2006, pp. 268-271).
In an Elliptic-curve crypto system, the key length denotes a number of binary bits.
PEPMA will manufacture cryptographic keys as a coordinate (x, y) of a point p in a
finite-field 2-dimensional space. Thus, the length for each big-number x or y could range
from 128 bits to 576 bits, depending on the security strength requirements. It has been
shown that 521-bit key works well mathematically under a prime field (See Appendix J)
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or (Cohen et al., 2006, p. 182); thus, it will be the chosen crypto key length in this
research. NIST Special Publication 800-56A also discussed this topic.
Concept of Point Computation in Projective Domain

The concept of point computation in a Projective domain will explain why the
existence of coordinate Z and why the first projective coordinate to enter the
exponentiation computational loop has a value of (X = x, Y = y, Z = 1). The literature
from (Rovenski, 2006; Ryabko et al., 2005, p. 98; Veblan et al., 1906) provided
discussion of this topic.
Additionally, the concept will help answer many other questions about efficient
computation in projective geometry. Salomon (2006) briefly described this conception in
a 3x3 matrix representation (p. 13).
Boston and Darnall in literature have researched this mathematically intense topic
(Koc, 2009). They noted that although an Elliptic curve having one genus (one doughnuthole) is a subset of Hyperelliptic curves, formulations derived for Hyperelliptic curves
can be used among different families of curves, such as the formulation for counting
points on a Jacobian curve JAC(C). They further noted that to compute kP for some
element P in Jac(C) and the order n  Z using the standard double-and-add method, one
would be forced to expend a computational cost of O(log2(n)) inversions 4 . Boston and
Darnall also showed that the high cost of inversions in an affine coordinate is usually
valid for software. The final evaluation would signify a higher-performance improvement
if one performs the comparison between a non-weighed projective transformation system

4

When using Boston and Darnall’s formulation, log2(n) cost index in PEPMA equals
exactly 521 inversions per double-and-add method.
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and a system that uses a weighed projective transformation. Naturally, both NSS and
OpenSSL PEPMA 2013 releases used the weighed projective transformation to obtain
higher efficiency.
Boston and Darnall indicated that by introducing another variable Z, it is possible to
delay performing inversions until the last step of the algorithm. They also noted that for
Elliptic curves, this extra coordinate Z is equivalent to storing the point in projective
coordinates. This is not the case for higher genus curves greater than 1; however, they
still called these coordinates projective because of the similarity to Elliptic curves. Their
notion helps clarify the concept of point computation in projective geometry. In turn, it
distinguishes between different approaches implementing point-doubling or point-adding
functions.
Joye also included the performance comparison between Jacobian and Chudnovsky
coordinates (Joye, 2008). His idea of saving one Multiplication, 1M, and one squaring,
1S was achieved by using two more new coordinates, E and F, additionally with the
Jacobian representation of points. The Chudnovsky presentation of a point P then
becomes P(X : Y : Z : E : F). Neither NSS PEPMA nor OpenSSL PEPMA uses point
presentation in the form of Chudnowsky, but uses three projective coordinates in a point
P(X : Y : Z) described as Projective-3 per Bernstein and Lange (Bernstein & Lange,
2007).
In 2007, Bernstein joined efforts with Lange, and together they published a paper
titled “Analysis and Optimization of Elliptic-curve Single-scalar Multiplication.” Their
work was supported in part by both the National Science Foundation and the European
Commission through the IST Programme (Bernstein & Lange, 2007). In their research,
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they intended to present greater precision on how many field multiplications were
required for the computation of kP.
To further elaborate the reasoning of other researchers in the projective field, Ryabko et
al. (2005) and Salomon (2006) explain the same idea in their work. Other mathematicians
(Cohen et al., 2006;

Case, 2006) studying the projective geometry first examined the

computation of an Elliptic-Curve point by drawing a point p, which has Euclidian 2D
coordinates (x, y). This point p, shown in the previous graph as p( 3 , 0), represents a
point on an Elliptic curve E. For simplicity, coordinate y is set to zero. Point p is situated
on a flat surface π and in a Cartesian “x-y” coordinate system as shown in Figure 12
below. General discussion of projective geometry can be found in (Cohen et al., 2006, p.
46).

Figure 12. Transforming an Elliptic Point onto Projective Geometry
Point p (italic letter) is then lifted upward one unit in the z direction. Point p now
becomes another point p (non-italic letter) that has an additional z coordinate equal to 1.
The vertical movement engages point p (italic letter) to enclose an Euclidian distance
vector equal to (x, y, 1) but this point is still in the Cartesian coordinate system.
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However, from PEPMA's computational perspective, coordinate z =1 has no effect on the
result. Thus, both points p (italic letter) and point p (non-italic letter) are the same point.
In referencing the points located on an axis parallel to the z axis shown in Figure 12, any
scalar value where z = α, point p and its many other point p’s located vertically above or
below point p are all identical. Ryabko et al. (2005, pp. 99-101) declared such
equivalency as follows:
( x , y ) ≙( x , y , 1 )
In technical terms, all points p(s) having coordinates (x, y, α) are "homogeneous"
with respect to point p for the reason that they all represent the same point p that exists in
Euclidean space (Bennett, 1995). Because of the homogeneity of point p (non-italic
letter), the flat surface “Hi” in Figure 12 can also be thought of as a projective plane
submerged in a homogenous coordinate system (Greenberg, 1995). The transition from
affine coordinates (x, y) to projective geometry containing the first point P(x, y, 1) and
immediately back to affine (x, y) is shown in the figure below.

Figure 13. First Movement of EC Point Onto PG and Back
The original Euclidian point p can now be correctly derived from its homogenous
coordinate to the Cartesian coordinate by “mapping,” or making a projection of p onto
plane π on the projection axis parallel to the Cartesian axis z (Greenberg, 1995). This
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calculation is valid since a chosen working finite field F within Euclidean geometry is
completely contained within a finite field K of Projective Geometry (Rovenski, 2006).
Because the transformation of (x, y) ↔ (x, y, 1) has already brought (x, y) into a
homogenous coordinate system, for distinction of notation, one can denote point p with
upper-case letters instead:
p(x, y, 1) ≙ P(X, Y, 1)
To further elaborate the analysis of the projective field, let another point Q with its
homogenous coordinates (X3, Y3, Z3) shown in Figure 14 be a point which its values are
the result of the projectivity of point P along axis vector V (Ryabko et al., 2005, pp. 99101). This vector, V, passes through the Cartesian original point (0, 0, 0).

Figure 14. Projectivity of Elliptic Points
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Due to the principle of similar triangles, the relationship between the two coordinates P
and Q is given by
X
1

X 3 Z3

and

Y
1

Y3 Z3

Under the working finite field F and the chosen modulus m, a 521-bit NIST Mersenne
prime (Solinas, 1999) for example, and by the congruent relationship of similar triangles,
homogenous coordinate X3 can be derived such that
X
1

→
X 3 Z3

X 3  X  Z3  mod m

(2.1)

and the homogenous coordinate Y3 is given by

Y
1

→ Y3  Y  Z3  mod m
Y3 Z3

(2.2)

In applying expressions (2.1) and (2.2), point Q will be correctly projected back to point
P, provided an inversion of Z3 modulo m exists. Once point P has been recovered by
reversing the projectivity of point Q, one can derive the Cartesian coordinates (x, y) right
after a projective transformation reverse (Cantor, 1987). Figure 15 illustrates a complete
computation loop of an Elliptic-Curve point p in the projective domain. The term PT
denotes any Projective Transformation, weighted or non-weighted.

Figure 15. PT and Projectivity of EC Points
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Assuming that point p(x, y) will be transformed into a homogenous coordinate by the
chosen weighted relationship
X = x×Z2

Y = y×Z3

Z=z

(2.3)

Accordingly, a constant vector α(1,1,1) in Cartesian has three homogenous coordinates
Λ (Z2, Z3, Z)

(2.4)

Using the principle of homogeneity in projective geometry, one can multiply coordinates
of Q by a homogenous vector without changing its perspectives (Blake, 2001; Cantor,
1987).
Q(X, Y, Z) ≙ Λ × Q(X, Y, Z)

(2.5)

Due to the inversions required in expressions (2.1) and (2.2), the result of a pointdoubling or point-adding in a projective-domain finite-field yields three coordinates with
two inversions in place

Q


 X3


mod m 
 ZX


,

 Y3


mod m  , Z?
 ZY







(2.6)

where X3, Y3, ZX, and ZY are the labels of the result of point-doubling or point-adding
done in projective domain. Point Q has a “Z?” at z-coordinate because its value will be
determined later in the computation process. Multiplying point Q with the homogenous
vector Λ will yield the same point. The challenge for NSS and OpenSSL developers
implementing PEPMA is to find a commonality between the terms Z, ZX and ZY, such
that inversions in the x and y-coordinates will be eliminated. Ryabko et al. (2005)
described and derived this common denominator using substitution of variables and
reduction of mathematical terms (p. 99). Assuming such a commonality is found,
ZX = Z2

and

ZY = Z3

(2.7)
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then the computations in expression (2.6) require no inversions, but the term Z must be
carried onto the next computation of Z (EFD, 2001). The homogenous vector Q is just
Q  X 3 , Y3 , Z 

(2.8)

Expression (2.8) concludes that point Q, the result of point-doubling or point-adding, can
be manipulated in a homogenous coordinate without any modulo inversions.
In summary, findings from mathematicians in projective geometry have indicated
that a projective space of an Elliptic curve can be formed by mapping vector spaces along
a line through origin O. Additionally, projective geometry where the Elliptic curve
reshaped is a non-metrical form of geometry. This means that coordinates associated with
projectivity are no longer based on the concept of Euclidian distance. However, when the
projective space of an Elliptic curve is projected back onto the Euclidean plane, the
original coordinates presented in finite-field big-numbers will be restored. The
homogeneous characteristic in projective geometry makes the exclusion of mathematical
inversions possible.
Point at Infinity

While observing stars in the sky hundred of years before Poncelet, an important
concept regarding a point at infinity appeared to the German mathematician and
astronomer Kepler (1571). Today, in the principle of Elliptic-curve point computation, a
point O at infinity must exist, be presentable, and be calculable. Thus, PEPMA's
performance measurements will be affected by how a point-at-infinity is presented and
processed. The point at infinity principle will be of assistance in selecting test vectors for
PEPMA composed of order n of subfield and base point G(x, y) from domain parameters.
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Computation in Mixed Coordinate

Cohen, Miyaji, and Ono presented an application of mixed coordinates, a
combination of affine and projective computation toward Elliptic curve exponentiation in
an article titled "Efficient Elliptic Curve Exponentiation using Mixed Coordinates." Their
research shaped the mathematical foundation for computations in a projective domain
with mixed coordinates (Cohen et al., 1998). Both NSS PEPMA and OpenSSL PEPMA
use the mixed coordinates approach to save costs during pre-computation. Thus, an
accurate performance evaluation should account for this “mixed coordinate” condition as
well.
PEPMA Domain Parameters

Processing

PEPMA

requires

additional

parameters

associated

with

the

characteristics of the curve. These domain parameters are chosen based on certain
security criteria and performance levels. They are also based on the possible attacks that
can be instigated on an Elliptic curve cryptosystem. For this reason, the ANSI X9.62,
NIST 186-2 and IEEE standards provide the acceptable global parameters for all fifteen
Elliptic curves.
Table 2. NIST P-521 Domain Parameters (FIPS PUB 186-4, 2013, p. 16)
Description
Field size

Letter Value (521 bits)
000001FF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
m

Coefficient for the
Elliptic curve
equation (521 bits)
Coefficient for the
Elliptic curve
equation (521 bits)

a

Order of the curve
(521 bits)

n

FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF

─3 (decimal)
000001FF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFC

b

00000051 953EB961 8E1C9A1F 929A21A0 B68540EE
A2DA725B 99B315F3 B8B48991 8EF109E1 56193951
EC7E937B 1652C0BD 3BB1BF07 3573DF88 3D2C34F1
EF451FD4 6B503F00
000001FF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFA 51868783
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BF2F966B 7FCC0148
F709A5D0 3BB5C9B8 899C47AE BB6FB71E 91386409

Cofactor h

1

Documentation in NIST 186-2 identified fifteen sets of parameters: five for prime fields,
five for binary fields, and five for Koblitz curves. These parameters have been chosen for
fast reduction with their respective modulo. A question here is whether NSS and
OpenSSL PEPMA have applied the fast NIST modulo reduction using the Mersenne
prime modulus (Solinas, 1999), since this mathematical optimization is a major
contributor to the efficiency of PEPMA.
One of the other not so obvious parameters from NIST was the cofactor h: product
of the cofactor and the order of the curve equals to the number of points on the chosen
Elliptic curve: h  n # E (GF ( p)) . For a more detailed discussion of cofactor h, readers
are referred to (FIPS PUB 186-4, 2013, p. 87) or (NIST, 2010).
NIST curves utilize a cofactor term with a value of 1. However, determining the
order n for an NIST curve requires a way to count the number of points available from
the curve. These principles and findings will help select test vectors for PEPMA
composed of order n of subfield and base point G(x, y) from domain parameters.
Research in Numeric Presentation and Computation

Integer computation for PEPMA requires processing multi-digit multiplications,
divisions, and inversions (NIST, 2010). If one views PEPMA as part of Digital Signal
Processing (DSP) at the microscopic level, the EPM operation begins with a low-level
multiplication of two polynomial signals.
Various numeric theories (Cohn, 1962) and DSP literatures (Li, 2008; Lathi, 1998)
have described the problem of N-digit polynomial multiplication (Bi et al., 2004);
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however, from a fundamental aspect, the multiplication of two polynomials is equivalent
to the problem of convolving two sequences of N-point signals.
If one denotes both n and k as non-negative integers for indexing into an N-digit number,
all multiplications and summations required in (2.9) can be done entirely in spatial
domain. However, in light of reducing computational costs, an existing problem is
computing the result r[n] with a multiplication algorithm that has the least multiplications
and additions among all algorithms that compute r[n].
Let x be the polynomial multiplicand and y be the polynomial multiplier, the
multiplication resulting in another polynomial r is obtainable by convolving x and y
N 1

r[n ]   x[k ] y[n  k ]  x[n ]  y[n ]

(2.9)

k 0

Computational efficiency of PEPMA begins with a proficient representation of a MultiDigit Number (MDN). The following information sets up essential terminology for a
discrete polynomial representation of a multi-digit number and prepares its usage for lowlevel arithmetic calls from PEPMA.
There are several ways to represent an MDN contained in a finite field K (Koc, 2009;
Saldamli, 2009). However, two types of presentations are popular, the prime field Fp and
the exponential prime field Fps.
If prime p is set to 2, then the exponential prime field Fps becomes F2s, an
exponential binary field. Moreover, if the MDN is implemented using a two-bit field F2,
then NSS or OpenSSL PEPMA can represent an S-bit multi-digit number, contained in an
exponential binary field, implemented over a two-bit field b as a finite discrete
polynomial, along with a sign indicator.
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MDN  ( sign ) bS 1 (2 S 1 )  bS  2 (2 S  2 )  ...  b1 (21 )  b0 (20 ) 

(2.10)

For a more detailed discussion of numeric representation, readers are referred to (Cohen
et al., 2006, p. 169) or (FIPS PUB 186-4, 2013, p. 88). Although expression (2.10) can
provide a workable representation of MDN as a bit vector, the representation is not yet
efficient for performing arithmetic between MDNs. Instead, almost all 64-bit
computational units currently available in general processors provide signed arithmetic
operations with arithmetic word lengths set to 32 (half-digit in 64-bit system), 58, 64, or
65 bits (64 bits plus hardware carry bit).
If one denotes arithmetic word lengths to be L, then the absolute minimum number
of digits N required in an S-bit MDN is a ceiling function of s and L
S 
N  
 L

(2.11)

and the representation of an MDN as a signed digit vector is given by
 N 1

MDN  ( sign )   d n (2nL ) 
 n 0


(2.12)

where digit d located at index n of an MDN is a weighed sum of the bit vector

d n  bnL  L 1 ( 2 L 1 )  bnL  L  2 ( 2 L  2 )  ...  bnL 1 ( 21 )  bnL  0 ( 2 0 )

(2.13)

n = {0, 1, 2, …, N–2}
Readers are referred to (Cohen et al., 2006, p. 171) for a general discussion of internal
representation of a single-precision number (digit d). The summation in (2.12) is valid
only for the lower N–2 digits, digit 0 to digit N–2. The most significant digit (MSD),
located at index N–1, is different because the computation in Elliptic-Curve Point
Multiplication (EPM) might not require all available bits in N digits. Upper zero bits in
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NSS and OpenSSL architecture are used for arithmetic overflow. How upper zero bits are
used will significantly affect efficiency.
For example, an EPM modulus is an MDN with S = 521 bits, but there are 544 bits
available in seventeen 32-bit digits. This setting always creates 23 zeros unused in the
most significant bits (MSB) in the digit N–1. The MSD of an MDN is a polynomial of
degree L, but it has a different form if S is smaller than the product N×L:
d N -1  0...  bS 1 ( 2 L 1 )  bS  2 ( 2 L  2 )  ...  b( N 1) L 1 ( 2 0 )

(2.14)

For a discussion of multi-precision number, readers are referred to (Cohen et al., 2006, p.
170). The representation of a Multi-Digit Number (MDN) in a computing platform’s
memory is illustrated in Figure 16 below:

Figure 16. Representation of a Spatial Multi-Digit Number

Several particular cryptographic service routines in NSS and OpenSSL, such as finding
an inverse of an MDN with an extended Euclidian algorithm, require a sign flag (sign) for
each MDN, allowing the arithmetic operations to work properly. A single bit in F2 will be
adequate to indicate a plus or a minus sign of an MDN. Computations in NSS and
OpenSSL PEPMA use a complete MDN with their representation shown in Figure 16.
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Modulo Reduction

Methods for performing modulo reduction after multiplying two polynomials in
spatial domain can be carried on with standard integer division (Maeder, 1996). The
modulo reduction can also be carried on using NIST reduction method (Hankerson et al.,
2004, p. 44; NIST, 2010). One can also choose an optimized division similar to Knuth’s
division technique (Knuth, 1985). With the selection of Knuth's algorithm, division in
spatial domain becomes highly efficient in that the quotient and remainder converge to
correct values fast; this quick convergence is possible because the error can be reduced
quadratically on each iteration. Setting a modulo reduction method other than the NIST
recommended way might change the efficiency of PEPMA. In this research, optimization
of modulo reduction algorithm other than NIST's approach will not be considered.
Inversion

Both NSS and OpenSSL PEPMA calculate the inversion of a number in spatial
domain using an extended Euclidean algorithm (Hankerson, 2004, p. 39). Given a
number n, its multiplicative inverse i, and the modulus m, then the relationship of

i  n  1(mod m) holds true between them.
Since m divides the term (in – 1), m is also a divisor of (in – 1). The relationship between
i, n and m can be rewritten as (i  n )  1  bm , where b is any non-zero integer.
Rearranging the terms of the equation equivalently produces:
(i  n )  ( b  m )  1
Given n and m, the extended Euclidean algorithm discovers three unknowns i, c and g
corresponding to the equation in + cm = g. Thus, if g = 1, then i is the inverse of n.
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Although the extended Euclidean function can calculate cofactors i, c and gcd(i, m)
quicker than Lagrange’s exponential method, it still can be further optimized to provide
additional efficiency for larger multi-digit numbers.

Input:
Output:
Processing Unit:
Processing Cost:

n to inverse, modulo m
i, the multiplicative modulo inverse of n
Euclidean Algorithmic
O ([log2 ( m)]2 )

Prior Research in Evaluating PEPMA

A comprehensive review on Elliptic curve cryptography for embedded systems has
been provided (Afreen et al., 2011). This document graphically shows various methods of
scalar point-multiplication kp. Figure 5 in the document describes the separation of kp
into three levels of abstraction: (a) upper level for protocol such as ECDH, (b) middle
level for Elliptic-curve Point-multiplication (EPM), and (c) low level for core arithmetic
such as addition, subtraction, and multiplication. At the middle level, Afreen illustrated
two different implementation methods: a projective coordinate standard projective
algorithm and the Jacobian based approach. In its context, the standard projective
implementation refers to Elliptic-curve arithmetic operations with orientation to
projective geometry, while the Jacobian implementation refers to weighted Elliptic-curve
arithmetic operations in the entire range of Jacobian space. Note that the comparison
between NSS and OpenSSL of two EPMs in projective domain was limited to a specific
weighted Jacobian computing space (Z2 and Z3). Their paper was recently published in
the International Journal of Computer Science & Information Technology (IJCSIT) in
2011.
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In the Journal of Computer article published in January 2010, the performance of Elliptic
curves in projective coordinates with parallel computing in GF(p) was evaluated
(Somani, 2010). Somani noted that projective-coordinate systems are used to eliminate
the need for performing inversions. He found and recorded several projective-coordinate
systems that had been proposed before his time. He noted that similar research on
computation in projective-coordinate systems is recorded in Bernstein (2007). Somani
describes how a homogeneous coordinate can be viewed as an Elliptic curve point p that
takes the form (x, y) = (X/Z, Y/Z). For the Jacobian coordinate system, point P takes the
form (x, y) = (X/Z2, Y/Z3). Without presenting any concrete proof, Somani provided the
formula for point adding and point doubling in a projective-coordinate system.
Several critical articles for Elliptic-curve computations were collected (Cetin Kaya
Koc 2009). Chapter 8, “Elliptic and Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography,” written by
Nigel Boston and Matthew Darnall, also provides an introduction to the topic of elliptic
and hyperelliptic curves.
An article, published in the Arithmetic of Finite Fields of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, described several strategies to speed up the arithmetic of Pointmultiplication on Elliptic-curve using right-to-left and left-to-right methods (Joye, 2008).
Both NSS and OpenSSL PEPMA use a right-to-left algorithm. In the point addition of
section 2.2, Joye calculated the costs of adding two different Elliptic-curve points in the
weighted projective coordinate system to be 12 multiplications (12M) and 4 squarings
(4S).
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Explicit Formulation

Explicit formulation offers specific formulas for calculating point-doubling and
point-adding. Derivations and proofs for these formulas require mathematical intensive
and tedious efforts. However, accessing the context of explicit-formula might be helpful
for optimizing the point-doubling or point-adding function. For completeness, the
derivation of explicit formulas will be listed in the report (Brown et al., 2001).
Bernstein and Lange introduced their Explicit-Formulas Database (EFD). It is a
web-based collection of explicit formulas for elliptic-curve cryptology. Additionally, the
EFD website has posted several useful formulas for other coordinate systems, such as
Edward’s curves. Bernstein and Lange designed the transformation as Projective-3 and
posted its cost for computing to be 12M+ 2S. Compared to a standard method, adding
two points in a Projective-3 coordinate system totally eliminates the inversion and, at the
same time, increase multiplications from 1 to 12 and squarings from 1 to 2.
For doubling a point in a Projective-3 coordinate, Bernstein and Lange posted the
cost for computing to be 7M+ 3S. Compared to the standard method, doubling a point
eliminates the inversion altogether but also increases the number of multiplications from
1 to 7 and the number of squarings from 1 to 3.
From a collection of each cost from the algorithm 3.21 for point doubling of curve y2 = x3
−3x + b in Jacobian coordinates 5 , estimated costs can be accumulated as follows:
T 1  Z 12
T 2  A  3  ( X 1  Z 12 )  ( X 1  Z 12 )
Y3  B  2  Y1

5

1S
2M
1M

This algorithm 3.21 is available from Vanstone’s literature
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Y3  B  2  Y1
Z 3  B  Z1

1M
1M

Y3  C  B 2
T3  D  C  X 1

1S
1M

Y3  C 2

1S

Y3  A
T1  2  D
T1  ( D  X 3 )  A

1S
1M
1M

Y3  ( D  X 3 )  A  C 2 / 2

1M

2

The total cost turns out to be 9M+3S, which supports Bernstein and Lange’s record of
7M+ 3S.
To evaluate PEPMA coarsely, researchers calculated the arithmetic costs in
projective coordinates of a specific point-adding and point-doubling method and
summarized them up to a total expenditure of mathematical operations for the scalar
point-multiplication kp. In certain findings, total arithmetic expenditures to compute kp
were 3668M + 3668S (Cohen et al., 1998; Brown et al., 2001); in Bernstein's findings,

the total arithmetic expenditure was 2983M + 3275S (EFD_Double, 2001; EFD_Add,
2007). From these explicit expenditures, two metrics multiplications (M) and squarings
(S) were the main coefficients of the cost equation to measure the performance of ellipticcurve point-multiplication kP residing in projective domain.
Theoretically, Bernstein's approach should be slightly faster than Cohen/Brown's
method. However, in a 64-bit x86 run-time environment, timing costs do not correlate
well to either Cohen/Brown's or Bernstein's total expenditures. In other words, the
metrics M and S alone cannot provide truthful performance between two elliptic-curve
scalar multiplications. Coarse-performance metrics can be used to validate the
correctness of formulations.
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Cohen and Frey collected a variety of articles belonging to the computations and
optimizations of an Elliptic-curve (2006). One article written by Christophe Doche and
Tanja Lange describes the arithmetic of elliptic curves. In section 13.2 (Choice of the
coordinates), Doche and Tanja presented computations in an affine coordinate,
computations with projective coordinates, and computations using mixed coordinates.
This topic has been shown in (Cohen, 1998). The computation of EPM in a mixed
coordinate was a new suggestion at that time. Both NSS and OpenSSL can activate the
computation in non-mixed and mixed coordinates.
In 2004, Aigner, Bock, Hutter, and Wolkerstorfer from Infineon Technologies took
a different approach toward the application of the kp process for computing EPM (Aigner
et al., 2004). They applied EPM using an affine coordinate to a low-cost ECC
coprocessor for smartcards. This custom-made, hardware-based co-processor runs a
specific function to produce an Elliptic Curve Digital Signature (ECDSA) in a GF(2m)
field. Table 3 of their paper lists the performance for a 191-bit ECDSA algorithm. Table
3 is duplicated here for investigation (Aigner et al., 2004, p. 117). NIST has approved the
use of test vectors for Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm as specified in ANSI
X9.62 (ANSI, 2005) to informally verify the implementation.
Table 3. Performance of EPM in Hardware
Operation clock cycle
Scalar Multiplication
30% overhead
GF(p) inversion
5% overhead
Total

341,430
102,429
24,310
1,216
469,385
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In particular, Aigner et al. noted that having a fast GF(2m) inversion makes it possible to
use affine coordinates instead of projective coordinates for an elliptic-curve scalar point
operation. This fast inversion is shown in the table above with 24,310 out of 469,385
clock cycles. Their paper marked a milestone in showing the best approaches for
performing a kp function in hardware. Their findings reinforce Joye’s theory about using
mixed coordinates in computation to improve efficiency. NSS and Open SSL PEPMA
switched this feature on and off under the user’s command.
In 2000, the Microprocessor and Microcomputer Standards Committee of the IEEE
Computer Society approved an IEEE Standard Specification for Public-Key
Cryptography. This standard, (IEEE 1363, 2000), specifies common public-key
cryptographic techniques, including mathematical primitives for deriving private keys,
public-key encryption, digital signatures, and cryptographic schemes based on those
primitives. It also specifies related cryptographic parameters, public keys, and private
keys. The purpose of this standard is to provide a reference for a variety of calculating
techniques from which applications may select.
In section A.10.5, projective elliptic addition (prime case), IEEE 1363-2000 defines
the projective formulation for point adding on the curve y2 = x3 + ax + b modulo m. The
algorithm will consume ten field multiplications (10M) and five temporary variables.
In section A.10.4, page 124, projective elliptic doubling (prime case), (IEEE 1363, 2000)
defines the projective formulation for point doubling on the same curve. The algorithm
will consume sixteen field multiplications (16M) and seven temporary variables.
This IEEE 1363 marked a significant developmental point where the industry tried
to standardize common computations, including computations in affine and computations
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in projective coordinates. The findings can also direct better usage of temporary variables
in point-doubling and point-adding to improve performance evaluation.
Chapter Summary

The literature review of PEPMA in a 64-bit x86 environment has two important,
top-level contexts: (a) prior research on the structure of PEPMA and (b) existing methods
for comparison and verification. Prior research on the structure of PEPMA was presented
at the beginning of the literature review. This section seeks research pertaining to
principles, findings, analysis in IEEE standards for Key Performance Indicators, Ellipticcurve principles, the concept of computation in projective coordinates, and big-number
arithmetic representation. These four principles will answer which metrics can
objectively evaluate PEPMA's efficiency.
To answer which metrics can be used for comparison and to subsequently provide
ways to improve PEMA, this research will depend on kin topics: basic arithmetic service
routines and modulo reduction. The main purpose of this literature review section is to
ascertain whether the proposed metrics can truthfully evaluate PEPMA's efficiency and
whether there are effective ways to improve PEPMA’s efficiency based on the empirical
comparison.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Overview

Given a mixture of projective transformations, diversity of underlying arithmetic
algorithms, and different computing platform architectures, the goal of this research is to
provide suggestions to improve the projective Elliptic-curve point-multiplication agent.
The objective is accomplished by dynamically or statically selecting higher-performance
arithmetic approaches based on quantitative computational metrics. To fulfill the ultimate
goal and to answer the particular research question of which metrics can truthfully
evaluate PEPMA's efficiency, construction of a specific performance measurement
system for PEPMA is necessary. The path to successfully derive Key Performance
Indicators is illustrated in Figure 17. For a general discussion of Key Performance
Indicators, readers are referred to the standard ISO/IEC 15939 (2001).

Figure 17. PEPMA Performance Measurement System
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The PEPMA Performance Measurement System (PMS) can be briefly defined as a set of
accurate, precise and quantifiable metrics applied to cost equations. The accuracy and
precision of these metrics are derived from an analysis of the accurate and precise
counting of the measurement units (MULq, MOVq etc.) Thus, the development of PMS
will start at the bottom, defining the measurement units, and ladder up toward KPI
through the maturity path. A general definition of PMS pertaining to the measurement
and rating of performance of computer-based software systems can be found in (IEC14756, 1999).
To date, there have not been significant standards available for developing the
performance of Elliptic-curve point-multiplication in a projective domain. Accordingly,
the construction of PMS will have to level on tailored models as described in software
engineering (Herrmann, 2007; Fenton, 1996) and other comparable publications (Keyes,
2005). There have been three other comparable publications in the field of security and
privacy metrics that can be applied to the construction of PMS: NIST SP 800-55 (NIST,
2008), and NIST SP 800-80 (NIST, 2003). In 2003, the National Institute of Standards
and Technology released a Special Publication 800-80 titled “Guide for Developing
Performance Metrics for Information Security.” These publications in the field of security
and privacy metrics can be applied to the construction of PMS as well.
The research on the construction of a performance measurement system for PEPMA
is quantitative and primary 6 . Following suggestions from Pare (2004) and Gillman
(2003), this research used an empirical case study with the following components: (a) the

6

Measurement primacy definition: The majority of measurement data for evaluation and
comparison will come directly from actual software coding and the run-time environment
of PEPMA but not from a secondary data source.
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three research questions presented previously, (b) six units of analyses, (c) a specific
procedure of performance measurement system to obtain evidence, and (d), a method to
verify the results.
For the Performance Measurement System (PMS) to be accurate and precise, a
mathematical assessment in the projective domain is necessary. PMS’s context will
contain an interdependent group of leading metrics forming a unified whole, the KPI.
Leading metrics will be obtained at three specific levels of evaluation: (a) exponentiation
service, (b) point-doubling and point-adding functions, and (c) supporting mathematical
software routines for point-doubling and point-adding functions.
To answer all three research questions and be able to verify the empirical results, the
author proposes applying IEEE standards 982.1-1988 and 982.1-2005 to evaluate and
construct the Key Performance Indicators, while tailoring the efficiency measurements
based on academic research and industry practices.
In addition to standards IEEE 982.1 (1988) and 982.1-2005, ISO/IEC 15939 (2001)
and ISBSG (2007) standards also provide direction for successfully implementing a
measurement program. Although these standards do not directly provide a method of
measurement, they provide guidance to identify, define, and improve processes to obtain
metrics. By these international standards, the core measurement of PEPMA's
performance can be facilitated by monolithic software measurement tools taking a set of
measurements as input and producing metrics, formulas, and Key Performance Indicators
(KPI) together with evaluation and analysis.
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Unit of Analysis

There were six units of analyses involved in conducting research. They are listed in
Table 4 below. Readers are referred to IEEE 982.1 (1988), Herrmann (2007), Laird et al.,
(2006), and Keyes (2005) for discussions of these first five units of analyses.
Table 4. Unit of Analysis
Unit of Analysis
Formula
Compliance Metric
CM
Static Complexity
SCM
Weighted Information Flow Complexity
WIFC
Module Maturity Index
MMI
Functional Metric
FM
Efficiency Metric and
EMF
Formulation

Reference/Comment
FIPS-140-2

Has the most weighting
toward KPI

The Efficiency Metric and Formulation (EMF) is the most important and difficult task in
this research. The EMF has the highest weighting for KPI since the research topic focuses
on computation efficiency. The major variables for each unit of analysis are summarized
in Table 5 below.

Unit of Analysis
NSS PEPMA
OpenSSL PEPMA
Infinity Point
Run-time Factor

Table 5. Unit of Analysis, EMF
Major Variable
Comment
APT, EF, PD, PA, PAT
APT, EF, PD, PA, PAT

Performance Hardware Instruction Counter
Counter
Program Profiling
Instruction Soft Counter
Formulation Analysis

Includes System Architecture,
Compilation Environment,
Test Vectors
Will call PAPI Services
Will load BOCHS Emulator
Manual analysis steps

Note: APT, EF, PD, PA, PAT respectively stands for Affine to Projective
Transformation, Exponentiation Function, Point Doubling, Point Adding, and Projective
to Affine Transformation
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The empirical evaluation method was used to provide a framework for research in the
area of efficiency metrics and formulations. The first two units of analyses shown in
Table 5 embrace two specific implementations used for the empirical study: NSS
PEPMA and OpenSSL PEPMA. These two open-source implementations provided
necessary procedures to execute: (a) projective transformation, (b) the exponentiation
function, (c) point-doubling and point-adding computations in Jacobian's transformed
domain, (d) modulo arithmetic (including 521-bit NIST modulo reduction), and (e)
localized mathematical procedures. Thus, a large portion of the analysis was focused on
these five sub-units (a-e) with specially chosen test vectors. Readers are referred to
Appendix F for a listing of test vectors.
In addition, the definition of an infinity point will formalize how point-doubling and
point-adding function can handle infinity coordinates in projective geometry.
The unit of analysis belonging to a runtime environment will identify the system
architecture. Analysis of this particular unit was directed toward internal characteristics
of the target CPU and its arithmetic unit. The results of the CPU characteristics partially
contributed to runtime factors in the performance equation.
NSS PEPMA and OpenSSL PEPMA were written in C language; hence, the
compilation environment and C compiler option settings will introduce some variations
in the resulting code. The performance equations should record these characteristics as
one of their performance coefficients so that the final result can be more defined.
OS overhead, threading time, and delay due to processor interrupt services are run-time
factors. They might affect the cost index produced from the Performance Hardware
Counter or Program Profiling process. These run-time factors are categorized as Quality
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of Service (QoS) for the verification procedure under the targeted Operating System. For
that reason, the evaluation used a low-overhead, 64-bit x86 Community Enterprise Linux
Operating System, version 6.4 (CentOS) for performance analysis. This specific OS is
stable; and the low-overhead helps decrease the error induced by the Performance
Hardware Counter. However, since these QoS run-time factors are a complex subject,
they were excluded from the report.
The Performance Hardware Counter and Program Profiling through Emulation will
assist and provide verification for the results during the development of efficiency
formulations. Mainly, the outcomes from Performance Hardware Counter and program
profiling data will contribute to part of the verification process. For a more detailed
description of Performance Hardware Counter or Program Profiling through Emulation,
readers are referred to open-source PAPI (2013) or BOCHS (2013).
Compliance Metric

The Compliance Metric (CM) of PEPMA measures the compliance with FIPS-1402 (FIPS-140-2, 2001; Herrmann, 2007, p. 91).
Static Complexity Metric

The Static Complexity Metric (SCM) measures the complexity of NSS or OpenSSL
PEPMA’s software modules (IEEE 982.1, 1988, p. 23; IEEE 982.2, 1988, p. 60).
SCM  E  N  1
SCM  RG

where
E = number of edges
N = number of nodes
RG = number of software modules bounded by edges with no edges crossing
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Weighted Information Flow Complexity

The Weighted Information Flow Complexity (WIFC) measures inter-module
complexity. The local direct flow exists if either PEPMA module invokes a second
module and passes information to it, or the invoked PEPMA module returns a result to
the caller (Herrmann, 2007, p. 121; IEEE 982.2, 1988, p. 74).
WIFC  ( fanin  fanout ) 2  length
where:
fanin = Local flows into module + number of data structures from which the module
receives data
fanin = Local flows out of module + number of data structures that the module outputs
length = Number of source statement in the module
Module Maturity Index

The Module Maturity Index (MMI) measures the effect of changes from one
software module baseline to the next. The effect of these changes will solely be directed
toward the efficiency of PEPMA. The MMI will be derived with different compiler
optimizing option settings based upon a general discussion in (Herrmann, 2007, p. 121),
as originated in particular standards (IEEE 982.1, 1988, p. 19; IEEE 982.2, 1988, p. 51),
or as described in other standards (IEEE 982.1, 2005, p. 26).
MMI 

(M T  FC )
MT

MT = Number of modules in current baseline
FC = Current baseline that includes changes from previous baseline
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Functionality Metric

The Functionality Metric (FM) measures the consistency and interoperability
between available point-doubling and point-adding functions. As noted, there are several
different approaches currently available to construct point-doubling and point-adding
functions in a projective domain. General discussions of this metric are found in (IEEE
982.2, 1988, pp. 70-71).
Efficiency Metric and Formulation

Efficiency measurement and formulation will be one of most significant aspects
beside other Key Performance Indicators as presented previously. The efficiency will be
measured with respect to its main objective, which is a minimization of computing costs
to reduce the number of CPU instructions. To date, there have not been significant
standards available for evaluating the efficiency of PEPMA; general discussions on a
comparable topic are suggested in some IEEE sources (IEEE 982.1, 1988, pp. 33-34;
IEEE 982.2, 1988, pp. 33-34, 91-93). Related information to address techniques used in
Efficiency Metric and Formulation is also scattered in Keyes's literature (Keyes et al.,
2005) and many other research papers presented in the literature review sections.
Additionally, because there is not an absolute reference that PEPMA's efficiency
measurement can be based on, the reference for measuring PEPMA's efficiency will be
relative ─ meaning in between efficiencies of NSS and OpenSSL. Essentially, the
Efficiency Metric and Formulation (EMF) will be derived from analysis of computing
procedures and counting the execution of units of measurement while applying specific
test vectors. The sections below further define the sub-units of analysis for obtaining
EMF.

75
NSS PEPMA
Exponentiation Function:

In a 2013 open-source release, Network Security Services (NSS, 2013) applied a 4bit window on the scalar k in PEPMA's exponentiation service. This service is shown as a
computation loop

in Figure 18 below.

Figure 18. 4-bit Windowing Exponentiation Service

The NSS PEPMA computation makes 524 calls to the point-doubling and 131 calls to the
point-adding function (NSS-2, 2014). Readers are referred to Appendix G for examining
an exact number of calls. The 4-bit exponentiation windowing requires a pre-computing
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of 15 Elliptic-curve points (pre = before entering exponentiation loop

). The 15-point

pre-computation calls point-doubling or point-adding services to calculate k(x, y) using k
= 2 to 15, and the coordinates (x, y) are the base coordinates of the cyclic subgroup of the
chosen Elliptic curve. When k = 1, the pre-comp coordinates are actually the base point
itself; thus, it requires no computation, just storing the coordinates in the table.
During the exponentiation computation in loop

, k slides from right to left (bottom

to top as shown) and 4 bits are extracted for indexing into the PRE-COMP table. The
PRE-COMP value p(x, y) will be used for point-adding if the index is non-zero (1...15);
otherwise, a zero-value table index will signify a "No-Add" condition. The 15-point, precomputing function makes service calls to 1 point doubling and 13 point-adding functions
to completely fill the 15-point recomputed table.

Figure 19. 4-bit Pre-comp Indexing Method
The mixed coordinate control signal directs the results from the 15-point pre-computing
function to output the coordinates of type hybrid (mixed coordinates between affine and
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projective coordinates). Building the pre-computed table is done outside the computation
loop. The point-adding function then uses the 4-bit window taken from k to index into the
table without the need to call point-adding four times. This reduces calling the pointadding function by 4:1 (131 × 4 = 524).
Point-doubling:

Inside the 4-bit windowing exponentiation service, NSS implemented a software
function point-doubling R(X3, Y3, Z3) = 2×P(X, Y, Z) using weighted projective
transformation (WPT) as described by (Cohen et al., 1998). In this document, the affine
coordinate variable x is substituted with X/Z2, and the affine coordinate variable y is
substituted with Y/Z3. These substitutions yield formulas for the point-doubling
coordinates (X3, Y3, Z3) as follows:
Let S = 4XY2, M = 3X2 −3Z4, T = M2 − 2S
X3 = T
Y3 = −8Y4 + M ( S − T )
Z3 = 2YZ

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Based on a source-code written in C language and publicly released in 2013, any
computing platform executing NSS point-doubling codes requires 4M+4S+5A+4Su+1Sh
operations, where the arithmetic operators are designated as M=multiplying, S=squaring,
A=addition, Su=subtraction, and Sh=Shift. Although the modular reduction routine
calling is hidden from computing codes, it is actually called from inside at the end of
each arithmetic operator (NSS, 2013). The computing cost index of Cohen yields 4M+6S,
as compared to 4M+4S+5A+4Su+1Sh from NSS.
Point-adding:

Network Security Services (NSS) implemented a software function point-adding of
point P1 and P2 using weighted projective transformation described by (Brown et al.,
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2001). In their paper titled "Software Implementation of the NIST Elliptic Curves over
Prime Fields," coordinate variable x is substituted with X/Z2, and coordinate variable y is
substituted with Y/Z3, with the result R being R(X3, Y3, Z3) = P1(X1, Y1, Z1) +P2(X2, Y2,
Z2).
These substitutions yield the formulas as follows:
Let A = X2Z12, B = Y2Z13, C = A − X1, D = B − Y1
X3 = D2 − ( C3 + 2X1 C2 )
Y3 = D ( X1C2 − X3 )
Z3 = Z1C

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Brown at al. (2001) recorded the arithmetic expenditure equal to 12M + 4S and excluded
other arithmetic operations such as additions, subtractions and multiplications with
constants. NSS actually executes a total of 8M+3S+2A+5Su.
Based on the explicit formulas above, NSS developers certified coding under FIPS
140-2 level 1 and released the point-adding function with C codes.
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OpenSSL PEPMA
Exponentiation Function:

In a 2013 open-source release, OpenSSL applied a 5-bit window on the scalar k in
PEPMA's exponentiation service shown as a computation loop

in Figure 20 below.

Figure 20. 5-bit Windowing Exponentiation Service

OpenSSL PEPMA makes 520 calls to the point-doubling and 104 calls to the pointadding function (OpenSSL-2, 2014). Readers are referred to Appendix H for examining
an exact number of calls. The 5-bit windowing requires a pre-computing of 31 points
using k = 1 to 31 and the base coordinates taken from the cyclic subgroup of the chosen
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Elliptic curve. The 31-point pre-computing function makes service calls to 1 point
doubling and 29 point-adding functions to fill the 31-point, pre-computed table. The
point-adding function then uses the 5-bit window taken from k to index the table without
the need to execute point-adding five times. This reduces calling the point-adding
function by 5:1 (104 × 5 = 520).
Point-doubling:

Inside the 5-bit windowing exponentiation service, OpenSSL PEPMA implemented
a software function point-doubling R(X3, Y3, Z3) = 2×P(X, Y, Z) using weighted
projective transformation as described by (Brown et al., 2001). In this document, the
affine coordinate variable x is substituted with X/Z2, and the affine coordinate variable y
is substituted with Y/Z3. These substitutions yield the formulas for the point-doubling
coordinates (X3, Y3, Z3) as follows:
Let A = 4X1Y12, B = 8Y14, C = 3(X1 − Z12)( X1 + Z12), D = C2 − 2A
X3 = D
Y3 = C(A − D) − B
Z3 = 2Y1Z1

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Based on a source-code written in C language and publicly released in 2013, any
computing platform executing OpenSSL codes will consume 3M+5S+3A+4Su
operations, where the arithmetic operators are designated as M=multiplying, S=squaring,
A=addition, Su=subtraction. Although calling to the modular reduction routine is hidden
from computing codes, it is actually called from inside at the end of each arithmetic
operator. The computing cost index of Brown et al yields 8M+3S, as compared to
3M+5S+3A+4Su from OpenSSL.
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Point-adding:

OpenSSL implemented a software function point-adding of point P1 and P2 using
weighted projective transformation as described by one paper (Brown et al., 2001). In the
paper, coordinate variable x is substituted with X/Z2, and coordinate variable y is
substituted with Y/Z3, with the result R being R(X3, Y3, Z3) = P1(X1, Y1, Z1) +P2(X2, Y2,
Z2).
These substitutions yield the formulas as follows:
Let A = X2Z12, B = Y2Z13, C = A − X1, D = B − Y1
X3 = D2 − ( C3 + 2X1 C2 )
Y3 = D ( X1C2 − X3 )
Z3 = Z1C

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Brown at al. (2001) recorded the arithmetic expenditure equal to 12M + 4S and excluded
other arithmetic operations such as addition, subtraction, and multiplication with
constants. NSS actually executes a total of 8M+3S+2A+5Su.
Based on the formulas above, OpenSSL developers certified coding under FIPS
140-2 level 1 and released the point-adding function with C-language source codes.
Point at Infinity

Based on point computation in the projective domain, there will be no use of the
projective coordinates at (X = 0, Y = 0, Z = 0). These particular projective coordinates
will be used as variable labels for a specific point at infinity. During mathematical
processing, this zero-vector will be detected and subsequently called for a software
handler to take care of the point at infinity.
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Performance Hardware Counter

The purpose of using the Performance Hardware Counter is to approximate PEPMA
machine instruction counts. This metric is available by calling the Performance
Application Programming Interface, PAPI. Both PEMA and PAPI will run under host OS
in real-time; thus, there will be synchronization issues and activation of filtering to
address multiple accesses into the Performance Hardware Counter.
Program Profiling and Emulation

The purpose of using Program Profiling and Emulation is to obtain precise and
accurate PEPMA counts of executing machine-codes. This metric is made available by
activation of the BOCHS hardware emulator (BOCHS, 2013). In turn, BOCHS will
supply a virtual-machine runtime environment to PEPMA. In this virtual-machine setup,
the Operating System CentOS 6.4 is the host OS that provides a virtual environment to
the guest OS, which is also a Centos 6.x OS. PEPMA runs under the Guest OS. The
diagram in Figure 21 shows a structure of Program Profiling and Emulation in relation to
other OSes, a Synchronization Agent, Software Counters, and PEPMA itself.

Figure 21. BOCHS Hardware Emulation
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The Synchronization Agent filters the commands to BOCHS to adjust for access into
each machine-code emulation. When the code in PEPMA's executable file accesses the
emulated machine-code, the precise and accurate number of accesses will be recorded in
Software Counters. An example of the emulation workflow is shown below:

Figure 22. Accurate Efficiency Evaluation of PEPMA
The virtual machine

loads the entire Guest Operating System

without any

modification to the Guest OS executable binary image. The Guest OS then loads and
executes PEPMA code
Inside PEPMA code
MOVq

without modification to the PEPMA executable binary image.
, the executable CPU instructions – for example, MULq

– will call the procedure "proc MULq"

or "proc MOVq"

at the hardware

emulator. These two procedures will emulate the CPU instruction MULq
. In turn, procedures

and

will call the hardware CPU

code emulation. However, the other processes

and

from the hardware emulator to emulate MULq

or MOVq

or

or MOVq

to fulfill the machine-

can also call "proc MOVq"
. Because the emulated

CPU instructions can be called from multiple processes, emulation of PEPMA codes
must synchronize with the hardware emulator via the communication path

to obtain

consistent and correct counting of the execution of machine-codes from PEPMA.
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Run-time Factors
System Architecture:

Associated environments of PEPMA are factors that could potentially change the
efficiency indexes of PEPMA in run-time. Thus, without accounting for these factors, the
comparison between two PEPMAs might not be accurate. One influential environmental
factor is the use of digit representation. As presented in the literature review chapter, a
digit contained in a complete big number is usually referred to as a limb – a computation
unit composed of several bits that should fit into a chosen system architecture. Otherwise,
computational efficiency might suffer.
Operating System overhead, pipe-line queuing, memory cache, threading lost time
due to other processes, and system interrupts overhead are factors that affect the run-time
environments of PEPMA. These run-time environments exist but will not be considered
in this research. Background of these factors can be found in computer architecture and
quantitative experimental analyses from these references (Hennessy, 2006; Szerwinski,
2008).
Compiling Environment:

Other influential environmental factors are compiling options. Today, NSS,
OpenSSL, and other open sources are mostly written in high-level languages. Given the
different compiler option settings, the compilation of high-level languages will end up
with different run-time machine codes.
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Domain Parameters:

Vector contents coming from the domain parameter are expected to contribute to the
performance evaluation of PEPMA as well. Domain parameters from the Client or Server
side are of the same tuple (p, a, b, G, n, h), where the product n×G(x, y) using the EPM
method must equal to infinity point O of the Elliptic curve. The domain parameter n is
the order of the subgroup, and h is the cofactor equal to the size of the cyclic subgroup
divided by n. The descriptions of these parameters are found in (FIPS PUB 186-4, 2013,
p. 16).
Test Vectors:

A global third-party laboratory, which is accredited as Cryptographic and Security
Testing (CST), can provide validation testing for FIPS approved and NIST recommended
cryptographic algorithms and components of algorithms. A description of the validation
program for cryptographic algorithms (CAVP) can be found at the NIST website (CAVP,
2013). Within the body of CAVP, NIST has approved the use of test vectors for Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) as specified in ANSI X9.62 (ANSI, 2005)
to informally verify implementation. To keep efficiency measurement consistent across
the verification platform, NIST-recommended test vectors for ECDSA which will be
applied toward the comparison between NSS and OpenSSL PEPMA.
Another recommendation for the test vector is posted in NIST Special Publication
800-56A (NIST 800-56A, 2013). The older version test vectors for ECDH are also
available from Certicom Research (Certicom, 1999), also known as Standards for
Efficient Cryptography organization (SEC). These test vectors will also be applied in the
comparison between NSS and OpenSSL PEPMA to explore the inconsistency between
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measurements of efficiency due to the application of different test vectors. Readers are
referred to Appendix F for NIST recommended test vectors.
Rigorous evidence of characteristics of the test vector may be found in Ellipticcurve and projective transformation literature (NIST, 2010; Certicom Research, 2009;
Blake, 2001; Menezes et. al., 1996; Cohn, 1962) and Finite-Field Projective Geometry
(Rosen, 2006). Following suggestions from these papers, other possible test vector
contents can be calculated from the order of the curve n, modulus m, and infinity point O.
Readers are referred to Appendix D for the value of modulus m and the order n of cyclic
subfield.
Efficiency Formulation Analysis

From a top-level formulation analysis, our adopted 12-step, closed-loop concept to
generate formulations of new metrics and to verify formulas is shown in Figure 23 below.
The overall technical approach included analysis, collected costs, and formulated the
efficiency of these necessary procedures based on the actual number of machine-code
instructions in a 64-bit x86 run-time environment. Subsequently, the formulation analysis
did allow the development of quantifiable key performance indicators, which provided
the benchmark in supporting realistic performance figures for PEPMA.

Figure 23. Formulation Analysis Block Diagram
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The System Architecture

and Compilation Environment

sources – NSS and OpenSSL PEPMAs

, along with two open-

– will generate a 64-bit x86 Machine Code

Dependencies such as algorithms, looping, runtime factors, etc. from
feeds Analysis and Formulation

,

.

and

to generate efficiency formulas. The analysis, design,

development, and test of efficiency formulas occur in block

.

from Analysis and Formulation will feed PHC, the Performance-

Outcomes

and PPE, Program Profiling through Emulation

Hardware Counter

for comparison.

Feedback paths

and

will adjust and verify formulations in the Analysis and

Formulation block

, which is the focus of this study. The work-flow approach for the

analysis and formulation of block

will mostly be based on a deductive-reasoning

model. An example of the work-flow for formulations of NSS PEPMA is shown in
Figure 24 below:

Figure 24. An Example of Performance Formulation
From the top-level, we derive two PEPMA formulas: one in theory (Cohen et al., 2006;
Brown et al., 2001) and one with actual implementation (NSS, 2013). If the arithmetic
operators are designated as M=multiplying, S=squaring, A=addition, Su=subtraction,
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Sh=Shift bit, then the performance formulation of NSS PEPMA might have five new
metrics: A, Su, Sh, k4, k5, etc. Therefore, the formula might be:
f  k 4 (4M  4S  5A  4Su  1Sh)  k 5 (8M  3S  2A  5Su )
From the formula above, the equations for M, S, A, Su, Sh, k4, k5 in terms of algorithms,
methods, looping, modulo reduction, test vectors, runtime factors, etc. can be derived.
The equation M and its coefficients might have a form:
M  f (method, looping, modulus, testVectors, RTF)  B
From the metrology requirement B, formulas G in terms of how many 64-bit x86
machine codes are required to accomplish function M can be derived. At the bottomlevel, performance functions G, H, J, K and L will have the formulations in terms of
machine-code instructions, such as MULq or MOVq, as units of measurement.
Complications will arise at the Arithmetic Layer, the 64-bit-x86-Machine-Code
Layer, and the Measurement Unit Layer. The Performance Hardware Counter
Program Profiling through Emulation

and

instruments will help fine-tune and verify the

formulations at these layers.
Point
outcomes

in Figure 23 indicates an exit path for this technical approach, where the
will

delineate

final

descriptions,

comprehensive

analysis,

numeric

presentations, and computing cost formulations for this study.
Individual performance comparisons of computing procedures (f hat, f, A, B, C,
D...L etc.) will help software developers choose better projective computation and
superior underlying mathematical service routines for the implementation of PEPMA.
Subsequently, combining these quantifiable metrics into a single key performance
indicator will offer ways to finally improve projective scalar point-multiplication
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technology. The results will offer users the ability to dynamically or statically select the
most efficient PEPMA.
Method for Verification

Program Profiling through Emulation (PPE) and its internal Software Counters,
along with Performance Hardware Counters (PHC), was used to verify the efficiency
formulas. Readers are referred to (BOCHS, 2013; Code XL, 2013) for a description of
PPE, and to (Intel PERC, 2013; PAPI, 2013; Levinthal, 2009; Drongowski, 2008) for a
description of PHC. A flowchart of the verification method is shown in Figure 25.

Figure 25. Efficiency Verification Block Diagram
Projected Outcome

The projected outcome will be the verification of the efficiency formulations with
the prescribed method. Due to limited development resources, this research will not
provide a verification method for the other five performance indicators: CM, SCM,
WIFC, MMI, FM. Readers can reference industry practices for detailed descriptions of
these five KPIs. Industry practice recommendations can be found at these cited sources
(Herrmann, 2007; Hennessy, 2006).
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Proposition of Format for Presenting the Results

The Performance Measurement System (PMS) used in this research will produce an
interdependent group of leading performance indexes forming intermediate and final
performance indicators. Table 6 shows an example of the final result.

KPI

CM
SCM
WIFC
MMI
FM
EMF
Total

Table 6. KPI between NSS and OpenSSL PEPMA
Max
OpenSSL
NSS
Weight
Value
Score
Score
%
(Target
(Unit
Value)
Under
Test)
2
2
3
5
3
100
85
90
80
90
100

Subtotal

2
2
5
10
5
72
95

The proposed PMS will obtain six Key Performance Indicators (KPI) and post them in a
table along with their weighting factor. The EMF's score for NSS PEPMA, the Unit
Under Test, for example, will be 90. Since the weight of this EMF KPI is 80% of the
KPIs, then NSS PEPMA scores 72, as shown in the subtotal column. Presumably, after
summing all KPIs in the column subtotal, NSS is given a score of 95, which is higher
than the OpenSSL target value of 90. This implies that NSS PEPMA is a better Projective
Elliptic-curve Point Multiplication Agent. Revisiting the EMF formulas will offer
insights to improve PEPMA's computing efficiency.
As shown in Table 6, formulations for the top five KPIs – CM, SCM, WIFC, MMI, FM –
are described in the previous sections. The formulas for efficiency will likely have the
following structures:
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EMF1  k a (k1MULq  k 2 MOVq)  k b (k 3MULq  k 4 MOVq)  RTF1  ...
EMF2  k c (k 5MULq  k 6 MOVq)  k d (k 7 MULq  k 8 MOVq)  RTF2  ...
EMFK  ...
K

EMFNSS   EMFN
N 1

Labels MULq or MOVq are the anticipated units of measurement. Each element of the
equation is the efficiency (or cost) of the mathematical module servicing PEPMA. Each
EMF value will be normalized.
Values in Table 6 can be applied toward a Combined Key Performance Indicator. Its
formula is defined as follows.
Combined Key Performance Indicator

The Combined Key Performance Indicator (CKPI) is defined as follows (Herrmann,
2007, pp. 123-124):
6

CKPI   KPIi
i 1

KPI1 = 0 if accuracy goals are not met
KPI1 = 1 if accuracy goals are met
KPI1 = 2 if accuracy goals are exceeded
KPI2 = 0 if precision goals are not met
KPI2 = 1 if precision goals are met
KPI2 = 2 if precision goals are exceeded
KPI3 = 0 if response-time goals are not met
KPI3 = 1 if response-time goals are met
KPI3 = 2 if response-time goals are exceeded
KPI4 = 0 if memory-utilization goals are not met
KPI4 = 1 if memory-utilization goals are met
KPI4 = 2 if memory-utilization goals are exceeded
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KPI5 = 0 if storage goals are not met
KPI5 = 1 if storage goals are met
KPI5 = 2 if storage goals are exceeded
KPI6 = 0 if storage goals are not met
KPI6 = 1 if storage goals are met
KPI6 = 2 if storage goals are exceeded
KPI7 = 0 if transaction processing rates are not met
KPI7 = 1 if transaction processing rates are met
KPI7 = 2 if transaction processing rates are exceeded
Resource Requirements

NSS and OpenSSL implementations of PEPMA will run under a 64-bit Linux based
Operating System. Particularly, the 64-bit OS will be the Community ENTerprise
Operating System version 6.4 (CENTOS). The GCC version 4.4.7.3 compiler from
Redhat Linux will be used for the compilation of NSS and OpenSSL PEPMA C codes to
x86 assembly language, and then onto 64-bit x86 machine-code instructions.
Timeline

The following was the proposed time line toward the completion of this study:

Figure 26. Timeline
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Chapter Summary

The construction of a precision Performance Measurement System for PEPMA will
be required to accurately evaluate the efficiency of PEPMA and provide a formal
approach to improve the performance of the system measured. The beginning of the
approach is a proposal for obtaining leading performance indexes that can be constructed
at three specific levels of evaluation: (a) exponentiation service, (b) point-doubling and
point-adding functions, and (c) supporting mathematical software routines for pointdoubling and point-adding functions. These three assessment levels, six units of analyses,
a specific comparative method with BOCHS and PAPI for the verification of results, and
the manual formulation analysis will all help reach the final goal while IEEE standards
will help to construct Key Performance Indicators.
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Chapter 4
Results
Introduction

This chapter reports the findings, the associated formulas (if any), and presents data
analysis of such findings. The findings consisted of outcomes, which were discovered
during close examination of six units of analyses directed toward the performance
comparison between NSS and OpenSSL PEPMA in 64-bit x86 runtime environment. The
units of analyses are listed in Table 7 below.
Table 7. Finding of Six Units of Analyses
Unit of Analysis
Efficiency Metric and Formulation
Compliance Metric
Weighted Information Flow Complexity
Cyclomatic Complexity Metric
Functional Metric
Module Maturity Index

Formula
EMF
CM
WIFC
CCM
FM
MMI

The data analysis section in this chapter provides information to familiarize the
reader with the basis of the finding. The chapter concludes with a summary of all findings
and data analyses, preparing the readers for the final chapter.
The ultimate goal of this research with two FIPS-140-2 certified studying cases was
to develop a repeatable and deterministic evaluation approach of the performance of
PEPMA. The study provides a detailed framework for the evaluators to construct a better
evaluation method. Thus, the final contribution to the field of cryptography is the formal
evaluation method that can lead to the performance improvement of PEPMA. Other
benefits related to industrial applications in the field will not be discussed in this chapter.
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They will be discussed in the closing conclusion, implication, recommendation and
summary of the final chapter.
Systematic Software Reviews and Selection of Unit of Analysis

The software reviews in this study adhered to the code walk-through and software
inspection formal process as recommended in IEEE 1028 (2008). The purpose of the
review is to determine and put together the performance improvements through the
findings and data analysis. IEEE-1028 covered code walk-through along with software
inspections first appeared in 1988 and then 1997 (IEEE 1028, 1997). This standard
suggested six reviewing areas of software products and provided ways to identify
anomalies, including errors and deviations from standards and specifications. However, it
is important to note that this research does not intend to identify and correct the
implementation errors; multiple comprehensive reviews across six areas have been
accomplished at the product design phase and/or at an accredited FIPS certification site.
Leveraging the same walk-through and code inspection procedures recommended in
IEEE standards, this study aims to provide ways for code improvements through findings
and data analysis as shown in Figure 27.

Figure 27. Types of Software Review Used in the Research
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The shaded areas in Figure 27 show an entry and exit path to obtain potential code
improvement portions which the formal code walk-though or inspection procedure
possibly might have missed or was not intended to correct.
While Fagan developed a formal software inspection process at IBM in the mid
1970s focusing on finding software defects, his work also resulted in a schematic of
defect classification and distribution (Fagan, 1976). However, the detail of the
classification was not clearly presented at that time. Later, Fagan's inspection methods
were thoroughly discussed in software inspection by Gilb & Graham (1993), which
focused on defect identification. According to Runeson et al (2006) or Jones (2010),
defects can be classified in many different ways. First, a defect can be cataloged as either
an omission (something is missing) or a commission (something is incorrect). Second, a
defect may be defined based on technical contents as to whether the product meets or
does not meet a specific requirement (i.e., efficiency or FIPS compliance). Third, defects
may be categorized by the impact to the user as the result of technical capability running
on a specific computing platform. During software review of PEPMA coding, this
research seeks for the omission and presents it in the key performance indicators and
improvements. The standard IEEE code walk-though and software inspection process
were used to collect quantitative data at defined points on prior works in this area.
Although code walk-through and code inspection are two related software review
methodologies, the latter is more formal than the first. Both walk-through and inspection
focus on finding errors in the product but not correcting them. Code walk-through often
requires less expertise in the subject domain while inspection might require
professionally trained inspectors.
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The software inspections remove roughly 85% of the total errors as Fagan reported in his
studying cases. It has been shown no other techniques, walk-through, or testing using
automatic checking tools identify errors better than the manual code inspection. Jones
suggested that manual code inspection could potentially remove 70% of the total errors as
he observed the outcomes in industrial projects (Jones, 2010, p. 574). It has been
advocated in (Source-Selection, 2011) that the end users in the field might experience the
remaining defects through the so called "degradation of performance." These user
experiences pertain to the remaining 15% to 30% of anomalies not found by code walkthough or code inspections. The shaded area in Figure 27 shows an opportunity for
improving efficiency that the code walk-though process or software inspection procedure
at the product design phase, or at an accredited FIPS certification site, possibly missed or
did not intend to correct.
The discussion above offers some hints that the code walk-through could help to
promote the improvement of the product, as seen by a person with less expertise;
meanwhile, code inspection could improve the product, according to the checklist of
items to be examined. For example, if PEPMA code is to be manually inspected, the
inspection checklist can include such items listed as six units of analyses pointing to the
efficiency, standards compliance, or coding information flow complexity. For a general
discussion of why these key performance indicators were selected, readers are referred to
recommendations in the standard ISO/IEC 15939 (2001). To answer three research
questions and be able to verify the empirical results, we suggested applying IEEE
standards 982.1-1988 and 982.1-2005 to evaluate and construct six units of analyses
while tailoring the efficiency measurements based on machine virtualization technology.
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Limitation

Since the goal of this study was to develop a more rigorous understanding of a
formal performance evaluation approach, the reader should bear in mind that all findings
in this report are subject to several limitations. First, the findings presented here are only
a representation of the essential outcome, which should provide meaningful evaluation
results. As an example, Table 8 (below) lists eleven findings to provide adequate results
for the evaluation of Cyclomatic Complexity Metric; however, one finding of the submodule is needed to represent the idea adequately.
Table 8. Finding Limitation
Unit Under Test Sub-Module Low-Level Routine
Cyclomatic
APT, EF, PD, Adding, Subtraction, Modulo Reduction
Complexity
PA, PAT
Squaring, Multiplication, Inversion
Metric
Second, findings of other units of analyses have been purposely excluded due to the
limited scope of this research. Third, the limitations mentioned above are also applicable
to the construct of formulations and data analysis. Fourth, only Efficiency Metric and
Formulation contains verification methodology while the other five units do not. Fifth,
the current research was not specifically designed to evaluate the importance factors of
each Key Performance Indicator.
Because of these limitations, the comparison results should be interpreted
cautiously; further investigation and report of the unlisted findings might be necessary to
achieve a realistic goal. Furthermore, the emphasis of this research was to uncover
whether the performance of PEPMA might be unknown based on existing theoretical
work, and what metrics should be used to candidly evaluate PEPMA's efficiency.
However, the findings and analyses of low-level mathematic routines are beyond the
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scope of this results chapter. They are presented here for completeness; although, the
findings and analyses of such low-level mathematic routines do offer more accuracy to
the final product.
While the literature review and the methodology section provided some evidence to
answer these research questions, the findings from six units of analyses could uncover
concrete facts of whether the performance of PEPMA might be unknown based on
existing theoretical work. Together with the findings, the constructed formulas and data
analysis could further confirm which metrics can be used to truthfully evaluate PEPMA's
efficiency.
For the benefits of applications in the cryptographic field, are there realistic and
deterministic performance evaluation approaches which will enable the code
implementers to improve PEPMA’s efficiency based on the empirical comparison? In
this results chapter, the findings and results based on six units of analyses could also
suggest a tangible setup for such a formal evaluation method.
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Chapter Organization

This results chapter is organized into seven sections:

to

,

corresponding to the

six units of analyses, and a combined performance indicator as shown in Figure 28.

Figure 28. Formal Performance Evaluation Approach
Figure 28 also represents the sequential order of flow of a suggested formal approach
for the performance evaluation where unit of analysis 1 – Finding of Compliance Metric
and Formulation – carries the highest level of importance/weight; and unit of analysis 6 –
Finding of Module Maturity Index – carries the lowest level of importance/weight.
However, this research is not specifically designed to evaluate the importance factors of
each Key Performance Indicator; hence the order of evaluation might change based on a
case-by-case application where the level of importance/weight can change for each unit
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of analysis. One possible approach to determine the importance level is found in (SourceSelection, 2011).
Verification of the Finding

As previously presented in the methodology chapter, the performance relating to
computational efficiency shall be verified through a formal verification process using
Program Profiling and Emulation with BOCHS. Additionally, the computational
efficiency shall be verified through another formal verification process by acquiring the
Performance Hardware Counter via Performance Application Programming Interface
(PAPI). In this section titled the "Analysis of Efficiency Metric and Formulation," we
applied these formal verification methods to fulfill the verification of the findings; hence,
the verification will be reported thoroughly in the analysis section. This formal
verification of efficiency will provide supports for a tangible closing conclusion of this
research. The approach for verification is depicted in Figure 29 below.

Figure 29. Efficiency Verification Block Diagram
Activation of virtual machine BOCHS to sandbox PEPMA under a guest Operating
System was complex. It required a specific set of instructions and process
synchronization in order to properly execute PEPMA under the virtual machine
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environment. Readers are referred to Appendix K, the Operation of BOCHS, for more
details on the commands and the setups of BOCHS.
Acquiring the performance hardware counter via Performance Application
Programming Interface (PAPI) also required a specific setup and compilation. Readers
are referred to Appendix L, the Operation of PAPI, for more details on the commands
and the setups of PAPI.
Concept of Instrumentation

This section describes the concept and rationale using two measuring instruments
PAPI and BOCHS. The instrument PAPI can accurately measure the total number of
instructions, TOT_INS, which are required to process a particular unit-under-test (a unitunder-test may be any of sub-modules belonging to six units of analysis). However, the
measurement TOT_INS is just a lump sum of all CPU instructions (around 26 millions
for NSS PEPMA); this metric does not indicate what types of CPU instruction that the
unit-under-test uses. Therefore, it is not a good metric for modular improvement (see
Appendix U, V for the descriptions of metrics). On the other hand, the instrument
BOCHS can accurately measure the total number of instructions; and it can also indicate
what types of CPU instruction that the unit-under-test uses. If the cost for processing a
module was approximately constructed by BOCHS as follows:
MODULE_COST ≈ k1(MULq) + k2(MOVq)
then the exact formula of MODULE_COST must be
MODULE_COST = k1(MULq) + k2(MOVq) + OHF
where the term OHF is defined as an overhead factor; and the OHF might include other
MULq, MOVq, or other types CPU instruction.
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If the metric TOT_INS is exact, then the following equality must be true
TOT_INS = MODULE_COST = k1(MULq) + k2(MOVq) + OHF
To be absolutely accurate, the equation TOT_INS must include all of the CPU
instructions. For instance, two additional coefficients k3(ADD) and k4(SUB) in the
equation TOT_INS will make the result more accurate:
TOT_INS ≈ k1(MULq) + k2(MOVq) + k3(ADD) + k4(SUB)
Due to limited scope of this study, the coefficient in TOT_INS equation does not expand
beyond the first two CPU instructions. Thus, the expansion coefficients (k3(ADD) +
k4(SUB) + others CPU Instruction... ) are lumped sum into a single over-head factor,
OHF. For comparison, one could convert TOT_INS to the total number of CPU cycles.
Overview of the Finding in General

Documentation search and/or certificates were used to collect some findings;
however, the primary method for collecting the findings was through the examination of
NSS/OpenSSL source codes. Additionally, the findings were discovered through running
executable binaries under both host and guest Operating Systems (Virtual Machine using
BOCHS) and taking the results from the program output messages. Since the results from
six units of analyses directly contributed to the performance comparison, six Key
Performance Indicators were derived from the following six units of analyses.
Table 9. Findings of Key Performance Indicators
Key Performance Indicator
Formula Importance
Level (Note 1)
Efficiency Metric and Formulation
EMF
6 = Highest
Compliance Metric
CM
5
Weighted Information Flow Complexity WIFC
4
Cyclomatic Complexity Metric
CCM
3
Functional Metric
FM
2
Module Maturity Index
MMI
1 = Lowest
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Note 1: The importance levels are only a representation/example. These levels were taken
from a particular investigation of ECDH public-key exchange protocol used in the
Department of Defense. This research was not specifically designed to evaluate the
importance factors of each Key Performance Indicator. However, it has been advocated
in the (Source-Selection, 2011) from the DoD suggesting approaches to obtain
importance levels pertaining to technical risk of a product.
Overview of the Findings of Efficiency Metric and Formulation

The findings of the efficiency metric in this section is a collection of outcomes that
have been discovered in examining computational efficiency directed toward the
performance comparison between NSS and OpenSSL PEPMA in 64-bit x86 runtime
environment. Essentially, this section shows the results of evaluating the components as
illustrated in Figure 2, the Projective Elliptic-Curve Point-multiplication Agent in the
introduction chapter. For reading convenience, Figure 2 has been expanded and shown
here with three other units-under-test:
runtime factor.

infinity point,

pre-computation table, and
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Figure 30. Projective Elliptic-Curve Point-multiplication Agent, Complete
The figure above illustrates the efficiency of NSS/OpenSSL PEPMA governed mainly by
five sub-modules: Affine to Projective Transformation, Exponentiation Function, PointDoubling, Point-Adding, and Projective to Affine Transformation (APT, EF, PD, PA, and
PAT respectively). The efficiency of NSS/OpenSSL PEPMA also depends on how
NSS/OpenSSL is implemented to handle the pre-computation, the infinity point, and the
runtime factor.
Table 10. Finding of Efficiency Metric and Formulation
Unit Under Test
Sub-Module Low-Level Routine
PEPMA
APT, EF, PD, Adding, Subtraction, Modulo Reduction
PA, PAT
Squaring, Multiplication, Inversion
Pre-computation
PD, PA
Adding, Subtraction, Modulo Reduction
Squaring, Multiplication, Inversion
Infinity Point
Runtime Factor
From Table 10, counting down from unit-under-test PEPMA, there were eleven findings:
five counts for sub-modules (APT, etc.,) and six counts for low-level routines. Although
the naming convention shown in the Sub-Module column and in the Low-Level Routine
column is the same for both NSS and OpenSSL, sub-modules and low-level functional
services comparing NSS PEPMA and OpenSSL PEPMA are not the same routines.
Furthermore, while all six low-level routines (listed in Table 10) fulfill the intended
function, each sub-module might not need to call all six low-level routines; the
explanation of which sub-level module calls which low-level routines is in order. Seven
low-level routines for each sub-module are summarized in the last column of Table 10.
The findings are presented in pairs (NSS APT vs. OpenSSL APT etc.) throughout the
section for the convenience of reading when comparing NSS and OpenSSL cases. The
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data analysis of this chapter includes only essential information to familiarize the reader
with the basis of the findings. The formulations for computational cost are presented at
the end of the findings section.
In the section “The Finding of Efficiency Metric and Formulation,” the word
"Formulation" refers to the construct of more succinct computational cost formulations as
the results of finding and data analysis. These formulations were used for verification of
the findings, with the lowest units of measurement being MULq instruction and MOVq
instruction, or scalar values. In the comparison of efficiency, NSS will serve as a
reference point (compared OpenSSL against the results from NSS).
BOCHS and PAPI were the verification instruments that provide Program Profiling
and Emulation Software Counters and Performance Hardware Counter, respectively.
Based on such formal verification of efficiency, a more tangible closing conclusion can
be drawn in the final chapter. The formal approach for verification of efficiency was
previously illustrated in Figure 28.
The verification instruments worked with specially chosen test vectors. For a listing
of test vectors used in this study, see Appendix F.
Infinity Point

In NSS, the representation of an infinity point in projective domain is defined as
follows:
NSS infinity point ≙ (X, Y, 0) where X = don't care, Y = don't care
In OpenSSL, the representation of an infinity point in projective domain is defined as
follows:
OpenSSL infinity point ≙ (X, Y, 0) where X = don't care, Y = don't care
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Runtime Factor

OS overhead, threading time, and delay due to processor interrupt services are runtime factors. They might affect the cost index produced from the Performance Hardware
Counter or Program Profiling process. These run-time factors are categorized as Quality
of Service (QoS) for the verification procedure under the targeted Operating System.
However, since these QoS run-time factors are a system specific subject, they were
excluded from the findings and data analysis.
Finding of NSS Affine to Projective Transformation

The NSS Affine to Projective Transformation (APT) is a functional service routine
that converts affine coordinates to the coordinate representations in the projective
domain. File location and function calling conventions are listed in Table 11 below.

Finding
of
File
location

Table 11. Finding of NSS Affine to Projective Transformation
Description of APT
Comment

NSS\mozilla\security\nss\lib\freebl\ecl\ecp_jac.c "NSS\" is the root
directory where project
was installed
Function ec_GFp_pt_aff2jac
*px, *py are the pointers
mp_err ec_GFp_pt_aff2jac ( const mp_int *px,
to affine coordinates (x,
const mp_int *py, mp_int *rx,
y).
mp_int *ry, mp_int *rz, const ECGroup *group)
{
*group points to a data
... calling Sub-functions below...
structure having
};
characteristics of the
Elliptic-curve
Note:
Description of data structure type "mp_int" can
be found in the literature review section of lowlevel arithmetic representation
Submp_copy(px, rx);
*rx, *ry, *rz are the
function mp_copy(py, ry);
pointers to the results in
mp_set_int(rz, 1);
projective domain
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As designed, the NSS APT function is conditionally called at the beginning of the PointAdding function. The calling sequence is shown below:
Start computing PA:
if (Z = = 0) ec_GFp_pt_aff2jac(...)
calling other functions...
Formulation

The formulations were derived by examining the operation of the following
statements:
mp_copy(px, rx);
mp_copy(py, ry);
mp_set_int(rz, 1);

Sub-Module
NSS APT
NSS APT
NSS APT

Table 12. NSS APT Formulation
Formula
NSS_APT ≈ 3(MULq)+29(MOVq)
NSS_APT_PAPI_TOT_INS = 2745
NSS_APT_PAPI_TOT_CYC = 7879

Unit of Measurement
MULq, MOVq
All CPU Instructions
CPU cycles

For comparison, testing for efficiency of APT was repeated under two verification
instruments, BOCHS and PAPI as shown in Table 13. The values shown in lower-limit
(MIN), Typical (TYP), and upper-limit (MAX) are the accuracy ranges of the measuring
instrument.

Components

NSS APT BOCHS
(Note 1)
NSS APT BOCHS
NSS APT PAPI
NSS APT PAPI

Table 13. NSS BOCHS/PAPI APT Limits
MIN
TYP
MAX
3

3

Unit of
Measurement
MULq

29

29

MOVq

2745
7879

TOT_INS
TOT_CYC

Note 1: Readers are referred to Appendix K, the Operation of BOCHS, and Appendix L,
the Operation of PAPI, for more details on commands and setups of BOCHS/PAPI.
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The same values presented in both "MIN" and "MAX" columns indicate that readings
from instrumentation are exact. Readings presented in "TYP" column are not exact. They
change from one sampling to the other.
Findings of APT in OpenSSL

The OpenSSL Affine to Projective Transformation (APT) is a service routine that
converts affine coordinates to the coordinate representation in projective domain. File
location and function calling conventions for OpenSSL are listed in Table 14 below.

Finding
of
File
location

Table 14. Finding of OpenSSL Affine to Projective Transformation
Description
Comment
O\crypto\ec\ec_lib.c

"O\" is the root
directory where project
was installed
Function EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp *group points to an
(group, point, x, y, BN_value_one(), ctx);
object having
{
characteristics of the
......
Elliptic-curve (as data),
group->meth->
and points to executing
point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group,
functional pointers (as
point, x, y, z, ctx);
method). Thus,
......
"group->meth->" is a
}
pointer to an executing
Note: group->meth->
method.
point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(...)
"point" is an array of
is a name holder for function
MDN.
EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp
BN_value_one() is a
"......" represents some other house-keeping
521-bit MDN having a
functions
scalar value of 1.
SubEC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp EC_GROUP,
function (const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
EC_POINT,
const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, const
BIGNUM,
BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx)
BN_CTX are data
{
structures.
......
"*ctx" is a pointer to a
calling group->meth->
context database, a
point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group,
temporary and volatile
point, x, y, z, ctx);
holding data structure
.......
for the function
};
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Table 15. Finding of OpenSSL Affine to Projective Transformation (Continued)
Finding of Description
Comment
Subgroup->meth->
function
point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(group, point,
x, y, z, ctx);
Note:
group->meth->
point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(...)
is a name holder for the function below
Subec_GFp_simple_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp
(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
function
const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, const
BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
......
BN_nnmod(&point->X, x, &group->field, ctx)
BN_nnmod(&point->Y, y, &group->field, ctx)
BN_nnmod(&point->Z, z, &group->field, ctx)
......
}
SubBN_nnmod(&point->X, x, &group->field, ctx)
BN_nnmod()
BN_nnmod(&point->Y, y, &group->field, ctx)
function
reduces an MDN
BN_nnmod(&point->Z, z, &group->field, ctx)
and places the
result in
"&point->Z"

Formulation

The formulation was carried out by executing the arithmetic operation of three
statements with a specific test vector, and using BOCHS to read the results.
BN_nnmod(&point->X, x, &group->field, ctx)
BN_nnmod(&point->Y, y, &group->field, ctx)
BN_nnmod(&point->Z, z, &group->field, ctx)

Sub-Module

OpenSSL APT

Table 16. NSS APT Formulation
Formula
OpenSSL APT ≈ 151(MULq) + 198(MOVq)

Unit of
Measurement
MULq, MOVq
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For comparison, these measurements were repeated under two verification instruments,
BOCHS and PAPI with test vector type A (see Appendix O).

Components

Table 17. APT Comparison
NSS OpenSSL

APT BOCHS
APT BOCHS
APT PAPI
APT PAPI
APT PAPI

3
29
745
879

MAX

151
198
1626 *
4190 **
5052

Unit of
Measurement
MULq
MOVq
TOT_INS
TOT_INS
TOT_CYC

* Test vector type A (see Appendix O). Computing platform type A (see Appendix R).
** Test vector type C (see Appendix Q) using CPU type C in a busy run-time
environment (see Appendix T).
Analysis of Affine to Projective Transformation

The data gathered in Table 14, 15, 16 and 17 suggest that the computing time of
target CPU for performing APT function is significantly different when comparing NSS
and OpenSSL implementations. The data yielded by these findings provide convincing
evidence that NSS implementation of APT might be more efficient since it uses three
simple functions "copy" and "set" to set the values into the results of APT
mp_copy(px, rx);
mp_copy(py, ry);
mp_set_int(rz, 1);
while OpenSSL uses three modulo arithmetic routines BN_nnmod() to set three values
into the results of APT. The cost of this computation depends on the content of the input
test vector (x, y, z) and how efficient the modulo reduction arithmetic was done.
BN_nnmod(&point->X, x, &group->field, ctx)
BN_nnmod(&point->Y, y, &group->field, ctx)
BN_nnmod(&point->Z, z, &group->field, ctx)
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For a detailed discussion of Affine to Projective Transformation, readers are referred to
the Concept of Point Computation in Projective Domain, which was previously presented
in the Literature Review chapter. Similarly, Ryabko et al. (2005) and Salomon (2006)
have found that using a sub-function as shown in Table 11 would be more
straightforward and better than using function BN_nnmod() as shown in Table 14, 15 for
computation of Affine to Projective Transformation.
Finding of NSS Exponentiation Function

In an open-source version 3.12.4 release, Network Security Services (NSS, 2013)
applied a 4-bit window on the scalar k in an exponentiation service. The Exponentiation
Function (EF) is shown as computation loop

in Figure 31 below.

Figure 31. Exponentiation Function in NSS
The NSS PEPMA computation makes 524 calls to the point-doubling and 131 calls to the
point-adding function (NSS-2, 2014). Readers are referred to Appendix G for examining
the exact number of calls.
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Real-time Samplings with PAPI, Function EF in NSS

The real-time sampling was taken from a particular desktop PC type B (see
Appendix S) with test vectors type A (see Appendix O).
Table 18. Real-time Samplings, Function EF in NSS, Vectors Type A
Iteration
TOT_CYC
TOT_INS
Deviation of TOT_CYC
from Minimum
1
15,094,162
26,707,442
49416
2
15,188,326
26,707,443
143,580
3
15,195,070
26,707,443
150,324
4
15,044,746
26,707,442
0
5
15,252,588
26,707,442
207,842
Figure below illustrates the deviations from iteration 4 of TOT_CYC as listed in Table
18.
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Figure 32. Real-time Samplings, EF in NSS, Test Vector Type A
Another real-time sampling was taken from the same desktop PC with test vectors type B
(see Appendix P).
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Table 19. Real-time Samplings, Function EF in NSS, Vectors Type B
Iteration
TOT_CYC
TOT_INS
Deviation of TOT_CYC
from Minimum
1
14,842,668
26,248,085
179,771
2
14,669,926
26,248,085
7,029
3
14,662,897
26,248,085
0
4
14,743,208
26,248,085
80,311
5
14,693,759
26,248,087
30,862
Figure below illustrates the deviations between TOT_CYC as listed in tables 18, 19;
deviations between TOT_INS as listed in tables 18, 19.
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Figure 33. Real-time Samplings, EF in NSS, Test Vector Type A vs. Type B
Formulation

Table 20 lists the efficiency formula for NSS Exponentiation Function with the unit
of measurements being PD, Point-Doubling, PA, Point-Adding, and Overhead Factor
(OHF). Overhead Factor includes all runtime factors.
Table 20. Formulation of NSS Exponentiation Function
Unit Under Test
Formula
Unit of
Measurement
NSS Exponentiation NSS_EF = 524(PD) + 131(PA) + OHF
PD, PA,
Function
(Value of OHF will be determined in the
OHF
next section)
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This test sequence shows that PEPMA computation does depend on value of k. Given k =
(00100011) in binary to process PEPMA, the NSS Exponentiation Function always
extracts the index for the PRE-COMP table from the leftmost four bits. Thus, k must be
shifted left 4 bits for the next 4-bit extraction (This shifting also gives a name "right-toleft" exponentiation function). Furthermore, let the base-point affine vector be (x, y); then
the NSS computing sequence of k×(x, y) occurs exactly as follows:

Iterat
ion
Entry

1

Table 21. Sequence of NSS Exponentiation Function
Parameter
Value
Comment
EF shifting method
Affine coordinate to multiply
k

Right-to-Left
(x, y)
0010,0011 (binary)

Affine-to-Projective
Transformation (APT)
Coordinates before doubling
Coordinates after pointdoubling
4 bits extracted from k
Index to PRE-COMP table

(RX, RY, 0)

Coordinates from PRE-COMP
table
Coordinates after point-adding
1.6
2

Coordinates before doubling
Coordinates after four pointdoubling operations
4 bits extracted from k
Index to PRE-COMP table
Coordinates after point-adding

Exit

k × (x, y) = 23 × (x, y)

(RX, RY, 0)
(RX, RY, RZ) =
(RX, RY, 0)
0010
2 (decimal)
2×(x, y)
≙ (x2, y2)
(RX, RY, RZ) =
(RX, RY, RZ) +
(X = x2, Y = y2, Z=1)
(RX, RY, RZ), same
as above
16 × (RX, RY, RZ)

0011
3 (decimal)
16 × (RX, RY, RZ)
+ 3×(x, y, RZ)
Same as above

Lower 8 bits
Upper (521−8) =
513 bits are all
zeros

4 bits extracted
from k
Affine coordinates
Another Affine-toProjective
Transformation
Exponentiation of
(RX, RY, RZ) by 4
Mixed-coordinate
point-adding
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Analysis of NSS Exponentiation Function

The Exponentiation Function in NSS can be more efficient if NSS did not use step
1.6 (as shown in Table 21) but instead followed the recommendation from Ryabko et al.
(2005) or Salomon (2006). This improvement in NSS Exponentiation Function can be
further verified by examining the following operational sequence:
After processing the Affine-to-Projective Transformation, APT, the affine input
coordinates (x, y) have been converted to projective coordinates (RX, RY, 0). These
coordinates are the representation of an infinity point in the projective domain of input (x,
y).
In the EF computation loop

, the first iteration of the loop is special; thus, a

comprehensive explanation is in order. At the beginning of the EF computation loop, the
result vector (RX, RY, RZ) is set to an infinity point (RX, RY, 0). This setting of the
infinity point always makes the result of point-doubling of (RX, RY, 0) to be an infinity
point since a multiplication of any scalar values with an infinity point always results in an
infinity point.
When this infinity point (RX, RY, 0) reaches the point-adding function for the first
time (first iteration in the loop) as shown in Figure 30, the point-adding function detects
the "point at infinity" condition (RZ = = 0) and returns a result (PX, PY, RZ = 1) without
any further computation. This operation (PX, PY, RZ = 1) sets the Z coordinate to 1 for
the first time in the EF iteration loop

; and

the result vector (RX, RY, RZ) is set to (PX,

PY, RZ = 1). Note that PX, PY are the coordinates extracted from the PRE-COMP table
according to the 4 bits that extracted from k.
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When loop

goes into the second iteration, the point-doubling function computes the

doubling of vector (RX, RY, RZ) recursively four times:
2 × (2 ×( 2 × (2 × (RX, RY, RZ) ) ) ) ≙ 16 × RX, RY, RZ
and the results are set back to result vector (RX, RY, RZ). The point-adding function then
adds this result vector (RX, RY, RZ) with the next vector extracted from the PRE-COMP
table.
Another interesting observation from Figure 31 and Table 22 is that if the size of
extracting window were 5 bits instead of 4 bits, higher efficiency can be achieved. New
values are the results of minor optimization in the implementation of EF as shown in
Table 22. Units of measurement are the same as before, PD and PA.
Table 22. Alternate Formulation of NSS Exponentiation Function
Unit Under Test
MIN
TYP
MAX
Unit of
Measurement
NSS Exponentiation Function
520
PD
(5-bit Window)
NSS Exponentiation Function
104
PA
(5-bit Window)
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Verification

Table 23 lists the efficiency formula found by BOCHS for NSS Exponentiation
Function with the units of measurement being MULq, integer multiplication, and MOVq,
moving quad words (64 bits). Test vectors are of type A (see Appendix O).
Table 23. Finding of NSS Exponentiation Function by BOCHS
Unit Under Test
MIN
TYP
MAX
Unit of
Measurement
NSS EF
1,461,962
1,461,962
MULq
NSS EF
2,744,501
2,744,501
MOVq
NSS_OHF
To be
MULq, MOVq
determined
and other
when
Instructions
NSS_PA,
NSS_PD has
been derived
The data collected in Table 23 is quite revealing in several ways. Since BOCHS can read
exactly the number of MULq or MOVq instructions used in NSS Exponentiation
Function, data in Table 23 could answer which metrics should be used to evaluate
PEPMA's efficiency. Second, since the counting of MOVq instruction did exceed the
counting of MULq instruction, data in Table 23 also uncovered the notion of whether the
performance of PEPMA might be unknown based on existing theoretical work (for
example, using only metric M, Multiplication).
Data from this table can be compared with the data in Table 32, which shows the
difference in efficiency between NSS and OpenSSL PEPMA.
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Finding of NSS Point-Doubling

Network Security Services implemented a software function point-doubling R(X3,
Y3, Z3) = 2×P(X, Y, Z) using weighted projective transformation as described by (Cohen
et al., 1998). Executing NSS Point-Doubling (PD) codes requires 4M+4S+5A+4Su+1Sh
operations, where the arithmetic operators are designated as

M=Multiplying,

S=Squaring, A=Addition, Su=Subtraction, and Sh=Shift. These measurement units have
been directly converted to the lowest measurement units MULq and MOVq using
BOCHS. Table 24 recorded this operation.
Table 24. Finding of NSS Point-Doubling by BOCHS
Unit Under Test
MIN
TYP
MAX
NSS_PD
NSS_PD

1550
3084

Unit of
Measurement
MULq
MOVq

Formulation

Table 25 below lists the efficiency formula for NSS Point-Doubling with the units
of measurement being MULq and MOVq. The formula for NSS_PD can be constructed
from values in Table 24.

Unit Under Test

NSS_PD

Table 25. Formulation of NSS Point-Doubling
Formula
NSS_PD ≈ 1550(MULq) + 3084(MOVq)

Unit of
Measurement
MULq, MOVq

Analysis of NSS Point-Doubling

The data gathered in Tables 24 and 25 suggested that the target CPU had spent more
time moving data than doing multiplication in PD function. The partial efficiency
formulation of Exponentiation Function can now be derived as follows (OHF = Overhead
Factor):
NSS_EF = 524(1550(MULq) + 3084(MOVq)) + 131(PA) + OHF
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Finding of NSS Point-Adding

Network Security Services implemented a software function point-adding of point
P1 and P2 using weighted projective transformation as described by (Brown et al., 2001).
NSS actually executed a total of 8M+3S+2A+5Su. These measurement units have been
directly converted to the lowest measurement units MULq and MOVq using BOCHS.

Unit Under Test

Table 26. Finding of NSS Point-Adding by BOCHS
MIN
TYP
MAX

NSS_PA
NSS_PA

1808
3592

Unit of
Measurement
MULq
MOVq

Formulation

Table 27 below lists the efficiency formula for NSS Point-Adding with the unit of
measurements being MULq and MOVq. The formula for NSS_PA was constructed from
the values in Table 26.

Unit Under Test

NSS_PA

Table 27. Formulation of NSS Point-Adding
Formula
NSS_PA ≈ 1808(MULq) + 3592(MOVq)

Unit of
Measurement
MULq, MOVq

Analysis of NSS Point-Adding

Similar to the characteristic of NSS_PD metric, the data gathered in tables 26 and
27 suggested that in Point-Adding function, the target CPU did spend more time moving
data than doing multiplication. Partial efficiency metric of Exponentiation Function now
can be calculated using NSS_PA metric (OHF = Overhead Factor):
NSS_EF = 524(PD) + 131(1808(MULq) + 3592(MOVq)) + OHF
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Analysis of NSS Exponentiation Function, Revisited

The results of NSS_PD and NSS_PA, as shown in tables 25 and 27, indicate that the
NSS Overhead Factor, NSS_OHF, now can be derived. Since the NSS_EF formulation
was constructed earlier as NSS_EF = 524(PD) + 131(PA) + OHF, then
NSS_EF = 524(1550(MULq)+3084(MOVq))+131(1808(MULq)+3592(MOVq)) +
OHF
Equivalently, NSS_EF = 1,049,048(MULq) + 2,086,568(MOVq) + OHF
From the findings earlier, the absolute computing cost for doing NSS_EF was:
Table 28. Formulation of NSS Exponentiation Function by BOCHS
Unit Under Test
MIN
TYP
MAX
Unit of
Measurement
NSS EF
1,461,962
1,461,962
MULq
NSS EF
2,744,501
2,744,501
MOVq
If an approximate value of NSS_EF is 1,461,962(MULq) + 2,744,501(MOVq),
and given NSS_EF = 1,049,048(MULq) + 2,086,568(MOVq) + OHF, then the value of
Overhead Factor (OHF) for NSS must exactly equal to:
NSS_OHF = 412,914(MULq) + 657,933(MOVq) + OHF
The formulation for NSS Exponentiation Function (EF) now can be compiled from the
findings listed above along with the Overhead Factor, NSS_OHF.
Table 29. Formulation of NSS Exponentiation Function, Complete
Unit Under Formula
Unit of
Test
Measurement
PD
NSS_PD ≈ 1550(MULq) + 3084(MOVq)
MULq, MOVq
PA
NSS_PA ≈ 1808(MULq) + 3592(MOVq)
MULq, MOVq
OHF
NSS_OHF ≈ 412,914(MULq) + 657,933(MOVq)
MULq, MOVq
NSS EF
NSS_EF≈524(NSS_PD)+131(NSS_PA)+NSS_OHF
PD, PA,
OHF
(NSS_OHF = Overhead Factor)
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Finding of OpenSSL Exponentiation Function

In a release of open-source version 1.0.1e, dated 11 Feb 2013, OpenSSL applied a
5-bit window on the scalar k in PEPMA's exponentiation service shown as a computation
loop

in Figure 34 below.

Figure 34. 5-bit Windowing Exponentiation Service in OpenSSL
Real-time Samplings with PAPI, Function EF in OpenSSL

The real-time sampling was taken from a particular desktop PC type A (see
Appendix R) with test vectors type A (see Appendix O).
Table 30. Real-time Samplings, Function EF in OpenSSL, Vectors Type A
Iteration
TOT_CYC
TOT_INS
Deviation of TOT_CYC
from Minimum
1
2,938,817
3,814,105
13695
2
2,935,684
3,814,104
10562
3
2,932,579
3,814,102
7457
4
2,925,122
3,814,104
0
5
2,925,122
3,814,104
0
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Figure below illustrates the deviations from iteration 4, 5 of TOT_CYC as listed in Table
30.
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Figure 35. Real-time Samplings, EF in OpenSSL, Test Vector Type A
Another real-time sampling was taken from the same desktop PC with test vectors type B
(see Appendix P).
Table 31. Real-time Samplings, Function EF in OpenSSL, Vectors Type B
Iteration
TOT_CYC
TOT_INS
Deviation of TOT_CYC
from Minimum
1
2,944,852
3,814,106
5675
2
2,942,158
3,814,106
2981
3
2,942,373
3,814,105
3196
4
2,939,177
3,814,107
0
5
2,951,294
3,814,106
12117
6
2,845,369 *
3,814,106 *
* Iteration 6 measured the TOT_CYC and TOT_INS parameters from a less activity
runtime environment. The TOT_INS value stayed the same, but the TOT_CYC value
has reduced to a smaller number. This signified a runtime dependency for TOT_CYC
parameter (see Appendix R, Figure 48 for the CPU loading condition).
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Figure below illustrates the deviations of TOT_CYC between Table 30 and Table 31,
and deviations of TOT_INS between Table 30 and Table 31.
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Figure 36. Real-time samplings, EF in OpenSSL, test Vector type B
Formulation

OpenSSL PEPMA makes 520 calls to the point-doubling and 104 calls to the pointadding function (OpenSSL-2, 2014). Readers are referred to Appendix H for examining
the exact number of calls to PD or PA. Open_SSL Overhead part is designated as
Overhead Factor (OHF) in the formula.
Table 32. Formulation of OpenSSL Exponentiation Function
Unit Under Test Formula
Unit of
Measurement
OpenSSL
OpenSSL_EF = 520(PD) + 104(PA) + OHF
PD, PA,
Exponentiation
OHF
Function
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The following three tables list the results of EF, PD, PA by BOCHS:
Table 33. Finding of OpenSSL Exponentiation Function by BOCHS
Unit Under Test
MIN
TYP
MAX
Unit of
Measurement
OpenSSL_EF
449,033
MULq
OpenSSL_EF
470,443
MOVq
Table 34. Finding of OpenSSL Point-Doubling by BOCHS
Unit Under Test
MIN
TYP
MAX
Unit of
Measurement
OpenSSL_PD
455
MULq
OpenSSL_PD
428
MOVq
Table 35. Finding of OpenSSL Point-Adding by BOCHS
Unit Under Test
MIN
TYP
MAX
Unit of
Measurement
OpenSSL_PA
1114
MULq
OpenSSL_PA
843
MOVq
From tables 33, 34, and 35 above, the cost formulas of OpenSSL EF and Overhead Factor
(OHF) now can be derived:
Table 36. Formulation of OpenSSL Exponentiation Function, Complete
Unit
Formula
Unit of
Under
Measurement
Test
PD
OpenSSL_PD ≈ 455(MULq) + 428(MOVq)
MULq, MOVq
PA
OpenSSL_PA ≈ 1114(MULq) + 843(MOVq)
MULq, MOVq
EF
OpenSSL_EF = 352,516(MULq) + 310,232(MOVq)
MULq, MOVq
+ OHF
OHF
OpenSSL_OHF ≈ 96,517(MULq) + 160,211(MOVq)
MULq, MOVq
OpenSSL OpenSSL_EF ≈
PD, PA,
EF
520(OpenSSL_PD)+104(OpenSSL_PA)
OHF
+OpenSSL_OHF
(OpenSSL_OHF = Overhead Factor)
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Analysis of NSS vs. OpenSSL Exponentiation Function

From the data in Table 29 and Table 36, it is apparent that the length of computing
time for NSS was longer than OpenSSL in a magnitude of at least 4 to 1.
NSS_EF ≈ 1,461,962(MULq) + 2,744,501(MOVq)
Open_SSL_EF ≈ 449,033(MULq) + 470,443(MOVq)
This 4:1 computing ratio was not correctly shown in the theoretical work of (Brown et
al., 2001), or (Cohen et al., 1998), or any other publications found in the literature review.
Instead, if one summarizes the total arithmetic expenditures in the exponentiation
function, he would find them to be 3668M + 3668S per (Cohen et al., 1998; Brown et al.,
2001); and 2983M + 3275S per Bernstein's explicit formulation (EFD_Double, 2001;
EFD_Add, 2007). From these explicit formulations, two metrics multiplications (M) and
squarings (S) are the main coefficients of the cost equation to measure the performance of
elliptic-curve point-multiplication kP residing in projective domain. Using these metrics,
the cost ratios between NSS and OpenSSL would be far off as compared to the ones
derived from BOCHS, or PAPI, or even from commonly used clock() function. The
comparisons between explicit formulation, BOCHS, PAPI, and Clock() are summarized
in Table below. The model of computing platform was of type A (see Appendix R).
Table 37. Analysis of OpenSSL vs. NSS Exponentiation Function, Test Vector A
Evaluation Method Used for
NSS
OpenSSL
Cost Ratio
Unit Under Test
NSS:OpenSSL
Explicit Formulation Metric M
3668
2983
1.25:1
Explicit Formulation Metric S
3668
3275
1.12:1
BOCHS, MULq
1,461,962
449,033
3.25:1
BOCHS, MOVq
2,744,501
470,443
5.83:1
PAPI, Number of Instructions
26,710,515 3,814,259
7:1
PAPI, Number of Clocks
15,230,372 2,939,649
5.18:1
Clock(), absolute time in mili Seconds
5101
909
5.6:1
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By PAPI, the number of instructions and the number of cycles are found by executing
OpenSSL PEPMA under host OS.

Figure 37. Result of 5-bit Windowing Exponentiation Service in OpenSSL
The outputs shown above are the results of computation with specific input test vectors as
follows:
k=1EB7F81785C9629F136A7E8F8C674957109735554111A2A866FA5A166699419BF
A9936C78B62653964DF0D6DA940A695C7294D41B2D6600DE6DFCF0EDCFC89FD
CB1
x=1D5C693F66C08ED03AD0F031F937443458F601FD098D3D0227B4BF62873AF50
740B0BB84AA157FC847BCF8DC16A8B2B8BFD8E2D0A7D39AF04B089930EF6DA
D5C1B4
y=144B7770963C63A39248865FF36B074151EAC33549B224AF5C8664C54012B818E
D037B2B7C1A63AC89EBAA11E07DB89FCEE5B556E49764EE3FA66EA7AE61AC0
1823
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and the modulus for modulo arithmetic is:
m=1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
FFFFF

The unrealistic calculation from existing theoretical work has happened due to the fact
that OpenSSL did apply 58-bit on multi-digit number whilst NSS used half-digit (32-bit)
representation (See System Architecture, section 1.2.1, or Research in Numeric
Presentation and Computation, section 2.5). Table 36 showing the overhead factor in
doing EF for OpenSSL was also lower than for NSS, but it is still a significant computing
cost contributing to the overall efficiency equation.
NSS_OHF ≈ 412,914(MULq) + 657,933(MOVq)
OpenSSL_OHF ≈ 96,517(MULq) + 160,211(MOVq)
None of these found differences were possible without the constructed formulations and
verifications from BOCHS/PAPI. The improvement of efficiency for PEPMA can be
effectively located by examining those comparative formulations and the findings
presented throughout this section. The results show that there are effective ways to
improve PEPMA’s efficiency based on these empirical comparisons. The findings and
analyses also have shown to account for "data/memory move" metrics to candidly
evaluate PEPMA's efficiency.
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Finding of NSS Pre-computation

The Pre-computation is an additional cost to perform exponentiation function since
the PRE-COMP table must be computed before entering EF. The performance evaluation
must account for this cost to gain more accuracy. During the processing of exponentiation
function, one of the significant costs is to compute the sub-exponentiation function be,
where b is a number of bits w (window width) extracted from scalar k, and the exponent e
is any small positive integer (0...15 etc.) The most common method for computing the
sub-exponentiation function be is the sliding window approach, which enhances the
efficiency at the expense of pre-computation efforts. As shown in the Methodology
chapter, Figure 18 provides an idea of the sliding-window: The Network Security
Services (NSS, 2013) applied a 4-bit sliding-window on the scalar k in PEPMA's
exponentiation service. Additionally, as shown in Figure 20 and also in the Methodology
chapter, OpenSSL applied a 5-bit window on the scalar k. However, Figure 18, Figure 20
and the associated information presented in the methodology were just a preliminary
investigation which contained incomplete/undefined data. This section recorded the
findings of Exponentiation Function (EF) and provided descriptions/explanations of the
differences between preliminary investigation and findings of this function.
Table 38. Finding of NSS Pre-computation
NSS
NSS
Preliminary in version
3.12.4
Window Width
4-bit
4-bit
Shift Direction
Right-to-left Right-to-left
Pre-computation of Elliptic-curve point
16
16
Note 1
Note 2
Parameters
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Analysis of Pre-computation
NSS Pre-computation:

Note 1: Out of sixteen Elliptic-curve points, two Elliptic-curve points do not need
the computation: Elliptic-curve point zero and Elliptic-curve point P itself. Effectively,
there were only fourteen Elliptic-curve coordinates (X, Y, Z), or 14 × 3 = 42 coordinates
(coordinates are multi-digit-numbers) to be computed since an Elliptic-curve point in the
projective domain has three coordinates (X, Y, Z).
Note 2: Same as above.
The NSS 4-bit exponentiation windowing requires a pre-computing of 15 Elliptic-curve
points (pre = before entering exponentiation loop). The 15-point pre-computation calls
point-doubling (PD) or point-adding (PA) services to calculate k(x, y) using k = 2 to 15,
and the coordinates (x, y) are the base coordinates of the cyclic subgroup of the chosen
Elliptic curve. When k = 1, the pre-comp coordinates are actually the base point itself;
thus, it requires no computation, just storing the coordinates in the table PRE-COMP.

Figure 38. 4-bit Pre-comp Indexing Method used in NSS
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During the exponentiation computation in the loop, k slides from right to left (bottom to
top as shown) and 4 bits are extracted for indexing into the PRE-COMP table. The PRECOMP value p(x, y) will be used for point-adding if the index is non-zero (1...15);
otherwise, a zero-value table index will signify a "No-Add" condition. The 15-point, precomputing function makes service calls to 1 point doubling and 13 point-adding functions
to completely fill the 15-point recomputed table.

Table
Index
0

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Table 39. NSS Pre-computation Values in PRE-COMP Table
x coordinate
y coordinate
Comment
(Affine)
(Affine)
0
0
Infinity Point in Affine
No-Add condition
p(x)
p(y)
Base point
2p(x)
2p(y)
Doubling of (x, y)
3p(x)
3p(y)
4p(x)
4p(y)
Doubling(Doubling of (x, y))
5p(x)
5p(y)
6p(x)
6p(y)
7p(x)
7p(y)
8p(x)
8p(y)
Doubling(Doubling(Doubling of (x, y)))
9p(x)
9p(y)
10p(x)
10p(y)
11p(x)
11p(y)
12p(x)
12p(y)
13p(x)
13p(y)
14p(x)
14p(y)
15p(x)
15p(y)

Data in Table 39 uncovered that an improvement to NSS implementation can be achieved
by doing three point-doublings (at table index 2, 4 and 8) and eleven point-addings.
Building the pre-computed table is done outside the computation loop. The pointadding function then uses the 4-bit window taken from k to index into the table without
the need to call point-adding four times. This reduces calling the point-adding function by
4:1 (131 × 4 = 524).
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Table 40. Finding of OpenSSL Pre-computation
Parameters
OpenSSL
OpenSSL
Preliminary in version
(Ver 1.0.1)
2.0.5
Window Width
5-bit
5-bit
Shift Direction
Right-to-left Right-to-left
Pre-computation of
32
16
Elliptic-curve point
Note 3
Note 4
Note 3: The description of this value was incomplete in the preliminary investigation.
The pre-computation of Elliptic-curve points should have been sixteen. Negation of these
coordinates (X, Y, Z) makes thirty two vectors. NSS did not use this method.
Note 4: In performing the computation of exponentiation function where the negation is
relatively easy, the binary signed representation (using +1, −1, 0) is meaningful because
this method can decrease the amount of required pre-computation. The best signed
representation is Non-Adjacent-Form (NAF), where the term "non-adjacent" implies
there will not be any two bits "1" located right next to each other (0110 is not a NAF,
etc.) As a result, the required pre-computation routines are reduced in half because the
negative number is just a sign-changing (negation) of the positive number. This bit
encoding enhances the efficiency of pre-computation since the pre-comp table now has
only half of it. Even though OpenSSL used 5-bit sliding windows for computation of
Exponentiation Function, there were only sixteen pre-computed values since OpenSSL
implementation applied the binary signed representation as described above. The 14point pre-computing function makes service calls to 1 point doubling and 13 point-adding
functions to fill the 16-point pre-computed table. The point-adding function then uses the
5-bit window taken from k to index the table without the need to execute point-adding
five times. This reduces calling the point-adding function by 5:1 (104 × 5 = 520).
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Finding of NSS/OpenSSL Projective to Affine Transformation

The Projective to Affine Transformation (PAT) is the last step to be executed inside
an Exponentiation Function. The PAT procedure converts a final computation of Ellipticcurve coordinates (X, Y, Z) in projective domain back into the Cartesian coordinates. The
results are two affine coordinates (x, y). Afterward, this conversion completes the scalar
multiplication function k(x, y) and returns the two affine values (x, y) to the caller of EF
function. The concept of PAT is shown in Figure 4, in (NSS PEPMA, 2013; OpenSSL
PEPMA, 2013; Cohen et al., 2006), and in "Concept of Point Computation in Projective
Domain" of the literature reviews chapter. Table 41 shows the real-time costs for
computing PAT in NSS/OpenSSL with vectors type A (see Appendix O).
Table 41. Real-time Samplings, Function PAT in NSS/OpenSSL, Vectors Type A
Iteration
NSS PAT
OpenSSL PAT
NSS PAT
OpenSSL PAT
TOT_CYC
TOT_CYC
TOT_INS
TOT_INS
1
164,904
208,209
285,500
306,445
2
163,525
206,878
285,500
306,445
3
163,631
207,377
285,500
306,445
4
163,281
209,220
285,500
306,445
5
162,703
209,184
285,500
306,445

Analysis of NSS/OpenSSL Projective to Affine Transformation

The difference of computational cost between two Projective to Affine
Transformations, NSS and OpenSSL was not significant. Given that both NSS and
OpenSSL must execute an inversion in PAT procedure, the results in Table 41 suggested
that the computing cycles were mostly consumed by the 521-bit inversion routine. Since
both NSS and OpenSSL PEPMA calculate the inversion of a number in spatial domain
using an extended Euclidean algorithm (Hankerson, 2004, p. 39), the results suggested
that further improvement for efficiency could not be done easily.
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Finding of the Compliance Metric

The Compliance Metric (CM) of NSS PEPMA or OpenSSL PEPMA measures the
compliance of computing modules to the Federal Information Processing Standard, FIPS140-2 (FIPS-140-2, 2001). According to the records from the Cryptographic Algorithm
Verification Program for certifying NSS/OpenSSL cryptographic modules (CAVP NSS,
2010; CAVP OpenSSL, 2012), both NSS and OpenSSL have received a variety of FIPS140-2, security level 1, 2 and level 3 certifications.
Table 42. Finding of NSS/OpenSSL Compliance Metric, Level 1
Level Description
NSS
OpenSSL
Overall Complied to Validation date:
Validation date:
FIPS-140-2 Security 12/28/2010
06/27/2012;07/09/2012;07/18/2012;
Level 1
Software Version:
10/24/2012;01/22/2013;02/06/2013;
3.12.4
02/22/2013;02/28/2013;03/28/2013;
05/16/2013;06/14/2013;08/16/2013;
08/23/2013;11/08/2013;12/20/2013;
06/27/2014;07/03/2014
Software Version: 2.0, 2.0.1, 2.0.2,
2.0.3, 2.0.4, 2.0.5, 2.0.6, 2.0.7
PEPMA Complied
Validation date:
Validation date: 07/03/2014
to FIPS-140-2
12/28/2010
Software Version: 2.0.7
Security Level 1
Software Version:
Module Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman
3.12.4
Cert #1747
ECDH, ECDSA
Cert. # 1280

NSS Certification

The NSS software cryptographic modules have been validated five times on
08/29/1997, 1999, 2002, 2007, and 12/28/2010 (certificate #1280 including ECDH
module) for conformance to FIPS-140-1 and FIPS-140-2 at security levels 1 and 2.
Additionally, NSS was the first open source cryptographic library to receive FIPS-140
validation.
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OpenSSL Certification

The OpenSSL version v2.0.7 has been validated on 07/03/2014, and the passing
grades were recorded in FIPS 140-2 certificate #1747 (FIPS-1747, 2014). Although the
software library version v2.0.7 is compatible with previous OpenSSL libraries (including
versions 2.0, 2.0.1, 2.0.2, 2.0.3, 2.0.4, 2.0.5, and 2.0.6), it is important to note that the
FIPS 140-1 or FIPS 140-2 certificate applies only to the version that was submitted for
validation.
Formulation

The compliance metric for either NSS or OpenSSL is a complex matter, and the
interpretation of these metrics might be subjective; thus, a quantitative verification using
BOCHS or PAPI is not applicable for this unit-under-test. To simplify the research, the
result of compliance is set to either "true" if PEPMA's technical risk assessment was low,
or set to "false" if PEPMA's technical risk assessment was high. There is no comparison
of compliance between NSS and OpenSSL. Nonetheless, the findings and formulations
listed here still form the basis of a formal performance evaluation approach. Based on
such a formal process to verify compliance, a more concrete closing conclusion about the
performance may be drawn.
For the purpose of evaluating NIST 521-bit prime-field PEPMA, the Compliance
Metric (CM) result was quantized to "low" from three available levels: low, moderate,
and high according to the DoD source-selection procedure (Source-Selection, 2011).

Unit Under Test
NSS CM

Table 43. Formulation for Compliance Metric
Formula
Comment
CM=low
NSS has complied with FIPS. It has little
potential to cause degradation of
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OpenSSL CM

CM=low

performance
OpenSSL has complied with FIPS. It has
little potential to cause degradation of
performance

Analysis of Compliance Metric

Since the judgment to determine the compliance is subjective, we discuss the
rationale of the judgment to accept the compliance of a product in a specific military case
study; and then apply the same evaluation method to this research. Readers should bear in
mind that the analyses presented here are only a representation, which should provide
somewhat meaningful evaluation results in a cryptographic application. With that said,
the following process used by the US Department of Defense (DoD) could describe the
compliance scenario for cryptographic module like PEPMA:
The DoD often solicited a Request for Proposal (RFP) publicly to fulfill an
operational product requirement, after which the military procurement authorities
normally follow a formal source-selection process to analyze/judge the proposals made
by

potential providers. As stated in the DoD source-selection procedures (Source-

Selection, 2011), one of the assessments in the source-selection process is the technical
risk. The term “technical,” as used throughout the source-selection document, refers to all
non-cost factors.
Table 44. Technical Risk Ratings
Rating
Low

Moderate
High

Description
Has little potential to cause disruption of schedule, increased cost or
degradation of performance. Normal contractor effort and normal
Government monitoring will likely be able to overcome any difficulties.
Can potentially cause disruption of schedule, increased cost or
degradation of performance. Special contractor emphasis and close
Government monitoring will likely be able to overcome difficulties.
Is likely to cause significant disruption of schedule, increased cost or
degradation of performance. Is unlikely to overcome any difficulties,
even with special contractor emphasis and close Government monitoring.
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With respect to the rating of technical risk, the assessment of technical risk manifested by
the identification of weaknesses, which have the potential for disruption of schedule,
increased costs, degradation of performance, increased Government oversight, or the
likelihood of unsuccessful contract performance. Technical risk shall be rated using the
ratings listed in Table 44 (Source-Selection, 2011, p. 16).
In a specific case study, the DoD did not have any intention to evaluate/prove the
validity of compliance submitted from the potential contractor. It is the potential offerer's
sole responsibility to obtain certification from a third-party prior to submitting the
proposal. The DoD only reviewed the “proof” of certification of technical factors and
accepted it as a "passing" condition.
As advocated in the source-selection procedures, the technical factors may be
divided into subfactors that represent the specific areas that are significant enough to be
discriminators and to have an impact on the source-selection decision. When subfactors
are used, the evaluator should establish the minimum number necessary for the
evaluation of proposals. The following technical subfactos are believed to be applicable
to the performance evaluation of PEPMA:
The Federal Information Processing Standards FIPS-140, entitled “Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules,” described the government requirements for
sensitive but unclassified products in terms of security and information assurance. The
FIPS standards are published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) and have been adopted by the Canadian government’s Communications Security
Establishment (CSE, 2014). The security requirements for cryptographic modules also
have been adopted in the financial community through the American National Standards
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Institute (ANSI, 2001; ANSI, 2005). Since NSS and OpenSSL PEPMA cryptographic
modules have adhered to some reasonable security requirements (i.e., implementing
FIPS-approved algorithms), they are better suited for more accurate analysis than
general-purpose computing systems. As such, PEPMA cryptographic with FIPS-140
ratings could provide a valuable measurement of the security controls and system
information assurance in place for a given cryptographic module.
From 1994 to 2014, NIST has released three versions of FIPS-140 publications. The
first version, (FIPS-140-1, 1994), was issued on 11 January 1994. This version was
developed by the US government and a commercial working group and subsequently
approved by the Secretary of Commerce. For security level 1, the FIPS 140-1
specification identified seven inspection areas as listed in Table 45 below.

Area
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Table 45. Compliance Metric, Seven Inspection Areas, Security Level 1
Unit Under Test
Comment
Crypto Module
Product specification
Module Interface
Information flow
Roles & Services
Definition of module’s roles and services
Finite-State Model How module transitions occur
Software Security
Specification of the software design
Key Management
FIPS approved generation/distribution techniques
Cryptographic
FIPS approved cryptographic algorithms for protecting
Algorithms
unclassified information

NIST operates both the Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP, 2013) and
the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) where CAVP is a prerequisite to
CVMP. This way, NIST ensures that cryptographic modules have been implemented
correctly prior to validating their security properties. Together, these programs provide an
organization with a framework to orderly certify cryptographic products against the
FIPS-140 standards. Under such guidance for certification, NSS or OpenSSL applicants
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have already followed at least four product requirements: (a) design a product that is
compliant with the selected FIPS-140 standard, (b) prepare the documentation required
for certification, (c) submit the product and documentation to an accredited testing
laboratory (CAVP LABS, 2014), and (d) submit test results from the laboratory to NIST
(or the Canadian government’s Communications Security Establishment) for
governmental approval of usage, and to receive a certification number.
In 2014, all tests under the Cryptographic Algorithm Verification Program (CAVP,
2013) are currently handled by 21 third-party laboratories that are accredited as
cryptographic module testing laboratories (CAVP LABS, 2014) and by the National
Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program. However, it is imperative to recognize that
the testing laboratory could derive some of the test results from the seven inspection areas
(listed in Table 45) using empirical experiments in which the results might never be fully
proven. Such results can only support a passing hypothesis or can invalidate the entire
validation process. Thus, while evaluating the compliance for cryptographic NSS or
OpenSSL PEPMA, one could either support the passing score or reject the compliance
based on seven inspection areas as shown in Table 45.
The second version, (FIPS-140-2, 2001), was issued on 25 May 2001. This version
took into account changes in computing technologies and suggestions received from the
communities since its first release in 1994. FIPS 140-2 defines four levels of security for
cryptographic modules: security levels 1 through 4 as shown in Table 46.
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Table 46. Compliance Metric, Security Level
Security Level
Summary of Qualification
FIPS-140-2 Level 1
At least one approved algorithm or approved security function
Lowest security
used. No specific tampering detection or intrusion prevention
mechanisms employed
FIPS-140-2 Level 2
Level 1 + Module must show evidence of tampering or
intrusion
FIPS-140-2 Level 3
Level 2 + Module must prevent intruder from gaining access
FIPS-140-2 Level 4, Level 3 + Provide reliable level of intrusion detection and
highest security
prevention system
Several security requirements pertaining to each security level have been incorporated
into Version 2. This addition was the direct result of the feedbacks from the communities.
The rationale for having different levels of security follows: The total number of
cryptographic service modules is usually large. This is certainly true in the case of NSS
or OpenSSL which has been around the industry for decades (NSS, 2013; OpenSSL,
2013). The security aspects of these modules are complex and costly for verification and
validation. Thus, not all modules can be certified at once. Instead, only special FIPS
object modules have been derived from un-certified core components and brought in for
certification at the third-party laboratories such as (CAVP LABS, 2014). These FIPS
object modules were carefully designed with specific compilation instructions so that the
certification can be transferred with minimal effort to the products applying
NSS/OpenSSL cryptographic service modules.
As shown in Table 42, both NSS and OpenSSL have gone through several certifying
iterations and have been working well in the fields. The evidence of having inspections in
seven or more areas covering Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic-curve Digital
Signature Algorithm indicated that both NSS or OpenSSL PEPMA implementations are
believed to be adequately stable; and that the codes can be applied to Elliptic-curve
public key exchange cryptography to ensure authenticity in the public key infrastructure.
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The third version, FIPS 140-3, is currently under development this year. In the first
draft, NIST introduced one additional security level: information assurance (level 5) and
two new power analyses to measure the signal leakages (Simple Power Analysis and
Differential Power Analysis). We discuss these new security aspects with respect to the
performance of PEPMA as follows:
One way to add dimension to the performance evaluation is to leverage the measurements
of outliers, that is, coding practices which produced signal patterns, or use of data outside
of the norm. According to Herrmann (2007) and Fenton (1996), the compliance to
federal standards could detect and correct outliers and thus contribute to the overall
performance of NSS/OpenSSL PEMA. Per Keyes (2005), further analysis of CM showed
that any service modules that have adequately complied tend to have lower complexity
and will eventually lead to better performance in the field. Thus, it is imperative to accept
that these new security aspects in FIPS-140-3 might contribute to PEPMA’s overall
performance if one chooses to emphasize the importance of information assurance level
5. In this evaluation, we did not emphasize the importance of information assurance
toward the combined key performance indicator for both NSS and OpenSSL; thus, for the
design of cryptographic modules, the technical risk level is still believed to be low for all
intended purposes of the performance evaluation of PEPMA.

142
Finding of Cyclomatic Complexity Metric

The Cyclomatic Complexity measures the structural complexity of NSS or
OpenSSL PEPMA’s software modules. The terminology "Static Complexity Metric" was
used in the older literature (IEEE 982.1, 1988, p. 23; IEEE 982.2, 1988, p. 60); however,
the term "Cyclomatic Complexity" is more commonly used today. Readers are referred to
NIST Special Publication 500-235 (Watson & McCabe, 1996) for a more detailed
discussion of Cyclomatic Complexity Metric.
This section is the follow-up from the previous methodology chapter, which already
constructed the Static Complexity Metric (SCM) in terms of the number of edges, E;
number of nodes, N; and a constant 1:
SCM = E – N + 1
Before proceeding to evaluate the Cyclomatic Complexity Metric (CCM) with respect to
PEPMA, it will be necessary to adjust the constant 1, which assumed the number of exit
path to be a loop-back to itself. If the number of exit path, P, is other than a loop-back,
then the SCM formula becomes:
CCM = E – N + 2P
The following tables present the findings for NSS Cyclomatic Complexity Metric of
Point-Doubling (PD), and Point-Adding (PA). Both PD and PA were called by two
functions: Exponentiation Function and Pre-computation.
Table 47. Findings of NSS Cyclomatic Complexity Metric of PD
Coefficients of
MIN TPY MAX
Unit of
NSS Cyclomatic Complexity
Measurement
of Point-Doubling Function
E = number of edges
123
Scalar
N = number of nodes
82
Scalar
P = number of exit paths
1
Scalar
CCM_NSS_PD
43
Scalar
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Table 48. Findings of NSS Cyclomatic Complexity Metric of PA
Coefficients of
MIN TPY MAX
Unit of
NSS Cyclomatic Complexity
Measurement
of Point-Doubling Function
E = number of edges
90
Scalar
N = number of nodes
60
Scalar
P = number of exit paths
1
Scalar
CCM_NSS_PA
32
Scalar

Formulation

The formulations of CCM were derived from the coefficients of Cyclomatic
Complexity:

Sub-Module

Table 49. NSS CCM Formulations
Formula

NSS PD
NSS PA

CCM = 123 - 82 + 2
CCM = 90 - 60 + 2

Unit of
Measurement
E, N, P
E, N, P

The following tables present the findings for OpenSSL Cyclomatic Complexity Metric of
Point-Doubling (PD), and Point-Adding (PD). Both PD and PA were called by two
functions: Exponentiation Function and Pre-computation.
Table 50. Findings of OpenSSL Cyclomatic Complexity Metric of PD
Coefficients of
MIN TPY MAX
Unit of
NSS Cyclomatic Complexity
Measurement
of Point-Adding Function
E = number of edges
34
Scalar
N = number of nodes
34
Scalar
P = number of exit paths
1
Scalar
CCM_OpenSSL_PD
2
Scalar
Table 51. Findings of OpenSSL Cyclomatic Complexity Metric of PA
Coefficients of
MIN TPY MAX Unit of
Cyclomatic Complexity
Measurement
E = number of edges
73
Scalar
N = number of nodes
71
Scalar
P = number of exit paths
1
Scalar
CCM_OpenSSL_PA
3
Scalar
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Formulation

The formulations of CCM were derived from the coefficients of Cyclomatic
Complexity:

Sub-Module

Table 52. NSS CCM Formulations
Formula

OpenSSL PD
OpenSSL PA

CCM = 34 - 34 + 2
CCM = 73 - 71 + 2

Unit of
Measurement
E, N, P
E, N, P

Analysis of Cyclomatic Complexity Metric

The cyclomatic complexity of PEPMA source code is the counting of linearly
independent paths through the service module (Watson & McCabe, 1996). A simple case
example is when CCM=2. If the PEPMA source code does not have any decision
branching such as an "if" statement, then the Cyclomatic Complexity Metric CCM equals
to 2, since there exists only one edge (E=1), one node (N=1), and one exit path (P=1)
throughout the module. However, if the PEPMA service module has an "if" statement,
there will be three edges through the code: one edge where the "if" statement is evaluated
as a "true" and two edges where the "if" statement is evaluated as a "false." In this case,
E=3, and N equals to 2. Thus CCM = 3. Simply, the Cyclomatic Complexity Metric = (
ifs + loops + cases − return + 2 )
Prior studies of cyclomatic complexity have shown a correlation between a
program's structural complexity and its testability. The scalar level of cyclomatic
complexity suggests that a software module of higher complexity tends to produce higher
probability of errors when fixing or enhancing the source code. Thus a high level of CCM
denotes a service module that exhibits lower reliability, a difficulty to test, more costs to
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certify, and a difficulty to maintain. Hence, a higher level of CCM can be thought of in
terms of lower performance, and vice versa. The Software Engineering Institute (SEI,
1997, p. 147) established the thresholds of CCM as follows:

CCM Level
1-10
11-20
21-50
51-above

Table 53. CCM Level
Complexity
Simple Module
Moderate Complex Module
Complex Module
Very complex, untestable

Risk
Not much risk
Moderate risk
High risk
Very high risk

The comparison of coding complexity between NSS and OpenSS were made using
Cyclomatic Complexity Metrics with the thresholds of CCM as shown above.
Table 54. Comparison between NSS and OpenSSL CCM
Sub-Module
CCM_NSS CCM_OpenSSL Comment
PD
43
2
NSS PD Module has higher risk
PA
32
3
NSS PA Module has higher risk
PD+PA
75
5
Used for calculating cKPI
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Findings of Weighted Information Flow Complexity

The Weighted Information Flow Complexity (WIFC) measures inter-module
structural complexity. The detailed characteristics of WIFC can be found in (Herrmann,
2007, p. 121; IEEE 982.2, 1988, p. 74).
WIFC  ( fanin  fanout ) 2  length
where:
fanin = Number of sinking capability into the module (module loading)
fanout = Number of sourcing capability from the module (module supplying)
length = Number of source statements in the module
The following tables present the findings for NSS/OpenSSL Weighted Information Flow
Complexity of Point-Doubling, PD, and Point-Adding module, PA. The values of fanin
and fanout were derived from NSS/OpenSSL Exponentiation Function and precomputation as the callers to PD or PA.
Table 55. Findings of NSS Information Flow Complexity of PD
Coefficients of
MIN TYP MAX
Unit of
Information Flow Complexity
Measurement
2
2
2
Scalar
fanin
12
12
Scalar
fanout
58
Scalar
length
NSS_WIFC_PD
33408
Scalar

Table 56. Findings of NSS Information Flow Complexity of PA
Coefficients of
MIN TYP MAX
Unit of
Information Flow Complexity
Measurement
2
2
2
Scalar
fanin
11
11
Scalar
fanout
45
Scalar
length
NSS_WIFC_PA
21780
Scalar
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Table 57. Findings of OpenSSL Weighted Information Flow Complexity of PD
Coefficients of
MIN TYP MAX
Unit of
Weighted Information Flow
Measurement
Complexity
2
2
2
Scalar
fanin
14
14
Scalar
fanout
33
Scalar
length
OpenSSL_WIFC_PD
8448
Scalar

Table 58. Findings of OpenSSL Weighted Information Flow Complexity of PA
Coefficients of
MIN TYP MAX
Unit of
Weighted Information Flow
Measurement
Complexity
2
2
2
Scalar
fanin
14
14
Scalar
fanout
68
Scalar
length
OpenSSL_WIFC_PA
17408
Scalar

Analysis of Weighted Information Flow Complexity (WIFC)

The high level of information flow complexity indicates a possibility for broader
testing or major redesign. Additionally, the usage of WIFC might offer the following
advantages: (a) controlling the service modules with improved efficiency, (b) enabling
improvement in terms of complexity and flow content, and (c) more accuracy in
performance comparison. In short, the WIFC is another important performance factor of
PEPMA, which contributes to the overall performance evaluation.
The fanin coefficient of WIFC is the number of other modules calling to the unitunder-test; thus, fanin indicates the sinking capability. The fanout is the number of other
modules being called by this unit-under-test; hence, it is the sourcing capability of the
unit-under-test.
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The high level of fanin indicates a better design structure of the module. A higher fanin
level also reveals that the unit-under-test has been called heavily. The fanin parameter
also shows the re-usability, and thus, it can help the code implementer to reduce
redundancy during coding.
The fanout coefficient indicates the coupling between this unit-under-test and other
modules in the system. A high level of fanout means a highly coupled module. A high
level of fanout also indicates that the unit-under-test depends highly on the other module;
thus, a high level of fanout indicates a poor design structure. A high level of fanout also
increases the cost to maintain. Any code changes in the module will require modifications
to the other modules and thus directly contribute to the increased level of maintenance.
Since the number of source-code statements can vary widely, the module can be
very simple or very complex. This suggests that the metric WIFC is to be weighted with
coefficient length. Readers are referred to the literature from (Herrmann, 2007, p. 121;
IEEE 982.2, 1988, p. 74) for more descriptions of this parameter. A comparison between
NSS and OpenSSL CCM is shown below.

Sub-Module
PD

PA
PD+PA

Table 59. Comparison between NSS and OpenSSL WIFC
WIFC_NSS WIFC_OpenSSL Comment
33408
8448
NSS PD Module has higher
information flow complexity
21780
17408
NSS PA Module has higher
information flow complexity
55188
25856
Use in cPKI
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Finding of Module Maturity Index

The Module Maturity Index (MMI) measures the effect of changes from one
software module baseline to the next. The findings of MMI were derived with two
different software versions based upon a general discussion in (Herrmann, 2007, p. 121),
as originated in standards (IEEE 982.1, 1988, p. 19; IEEE 982.2, 1988, p. 51), or as
described in other standards (IEEE 982.1, 2005, p. 26).
MMI 

M  (A  C  D)
M

M = Number of modules in the baseline
A = Number of added modules from baseline
C = Number of changed modules from baseline
D = Number of deleted modules from baseline

MMI Coefficient
M
A
C
D
NSS_MMI

MMI Coefficient

M
A
C
D
OpenSSL_MMI

Table 60. Module Maturity Index, NSS
NSS Version 3.12.4
NSS Version 3.16.1
1758
1785
0
27
0
0
0
0
1
0.98

Table 61. Module Maturity Index, OpenSSL
OpenSSL Version
OpenSSL Version
FIPS 1.2.3
FIPS 2.0.5
980
1044
0
64
0
197
0
389
1
0.3
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Analysis of Module Maturity Index

In order to derive the Module Maturity Index, MMI, a side-by-side file comparison
was set out to work on files with extension *.c and *.h. With these specific settings for
file filtering, WinMerge – a “file-diff” program – computed six coefficients A, C, D for
NSS and OpenSSL as shown in tables 60 and 61. From these coefficients, the Module
Maturity Index for NSS was found to be 0.9, and the MMI for OpenSSL was 0.3.
Apparently, NSS implementation was more mature than OpenSSL implementation.
Finding of Functionality Metric

The Functionality Metric (FM) measures the interoperability between available
point-doubling and point-adding functions. There were several alternate arithmetic
approaches currently available to construct Point-Doubling (PD) and Point-Adding (PA)
functions in a projective domain. However, the mathematical results of NSS or OpenSSL
PEPMA are still the same in applying these alternate PA and PD functions. The literature
(IEEE 982.2, 1988, pp. 70-71) provided a general discussion of this metric.

Module
Point Doubling type 1
(Cohen et al., 1998)
Point Doubling type 2
(Brown et al., 2001)
Point Adding type 1
(Brown et al., 2001)
Point Adding type 2
(Brown et al., 2001)

Table 62. Functional Metric
Description
Used in NSS Point-Doubling
function
Used in OpenSSL PointDoubling function
Used in NSS Point-Adding
function
Used in OpenSSL PointAdding function

Interoperable with
OpenSSL PD

NSS PD
OpenSSL PA
NSS PA

Analysis of Functional Metric

The Functional Metric indicates that Point-Doubling or Point-Adding functions ─ as
suggested in (Cohen et al., 1998) or in (Brown et al., 2001) ─ are mathematically
interchangeable between NSS and OpenSSL. Although there was limited evidence
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showing the benefit of exchanging modules in terms of efficiency, it is interesting to note
that in some applications, exchanging modules to gain federal compliance might be
beneficial.
Summary of Key Performance Indicators

For the metric EMF, equation TOT_INS should include all CPU instructions. For
instance, one additional coefficient RET in the equation TOT_INS will make the result of
EMF accurate. This case study is described in Appendix U, and in Appendix V for a
simple 64 bit multiplication:
TOT_INS = MULq + MOVq + RET
For comparison, one should convert TOT_INS to the total number of CPU cycles.
However, there is always a “cost of quality” associated with measuring instrumentation
and modular improvements. Intensive analysis labor for adding more coefficients into the
BOCHS equations will be required to construct EMF accurately. Consequently, the
TOT_CYC values approximated by PAPI were applied: 15,230,372 for NSS EF and
2,939,649 for openSSL EF. Lower PAPI value indicates a better performance. For
computing the combined key performance indicator, the perform ratio between OpenSSL
and NSS is 518/100. Higher value indicates a better performance.
As shown in Table 42, both NSS and OpenSSL have gone through several certifying
iterations and have been working well in the fields; thus, the CM performance scores for
NSS and OpenSSL are even. For computing the combined key performance indicator, the
CM scores are normalized to 100.
Table 54 shows the results of code walk-through and inspection of CCM: 75 for
NSS and 5 for OpenSSL. Lower values indicate a better performance. For computing the
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combined key performance indicator, the perform ratio between OpenSSL and NSS is
1500/100. Higher value indicates a better performance.
Table 59 shows the results of code walk-through and inspection of WIFC: 55,188
for NSS and 25,856 for OpenSSL. Lower value indicates a better performance. For
computing the combined key performance indicator, the perform ratio between OpenSSL
and NSS is 213/100. Higher value indicates a better performance.
Table 60 and 61 show the MMI values as the results of a side-by-side file
comparison on the source codes. The final scores are 0.98 for NSS and 0.3 for OpenSSL.
For computing the combined key performance indicator, the perform ratio between
OpenSSL and NSS is 33/100. Higher value indicates a better performance.
Table 62 shows the results of code walk-through and inspection of FM: the
performance scores for NSS and OpenSSL are even. For computing the combined key
performance indicator, the FM scores are normalized to 100.
Finding of Combined Key Performance Indicator

The combined Key Performance Indicator (cKPI) is the final single scalar-value to
provide the overall performance of PEPMA. It has been shown in Herrmann (2007, pp.
123-124) that in order to derive the cKPI, the evaluator should determine the importance
level of each individual performance indicator. Subsequently, the weighted factors can be
derived from these importance levels. The lack of a proper approach to determine the
importance level might be a handicap for a practical application; however, in this study,
an observation that emerged from the findings of importance levels, and weighted factors
was that EMF usually carries the most weight; but there might be some application where
the Certification Metric may become a greater governing factor for the performance of
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PEPMA; thus, the determination of importance levels and weighted factors has been left
off from this study and should be determined on a case-by-case application. With that
said, the weighed factors listed in Table 63 on the fifth column were the author’s own
opinions while working with Certificate and Authority in 2013.

Key
Performance
Indicator
EMF

CM
CCM
WIFC
MMI
FM
cKPI

Table 63. Final cKPI of NSS/OpenSSL PEPMA
Max
NSS
OpenSSL
Weight
Value
Score
Score
%
(Reference)
100
100*15,230,372/
60
2,939,649
100
100
100
15
100
1500 (normalized)
10
100
213 (normalized)
7
100
33
5
100
100
100
3
100
100

Subtotal
(OpenSSL)

311
15
150
15.1
1.65
3
496

A higher cKPI value signifies a better performance as compared to NSS. Overall,
OpenSSL's performance is 5 times better than NSS's performance. The method for
calculating a final value of cPKI = 496 was briefly described in methodology section.
Detailed industry practice and recommendations for calculating a value of cKPI can be
found at these cited sources (Herrmann, 2007; Hennessy, 2006).
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Chapter Summary

This chapter reports the findings from six units of analyses, associated formulations,
and analysis of the findings to show evidence that the performance of PEPMA might be
unknown based on existing theoretical work. More key performance indicators to
evaluate PEPMA’s efficiency are also presented in the findings, rather than just the three
metrics (M, S and I) suggested by the existing theoretical work. The findings from two
studying cases suggested that the efficiency metrics and formal verification method along
with other key performance indicators (CM, WIFC, CCM, MMI, FM) can be used to
accurately evaluate the performance of Projective Elliptic-curve Point Multiplication in
64-bit x86 Runtime Environment.
What has emerged in the findings and analysis of the key performance indicators is
the overall performance of PEPMA, which measured by the combined key performance
indicator, should be a function based on role-sharing rather than a single dedicated
performance indicator. The role-sharing relates to the importance of each role, and it
must be carefully determined on a case-by-case basis. Finally, based on the empirical
comparison of sub-modules and low-level services, clearly that a formal performance
evaluation approach will provide a useful tool to enable the code implementers to
improve PEPMA’s efficiency.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary
This chapter is organized into five sections. The beginning section titled "Objective
and Goal" reiterates several main evaluation methodologies and summarizes the purpose
of this study. The concept of reductionism, which is finding the most fundamental
metrics and formulations and reducing them to one final result, is central to this research.
In the section titled “Conclusion,” we present our thoughts regarding reductionism. The
“Implications” section recapitulates the findings and the results from chapter 4. On
logical grounds, there is no compelling reason to disagree with the generality of this
research. Section 3 implies that this research on PEPMA can be realistically expanded
beyond its original goal and scope. Section 4 “Practical Applications” provides ways to
apply this study to industry applications; and the section titled “Recommendation”
provides a recommendation of changes to improve PEPMA’s performance evaluation.
Lastly, a "Future Work" clause briefly lists out future tasks that could enhance the
performance evaluation.
Objective and Goal Review

It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the fact that network penetration by
malicious software is getting more sophisticated every day. According to US-CERT,
more than one hundred thousand damaging intrusion attacks to the U.S. military network
have occurred every year. This highlights the need for the next-generation public-key
exchange design to encompass high withstanding capability. This requirement poses a
major challenge to software professionals who will need to search for an innovative
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approach to derive longer private keys with the best performance possible. For this
reason, the main topic of this study was to focus on a specific performance comparison of
projective Elliptic-curve point-multiplication in a 64-bit x86 runtime environment ─ an
effort to compare quantitative key performance indicators between two FIPS-certified
Projective Elliptic-curve Point-Multiplication Agents for the purpose of improving
PEPMA itself.
To realize such empirical comparisons, the research focused on uncovering whether
the performance of PEPMA might be unknown based on existing theoretical work and
revealing what metrics should be used to truthfully evaluate efficiency through the use of
virtual machine and performance hardware counters. After these questions have been
satisfactorily answered, the evaluator eventually will attempt to seek ways to improve
PEPMA’s final performance based on such empirical comparisons.
In order to fulfill these objectives, we constructed a specific performance
measurement system that targeted two FIPS-certified PEPMA open-sources: NSS and
OpenSSL. We used various means to extract the findings. They were found through the
review of existing industrial documentation and the active contents of cryptographic
certificates. They were also found by examining NSS/OpenSSL open-source codes, and
by discovered the efficiency through executable-binaries that run under both host and
guest Operating Systems. We were able to complete all objectives of this study
successfully. The ultimate goal of this research was to develop and suggest a repeatable
and deterministic evaluation approach of the performance of PEPMA.
As previously stated in the product requirements, the evaluation approach shall
provide a detailed framework to construct a better evaluation method with deterministic
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verification systems. Thus, the final contribution to the field of cryptography is a formal
and practical evaluation method that can guide the evaluator through the performance
improvement of PEPMA.
Conclusion

This study provided the following answers to the three research questions posted in
Chapter 1.
Research Question 1: Is the performance of PEPMA unknown based on existing
theoretical work?
Case evidence for this question showed that the performance of PEPMA is unknown
based on existing theoretical work. In order to accurately describe the performance of
PEPMA, the evaluator should include at least six Key Performance Indicators and
combine them into a final value cKPI as listed in Table 63.
The quantity Efficiency Metric and Formulation was derived from the software
reviews combined with the usage of a special virtualization technology and hardware
performance counters. The computational efficiency comparison leveraged around these
two technologies.
The judgment of Compliance Metric is subjective; thus, the research provided a
discussion for ruling the compliance with respect to the DoD source-selection guide. The
remaining key performance indicators (CCM, WIFC, MMI and FM) are quantitative
metrics. They were derived from the manual software reviews. The manual software
reviews in this study adhered to the code walk-through and software inspection formal
process as recommended in IEEE standards.
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Research Question 2: What metrics should be used to truthfully evaluate PEPMA's
efficiency?
NSS/OpenSSL case evidence and data validations from BOCHS and PAPI showed
that the metric to truthfully evaluate PEPMA's efficiency is the cost equations provided
by the CPU instruction software counters. The CPU instruction software counters are
realized with machine virtualization technology, BOCHS.
The instruments BOCHS which provided machine virtualization can accurately
measure the total number of CPU instructions and CPU cycles. It can also indicate what
types of CPU instruction that PEPMA uses. In short, machine virtualization allowed
accurate counting each CPU instruction; and at the same time, provided an indication of
what CPU instructions are being used. By analyzing these parameters in the cost
equations, the evaluator will be able to determine ways to improve PEPMA’s efficiency
and targeting precisely which software module can be improved, even without library
source code. It is also feasible to derive an accurate cost equation by expanding the
BOCHS software counters to cover all CPU instructions.
There is always a “cost of quality” associated with measuring instrumentation and
improvements. Intensive analysis labor for adding more coefficients into the BOCHS
equations will be required to construct this metric.
The second most accurate metric is the PAPI hardware CPU instruction counter.
This quantity can be measured quickly and effortlessly but it cannot be used for modular
improvement. The third accurate metric is the PAPI hardware CPU cycle counter. This
quantity can also be measured quickly and effortlessly but it, too, cannot be used for
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modular improvement. All PAPI type measurements are less accurate than BOCH
instrumentation; however they do complement the construction of cost equations.
Research Question 3: Are there ways to improve PEPMA’s efficiency based on the
empirical comparison?
Documentation search and/or certificates were used to determine some possible
areas of improvement with respect to PEPMA’s overall performance. However, the
primary method of searching for ways to improve efficiency was through the examination
of NSS/OpenSSL source codes. Subsequently, the cost formulas for the empirical
comparison and data validation were constructed. Furthermore, PEPMA’s efficiency can
also be improved by running the executable binaries under both host and guest Operating
Systems (Virtual Machine using BOCHS) then comparing the results to the program
outputs.
In general, the reductionism method is a powerful approach for studying and improving
complex mathematical systems ─ systems such as PEPMA. This is an approach to
comprehend each level of complexity in terms of the next lower level; and perhaps, this is
the traditional philosophy of reductionism simply stated: "Let us find the most
fundamental parts and laws." Gell-Mann (1996) and Morowitz (2002) further see the
complex system that always possesses multiple complexities; and such complexities
always reside scattering in an extended space of dimensionalities.
While the introduction, literature review, and methodology sections already
provided some evidence to describe those complexities, the findings from six units of
analyses in the results chapter have uncovered those extended spaces of dimensionalities.
The exploration of findings has shown concrete facts that the performance of PEPMA
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was incomplete based on existing theoretical work, which operates and resides only in a
one-dimensional metric. Additionally, together with the findings, the constructed
formulas and multiple data analyses have confirmed which metrics could be used to
truthfully evaluate PEPMA's efficiency.
Furthermore, the findings and the results based on six units of analyses suggested a
comprehensive setup for a formal evaluation method with several Key Performance
Indicators instead of a single indicator as suggested through existing theoretical work. A
combined Key Performance Indicator, cPKI, then can be derived from these individual
Key Performance Indicators; the final single numerical score registered in the combined
Key Performance Indicator will show how well a PEPMA performs relative to other
PEPMA(s).
Implications

Although the ultimate goal of this research singularly focused on an evaluation
approach of the performance of PEPMA, this research can be realistically expanded
beyond its original goal and scope.
Practical Applications

One possible application in the cryptographic field is the code implementation of
Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) public-key-exchange protocol running on limited
computing-power platforms. These platforms may include tablet PCs, wrist-worn
computers, or futuristic micro-size computing gadgets. Because of limited computingpower, these tablet PCs or wrist-worn computers must rely on highly efficient public-key
exchange, PEPMA in particular, to accomplish its public-key exchange function in a very
short duration; at the same time, the computing platforms must also meet or exceed other
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performance indicators such as Cyclomatic Complexity. The results of this research
support the idea that to effectively improve PEPMA, the evaluator should have a way to
accurately measure it first. Along with a concept of point-computation in a projective
domain, a deep understanding of how PEPMA was implemented and processed is the key
to realize a high-performance Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman protocol.
Another possible application of this research relates to Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS). As the name implies, IDS is a device that is specifically designed to detect and
prevent malicious intrusion to a system. However, before it can effectively perform that
defensive task, the internal structure of IDS must provide accurate and reliable intrinsic
services. The performance evaluation and measuring instruments of PEPMA may be used
to improve IDS design. Furthermore, the performance evaluation of PEPMA can be
mapped directly to the performance evaluation of IDS with minimum re-engineering
efforts since most methodologies and verification tools have already been built.
The third benefit as the result of improving efficiency of PEPMA can be directed at
the cryptographic hardware units. For instance, most Internet data traffic coming in and
out of a military base must go through several layers of data filtering. These sessionbased digital filtering functions are being executed inside a piece of high-speed hardware
known as "the Guard" which is capable of accomplishing traffic filtering at a data rate of
ten or more Giga-bit per second (multiple Giga bytes per second filtering capability in
real-time). To realize this lightning task, the Guard must transform all data into a
projective domain, process data filtration in this domain, and convert them back into
time-domain – all done in real-time on custom-made hardware fabrics (or using Field
Programmable Gate Array, FPGA). The efficiency evaluation of PEPMA may be useful
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during design and/or evaluation of the Guard and thus might result in better hardware
design and firmware/micro code engineering.
Recommendations

Applying Formal Evaluation Approach:
What has emerged from the result of this study was the overall performance of
PEPMA measured by a combined key performance indicator. This indicator suggested
that the performance measurement should be a function based on role-sharing rather than
a single dedicated performance indicator. This research sought to remedy the use of an
insufficient one-dimensional performance indicator as suggested in theoretical work. The
objective was done by reviewing other methods used in industry during a time period
spanning two decades. Because of this insufficient performance merriment, one of the
recommendations is to instigate a change to the way performance evaluation has been
performed. The rationale behind giving out this suggestion is to remedy a problem: It is
necessary but insufficient to evaluate the performance of Elliptic-curve scalar pointmultiplication in projective geometry using the total number of single-digit non-modular
multiplication metric, or single-digit non-modular squaring metric, or under an
unspecified computing architecture.
Another

recommendation

relates

to the

use

of

advanced

measurement

instrumentation: A virtual machine can be used to precisely and accurately measure the
performance metrics. As a matter of fact, commercial industry and government entity are
utilizing virtual machines today to suppress adversaries on the world-wide network by
accurately measuring suspicious activities occurring real-time on a piece of malware.
Bottom-line, using a virtual machine to acquire metrics instead of relying on the primitive
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clock() measurement method will offer consistent and accurate results on the
performance comparison of a projective Elliptic-curve point-multiplication in a 64-bit
x86 runtime environment.
Efficiency Improvement:
A particular feature was noted at NSS exponentiation procedure where a number of
projective point-adding can be reduced by increasing the width of the sliding-window
from 4 to 5. Even though the exponentiation procedure uses a 5-bit sliding-window for
the computation, there will be only sixteen pre-computed values needed since the
implementation could apply the binary signed representation as described previously.
This reduces calling the point-adding function by 5:1 instead of 4:1 as currently
implemented in NSS.
During the findings, another property was spotted in NSS half-digit 32-bit numeric
representation that can be adjusted for improving efficiency. The conversion of existing
codes from a half-digit 32-bit representation to a 65-bit numeric representation (64-bit
with hardware carry bit) is possible in a 64-bit x86 system. Such successful conversion
can significantly change the computing efficiency of PEPMA. This improvement can also
be applied to OpenSSL PEPMA since its 58-bit numeric representation was not at the
optimum level.
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Future Work

Performance evaluation of PEPMA is a complex interdisciplinary research and thus,
works involved with such multiple complexities will never be complete. One of the
dimensions within interdisciplinary research is the uncertainties associated with their
complexities. Before dealing more with such multidisciplinary exploration, it is necessary
to acknowledge any missing or weaknesses of the findings in this study. Among the
desirable findings listed in the result chapter, three essential findings as shown below in
Table 64 have yet been fully realized. Those open deficiencies should be remedied to
provide better accuracy in the evaluation. Realizing these additional measuring
instruments suggests a variety of research to improve the combined key performance
indicator; and the plan is to continue tackling these problems with future works and/or in
the extension of this study making the performance evaluation more accurate.

Future Work
(Why)
Evaluating Low-level
Arithmetic and Arithmetic
Optimization
(To enhance efficiency
measurement)
Enhancing Synchronization
Agent
(Improving accuracy for
efficiency measurement)
Evaluating Compliance
Metric on every service
module
(To enhance compliance)

Table 64. Future Work
Area of Enhancing

Rationale of
Deficiency
We could not provide
Including the findings and
such findings and
data analyses on six lowlevel mathematic routines as data analyses due to
shown in Figure 30, block . limited scope of this
paper
Figure 21, BOCHS Hardware Virtual machine realEmulation and
time response was
Synchronization Agent
slow

Compliance

Subjective and
complex
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Appendix A. Counting CPU Instructions
The cost indexes of s_mpv_mul_d_add () NSS PEPMA executable code:
Table 65. Cost Index of s_mpv_mul_d_add()
movq
Count
29

movq
Latency
6

movq Cost Index
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imulq
Count
4

imulq
Latency
10

imulq
Cost Index
40

Cost for functional computation is higher when cost index is higher.
The s_mpv_mul_d_add () NSS PEPMA 64-bit executable code compiled under GCC 4.7:
Table 66. The s_mpv_mul_d_add NSS PEPMA Executable Code
s_mpv_mul_d_add:
.LFB122:
.cfi_startproc
pushq
.cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
.cfi_offset 12, -16
pushq
.cfi_def_cfa_offset 24
.cfi_offset 6, -24
pushq
.cfi_def_cfa_offset 32
.cfi_offset 3, -32
movq
testl
je
movq
shrq
subl
leaq
movl
andl
movabsq
.L122:
movq
movq
movq
andl
movq
shrq
movq
imulq
movq
imulq
addq
movq

%r12

#

%rbp

#

%rbx

#

$0, carry(%rip)
%esi, %esi
.L117
%rdx, %r9
$32, %r9
$1, %esi
8(,%rsi,8), %r10
$0, %eax
$4294967295, %edx
$4294967296, %r11

#, carry
# a_len
#,
# b, D.6652
#, D.6652
#, tmp90
#, D.9447
#, ivtmp.694
#, D.6649
#, tmp105

(%rdi,%rax), %r8
%r8, a_i(%rip)
%r8, %rsi
$4294967295, %esi
%r8, %rbp
$32, %rbp
%r9, %rbx
%rsi, %rbx
%rdx, %r8
%rbp, %r8
%rbx, %r8
%r8, %r12

#* ivtmp.694, a_i.273
# a_i.273, a_i
# a_i.273, D.6648
#, D.6648
# a_i.273, D.6651
#, D.6651
# D.6652, a0b1
# D.6648, a0b1
# D.6649, a1b0
# D.6651, a1b0
# a0b1, a1b0.706
# a1b0.706, tmp92
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shrq
imulq
leaq
movq
cmpq
jbe
addq
movq

$32, %r12
%r9, %rbp
(%r12,%rbp), %rbp
%rbp, a1b1(%rip)
%r8, %rbx
.L118
%r11, %rbp
%rbp, a1b1(%rip)

#, tmp92
# D.6652, tmp93
#, a1b1.278
# a1b1.278, a1b1
# a1b0.706, a0b1
#,
# tmp105, tmp95
# tmp95, a1b1

salq
imulq
leaq
cmpq
movq
adcq
movq
addq
movq
cmpq
adcq
movq
movq
movq
addq
movq
cmpq
adcq
movq

$32, %r8
%rdx, %rsi
(%rsi,%r8), %rsi
%r8, %rsi
a1b1(%rip), %rbx
$0, %rbx
carry(%rip), %r8
%r8, %rsi
%rsi, a0b0(%rip)
%r8, %rsi
$0, %rbx
%rbx, a1b1(%rip)
(%rcx,%rax), %r8
%r8, a_i(%rip)
%r8, %rsi
%rsi, a0b0(%rip)
%r8, %rsi
$0, %rbx
%rbx, a1b1(%rip)

movq
movq
movq
addq
cmpq
jne
addq

%rsi, (%rcx,%rax)
a1b1(%rip), %rbx
%rbx, carry(%rip)
$8, %rax
%r10, %rax
.L122
%r10, %rcx

#, a1b0.707
# D.6649, a0b0.281
#, a0b0.281
#a1b0.707, a0b0.281
# a1b1, tmp100
#, tmp99
# carry, carry.283
#carry.283, a0b0.284
# a0b0.284, a0b0
#carry.283, a0b0.284
#, tmp106
# tmp106, a1b1
#* ivtmp.694, a_i.285
# a_i.285, a_i
# a_i.285, a0b0.286
# a0b0.286, a0b0
# a_i.285, a0b0.286
#, tmp101
# tmp101, a1b1
#a0b0.286,*
ivtmp.694
# a1b1, a1b1
# a1b1, carry
#, ivtmp.694
# D.9447, ivtmp.694
#,
# D.9447, c

movq
movq
popq
.cfi_def_cfa_offset 24
popq
.cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
popq
.cfi_def_cfa_offset 8
ret

carry(%rip), %rax
%rax, (%rcx)
%rbx

# carry, carry
# carry,* c
#

%rbp

#

%r12

#

.L118:

.L117:
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Appendix B. ECDH Protocol
The ECDH cryptography protocol used for exchanging private keys is believed to
be intractable under an unsecured communication channel. Additionally, it is not feasible
to find the discrete logarithm of a random 521-bit Elliptic curve element with respect to a
publicly known base point G(x, y). The ECDH procedure starts out at transaction (1) with
Client's domain parameters (p, a, b, G, n, h). The complete ECHD transaction under a
public viewer and on an unsecured communication channel is summarized in the figure
below. The scalar product calculation of k(x, y) occurs at the computations of sG, cG,
csG, where G(x, y) is the generator for the cyclic subgroup with order n. Furthermore, the
scalar product nG(x, y) must equal to the infinity point O of the Elliptic curve; h is the
cofactor that equals to the size of cyclic subgroup divided by n; h = E(Fp)/n

Figure 39. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Used with PEPMA
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At time (1), Client initiates the session by sending a request signal followed by a
proposed cipher and the client’s PKE capability. Since both Server and Client have
agreed on the cipher suite, they have the same domain parameters, including modulus 7 p;
curve coefficient a and b; base point G(x, y); curve’s order n; and cofactor h. At time (2),
Server is ready to accept the connection and generates 521-bit random number s. Server
then multiplies s with the base point G(x, y). This product is designated as Qs = s×G(x, y).
The Server sends Qs to the client (optionally with digital signature ECDSA). At time
(3), Client receives Qs and verifies that it has received the one sent from Server. Then
Client computes the shared secret key: the product of two components c × Qs . Since Qs
equals to s × G(x, y), then the shared secret key c × Qs must be c × s × G(x, y).
The Client then proceeds to compute the public key c × G and sends it to the Server.
This product is designated as Qc = c × G(x, y). At time (4), Server receives Qc and
computes the product s × Qc . Equivalently, s × Qc equals to s × c × G(x, y); it also equals
to c × Qs – the shared secret of Client that sent from Client. At time (4), both parties have
exchanged an elliptic curve based private key under the observation of public viewers.
On the Server side, PEPMA can help reduce computing costs when calculating sG
and cQs. On the Client side, PEPMA can help reduce computing costs when calculating
cG and cQs. Readers are referred to the next Appendix for a numerical example of this
transaction.

7

Modulus p is the same as modulus m in this research. It is a 521-bit prime.

169

Appendix C. An ECDH Transaction
The following data shows the results from an ECDH key negotiation corresponding
to the transactions described in ECDH protocol.
base point x
MSB.........................................LSB
|.........| |.........| |.........| |.........|
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 C6
85 8E 06 B7 04 04 E9 CD 9E 3E CB 66 23 95 B4 42
9C 64 81 39 05 3F B5 21 F8 28 AF 60 6B 4D 3D BA
A1 4B 5E 77 EF E7 59 28 FE 1D C1 27 A2 FF A8 DE
33 48 B3 C1 85 6A 42 9B F9 7E 7E 31 C2 E5 BD 66
base point y
MSB.........................................LSB
|.........| |.........| |.........| |.........|
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 18
39 29 6A 78 9A 3B C0 04 5C 8A 5F B4 2C 7D 1B D9
98 F5 44 49 57 9B 44 68 17 AF BD 17 27 3E 66 2C
97 EE 72 99 5E F4 26 40 C5 50 B9 01 3F AD 07 61
35 3C 70 86 A2 72 C2 40 88 BE 94 76 9F D1 66 50
Server public key x
MSB.........................................LSB
|.........| |.........| |.........| |.........|
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 42
B5 EF EB 9C 79 89 77 5C F2 E4 B8 5F 0C EA 2E 2F
84 3D D7 DF 63 0E 9E 68 5F 9D 6B 0C F4 C7 9A A4
D9 83 7E C9 FB 53 B3 0D 3A 18 9E E3 50 4A 61 8D
47 55 FB 5A 88 C0 FF 3C 0F 73 A9 1D C5 AF 1D 60
Server public key y
MSB.........................................LSB
|.........| |.........| |.........| |.........|
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 27
62 AE 23 71 19 28 7A 17 DF 44 91 ED 14 F8 73 AD
4C BC 3F 6C C9 82 54 3B B5 07 CE 5D A4 AD E7 28
91 86 F3 D3 02 26 57 5E 70 54 A8 CC F5 E0 2B EF
D7 45 DA 26 CF 7C A9 8B A8 3B 4E DD 4D 25 2E 7D
Client private key x
MSB.........................................LSB
|.........| |.........| |.........| |.........|
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 21
FF 0E 29 45 9A 0B 2F 19 C0 81 C8 91 4E 30 8B 47
FF 8D 93 DD CC 06 BF 5D 20 70 82 73 55 7A 1F F1
73 44 F2 53 E7 1B 44 39 13 89 2C 60 43 7F 6F BD
15 D6 F2 8B EA 55 E1 30 CE 3D DC D9 A4 B9 F0 74
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Client private key y
MSB.........................................LSB
|.........| |.........| |.........| |.........|
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28
0A EA 55 12 25 26 44 1F 69 7C A9 F2 13 CF F3 3A
AB BF B6 25 BD C7 47 AC BA 2A 5E 20 5D BE E3 ED
9B D2 F5 0E C9 0B D7 F9 79 52 92 77 F8 94 88 8F
E8 BA 5C B7 2A 7D 95 55 28 6D C3 A9 8E 0D E9 E1
Client public key x
MSB.........................................LSB
|.........| |.........| |.........| |.........|
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 0F
D4 4B 13 C3 4A F1 9C DA E0 88 28 8D 5A 88 99 B1
67 23 6D 41 EE 77 1B 1D 06 64 AA 05 94 23 4A F1
78 A8 FB CA 5E 51 C0 AA 85 6C BB 3C E2 0C 10 B9
A1 ED 79 33 F0 0D BD 0A 2A 6B 87 F2 6F 06 43 84
Client public key y
MSB.........................................LSB
|.........| |.........| |.........| |.........|
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 DB
63 3D 86 7A 51 AB 8B D3 81 5F 50 B7 C5 5F 05 21
58 14 0A D0 D7 74 A4 1B 4B BC 91 C0 5A 5D 5C 86
D9 3C 54 34 4D 90 C8 EB 62 5A 28 98 76 00 6E 8C
7F D8 59 E9 19 B0 58 3B 4E A1 B6 D9 9F 87 FF 27
Server private key x, a.k.a. our key x
MSB.........................................LSB
|.........| |.........| |.........| |.........|
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 21
FF 0E 29 45 9A 0B 2F 19 C0 81 C8 91 4E 30 8B 47
FF 8D 93 DD CC 06 BF 5D 20 70 82 73 55 7A 1F F1
73 44 F2 53 E7 1B 44 39 13 89 2C 60 43 7F 6F BD
15 D6 F2 8B EA 55 E1 30 CE 3D DC D9 A4 B9 F0 74
Server private key y, a.k.a. our key y
MSB.........................................LSB
|.........| |.........| |.........| |.........|
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 28
0A EA 55 12 25 26 44 1F 69 7C A9 F2 13 CF F3 3A
AB BF B6 25 BD C7 47 AC BA 2A 5E 20 5D BE E3 ED
9B D2 F5 0E C9 0B D7 F9 79 52 92 77 F8 94 88 8F
E8 BA 5C B7 2A 7D 95 55 28 6D C3 A9 8E 0D E9 E1
Exchanged key x part was successful
Exchanged key y part was successful

The numeric example above shows the private key has two parts: x and y. The actual
private key can be concatenated from x and y, making it a 1042-bit key.
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Appendix D. Modulus m, Order m
In this research, italic letter "m" is used as a label for the Mersenne modulus of
NIST P-521 Elliptic curve. Related literature might have used another letter to represent
the modulus. One common designation from the industry is letter "p" for prime. Here,
this letter "p" has already been designated as a Cartesian Elliptic-curve point p(x, y).
Table 67. The Modulus of Finite Field
Format
Hexadecimal

Decimal
Number
of Bits
Is m Prime?

m = 2521 – 1, log2(m+1) = 521
000001FF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
686479766013060971498190079908139321726943530014330540
939446345918554318339765605212255964066145455497729631
1391480858037121987999716643812574028291115057151
521
Probably

The order of the cyclic subgroup is designated as italic letter "n".
Table 68. The Order of Finite Field
Hexadecimal

Decimal
Number
of Bits
Is n Prime?

00001FF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFA 51868783 BF2F966B
7FCC0148 F709A5D0 3BB5C9B8 899C47AE BB6FB71E
91386409
686479766013060971498190079908139321726943530014330540
939446345918554318339765539424505774633321719753296399
6371363321113864768612440380340372808892707005449
521
Probably
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Appendix E. Point Adding of NSA Test Vectors
Input: k, x, y
Output: k×(x, y)
scalar k
MSB.........................................LSB
|.........| |.........| |.........| |.........|
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 EB
7F 81 78 5C 96 29 F1 36 A7 E8 F8 C6 74 95 71 09
73 55 54 11 1A 2A 86 6F A5 A1 66 69 94 19 BF A9
93 6C 78 B6 26 53 96 4D F0 D6 DA 94 0A 69 5C 72
94 D4 1B 2D 66 00 DE 6D FC F0 ED CF C8 9F DC B1
point x
MSB.........................................LSB
|.........| |.........| |.........| |.........|
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 D5
C6 93 F6 6C 08 ED 03 AD 0F 03 1F 93 74 43 45 8F
60 1F D0 98 D3 D0 22 7B 4B F6 28 73 AF 50 74 0B
0B B8 4A A1 57 FC 84 7B CF 8D C1 6A 8B 2B 8B FD
8E 2D 0A 7D 39 AF 04 B0 89 93 0E F6 DA D5 C1 B4
point y
MSB.........................................LSB
|.........| |.........| |.........| |.........|
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 44
B7 77 09 63 C6 3A 39 24 88 65 FF 36 B0 74 15 1E
AC 33 54 9B 22 4A F5 C8 66 4C 54 01 2B 81 8E D0
37 B2 B7 C1 A6 3A C8 9E BA A1 1E 07 DB 89 FC EE
5B 55 6E 49 76 4E E3 FA 66 EA 7A E6 1A C0 18 23
point x3
MSB.........................................LSB
|.........| |.........| |.........| |.........|
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 91
B1 5D 09 D0 CA 03 53 F8 F9 6B 93 CD B1 34 97 B0
A4 BB 58 2A E9 EB EF A3 5E EE 61 BF 7B 7D 04 1B
8E C3 4C 6C 00 C0 C0 67 1C 4A E0 63 31 8F B7 5B
E8 7A F4 FE 85 96 08 C9 5F 0A B4 77 4F 8C 95 BB
point y3
MSB.........................................LSB
|.........| |.........| |.........| |.........|
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 30
F8 F8 B5 E1 AB B4 DD 94 F6 BA AF 65 4A 2D 58 10
41 1E 77 B7 42 39 65 E0 C7 FD 79 EC 1A E5 63 C2
07 BD 25 5E E9 82 8E B7 A0 3F ED 56 52 40 D2 CC
80 DD D2 CE CB B2 EB 50 F0 95 1F 75 AD 87 97 7F
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Appendix F. NIST Test Vectors
# CAVS 11.0
# "Key Pair" information
# Curves selected: P-192 P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 K-163 K-233 K-283 K-409 K-571
B-163 B-233 B-283 B-409 B-571
# Generated on Wed Mar 16 16:16:42 2011
[P-521]
[B.4.2 Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates]
N = 10

d=
0184258EA667AB99D09D4363B3F51384FC0ACD2F3B66258EF31203ED30363FCDA7661B6A817DA
AF831415A1F21CB1CDA3A74CC1865F2EF40F683C14174EA72803CFF
Qx =
019EE818048F86ADA6DB866B7E49A9B535750C3673CB61BBFE5585C2DF263860FE4D8AA8F7486
AED5EA2A4D733E346EAEFA87AC515C78B9A986EE861584926CE4860
Qy =
01B6809C89C0AA7FB057A32ACBB9AB4D7B06BA39DBA8833B9B54424ADD2956E95FE48B7FBF6
0C3DF5172BF386F2505F1E1BB2893DA3B96D4F5AE78F2544881A238F7
d=
014B967F6651B5E6A482FCCC609AB6630B3806FE1F94F4083319B0B50575FB3436A04F508172F7F
C396D6E969CA3E8D1C1E9A84D431A48B94F30566DC6808DD1D138
Qx =
0145F371040D3D4A24D6D3CEB2681DB207B77096AB57606D92981A69CE35A0AC4628C2DC1284E
4DD9715CDE46F18B59E9FC98FEA162CEB6E2C481ECBFAD4E19D3ABF
Qy =
0125EB751FF4FB8BB98E1FB455D2CFB35E3323DE5C7280FC9E51729704F4FEC51D5A6CE6C1F75
DBF710E1F9D3EE9F2A77E7C12C045E729D0E9A281C37F0F07B8CF0C
d=
7616133442038E27357DB450C353BD11FBA3BCAC8B7B8C3EF76AADB5FE05BE1DD57A22D42A5
444D00DCD018D389170C54FE781CB21C36020F657D001E1CBB41DD1
Qx =
BBECF65446053080CC1CF955938C58EB630C84ECAD2756F93B47EBFA9F9BCA3FA834353981260
8CAB2D3A9F8079AB8311A4F269B0A3CD9E0DDD066FC4121D92F0E
Qy =
01DD96DB411AD67997B10D42C76B8510C8A930DFA9A5927AC274B0C5021798690777B8E77E6AE
2648BF513E02F586898E7DAE20D71D19838A9F3175F06B057C5F2F4
d=
013BCC0ED286861D3F5463BCFC0B68A6EC0FCF86291BA41257838B72536ADA986E43E05EC4C32
C0B29DA632DD1CE39EFC81C8278F5D18D9CF27F6E75523821A46D99
Qx =
A3A165C2BB535D1041D54B749E2F6E6C734A03C09DF69C14A5DD2AA57790ACC504548885F0BD
3A44F8B66BB9C36B3FF257D7D465EFB81445D4CC5A5AF7F36C679C
Qy =
8A5D094E4F2AA18FB877D2649DFD76F9482AC2E049AEFBB463F3C9061CFDFAEC785DF9577A09
0E45A17330F422FB16A16ACCCFF9ADE7B034EC544C7A8AEA441C49
d=
01F79977450CE5887AE2EF7D648AB658C056E57F0A690CF28A4E94F373F2C15EB3C0D3E0D670FE
CA6FF02D5FD03187146EB85E09D72F8CABB1900D0C338A23080C12
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Qx =
016D9EDE24A3950098798766E57C53F2749CD0D3F56CA0904A3711C030965291EDD5C6FE0903771
768F42340E88E1CD2F161358972775FA53E5B87C3B660ACC447E2
Qy =
010CA5CFE6DF8E069AE1326DD9E18CCA75CDE7CB24B427A409025F9E12B5098A56A20BB90B1
D23B75FAD7A54F9E25FF892E1236D1717F1F94E18FA2289F899FE2221
d=
9A9160D2614937C33284627826BE871C26407C84D23E6D23DE5F5F48B500B89B0BC07F10C4E0FB9
9C085D9E9D7149278F76E3FAE4ABAEEEF2495FE3D228EF0F949
Qx =
019ED72E6BFC673F2A852ACF9D60E2C3B19C50A56C54AC304612B26F83AFE1AFF4F87DCA458E
83B6F89EC48F8B1A20931ACD3C97C71BF21B5633CF4FD68437DB45C1
Qy =
D141DC4272CA03A528AD8FDADE9ECB3070FB2D4AF0BB296ABDAED651B5D26573EB4443A4D
0D4134FF248D8ED402C93BF6A905CB2792B9CECB4AEB69ED78F410382
d=
2FDC02492573228ADA3FA8A2DB68D72E9396A2BFCA9A8EBDB5C2955CC894A7493CFAE001759
368EB8FFC3C29B15365F6484CDD6A44E084F1D3C88DBA7AA4F29C3C
Qx =
010BA48733FC3E8F54F601F74659BCD43FDE4CF8C5A07DA341CE68E792F8F70721C23DC6D9B1B
401BD3254C8DE546E9367F10AEE947B1DD295E6D822524546DDC195
Qy =
01B2C0EA5C4171CDC069FC6C69E18636CFA404F487A143B3981A1F212969CDBD6601A84302867F
8A4A4730FDCD0F994C226F7C02C5E664B79C34B7E5D071423FF528
d=
01AD69406C11C66FAD5FE2295F0E526622488755ECB18BA12EE51FA879ED47FF5F5B05195A821E
8D36489492B5DE2009F303E17B9FDF6379DAE52C0178A16927CA38
Qx =
01F1CA24041BA73812C1124E96454545C45AB903407AFCE3105108362ED3CB4F7D0D5B1466074C
2EF22C7FD1EBC16E74A74A163FBB2F530EF44549DAD81E806F24D6
Qy =
6B34D6EFF12BB76AEE9BD7AC590E437735AE77DA4A60191E8E01F1CEB8AD7C1EDA4D0F84D4
ED2DC72DE702D351EF8F64B2CDF2A95EF185D3119F276F6CCB3C5A65
d=
013C41B6514C608A2E4696CFC6BD2DDD36611CA5DBF6F2D2E3E32A1925C5AE4FF591DCAA75C
4E8043ADCB99D510CB664868BB638A2C52B81BB240A974548A68FCE79
Qx =
C6D82F16433C71E37F2E9779BE4599A3B1DDA415F6C338E52DF4CA70607A69637B50170F21BBB7
F60B9A9C145BB63E6D4F370FCD00BFB60F7A0DC55CC44F65FC90
Qy =
0152344D6F2E72DEB2C59FF2AE268FB067279A1942AE231734BA980C5457A6A73BBF2B13343AE4
4A0C8A712572851DA4B91065EE0436ABE811AE71883C4A2F1B797F
d=
316E2D06FD00C9C4266EA20BF60CDF867859A6F5BA242DE35054CDCF5486E5E344AB1D1BCE13
E2CC831137320774EC3AB0F6FB554FCCEC56ADA267959794898028
Qx =
A183880E61C6E0435E591694E51F63C099FCD5B61E3DDACC4057399AFC6A90321424AB0EC1699
AEEB9C404616D62C23466132B52583C18D3530116B58AD41452F0
Qy =
191E06057E2282B4DE6E0741FB37B04F0E6AE172BE81267B0DB3023E7A116AC5861DECD54BA84
E15D5FD64D6CA628461B79E120851BED1C74ADEBE3DDEE838A170
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Appendix G. NSS Exponentiation Procedure
Users will find NSS PEPMA in its source code repository (NSS-1, 2014). The NSS
exponentiation procedure is coded in the source file "ecp_jac.c". NSS PEPMA makes 524
calls to the point-doubling and 131 calls to the point-adding function. The following
messages list some essential entrant parameters to the PEPMA:
GFMethod_consGFp
modulus
=
1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
FFF
order
=
1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
FFA51868783BF2F966B7FCC0148F709A5D03BB5C9B8899C47AEBB6FB71E91386
409
a
=
1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
FFC
b
=
51953EB9618E1C9A1F929A21A0B68540EEA2DA725B99B315F3B8B489918EF109E
156193951EC7E937B1652C0BD3BB1BF073573DF883D2C34F1EF451FD46B503F00
genx
=
81D687818FC9BA21A2C7B00FE84C69E8113DA5FB1439D7A83A0585DC2550ABF
E423DE7C6E0B54595C5FEC716853E9CD7825844C9877B6D6AE0DA7571A4FD9B0
23B
geny
=
144B7770963C63A39248865FF36B074151EAC33549B224AF5C8664C54012B818ED
037B2B7C1A63AC89EBAA11E07DB89FCEE5B556E49764EE3FA66EA7AE61AC01
823
scalar
d
=
1EB7F81785C9629F136A7E8F8C674957109735554111A2A866FA5A166699419BFA
9936C78B62653964DF0D6DA940A695C7294D41B2D6600DE6DFCF0EDCFC89FDC
B1
ec_GFp_pt_mul_jac
mp_digit size = 8
unsigned int = 4
unsigned long = 8
unsigned long long = 8
Exiting ec_GFp_pt_mul_jac
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Total double = 524, total add = 131
Total double bypass = 0, total add bypass = 1

result x =
4634C62EEC4F2D875DE95AE71E95C58812342A29A37139A23299F053203F9BE9D
00E057C6CBBFB8D6C6D9EFDBE34BA409949AD09809B15A98A08637136CE7239
37
result y =
162495DB3E31BE7E8EEFCD96EE6698EB915DE882118DFAD1BC83B1369FAB93A
35D69C0E9A7A3CA1D7F83ED2EE2FBFD565AAF76A65BBC1C1C7C97CFF45DD7
B533FAF
An incomplete listing of NSS PEPMA is provided below for reference.
NSS PEPMA:

mp_err ec_GFp_pt_mul_jac(const mp_int *n, const mp_int *px, const mp_int *py,
mp_int *rx, mp_int *ry, const ECGroup *group)
{
mp_err res = MP_OKAY;
mp_int precomp[16][2], rz;
int i, ni, d;
MP_DIGITS(&rz) = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
MP_DIGITS(&precomp[i][0]) = 0;
MP_DIGITS(&precomp[i][1]) = 0;
}
ARGCHK(group != NULL, MP_BADARG);
ARGCHK((n != NULL) && (px != NULL) && (py != NULL), MP_BADARG);
/* initialize precomputation table */
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
MP_CHECKOK(mp_init(&precomp[i][0]));
MP_CHECKOK(mp_init(&precomp[i][1]));
}
/* fill precomputation table */
mp_zero(&precomp[0][0]);
mp_zero(&precomp[0][1]);
MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(px, &precomp[1][0]));
MP_CHECKOK(mp_copy(py, &precomp[1][1]));
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for (i = 2; i < 16; i++) {
MP_CHECKOK(group->
point_add(&precomp[1][0], &precomp[1][1],
&precomp[i - 1][0], &precomp[i - 1][1],
&precomp[i][0], &precomp[i][1], group));
}
d = (mpl_significant_bits(n) + 3) / 4;
/* R = inf */
MP_CHECKOK(mp_init(&rz));
MP_CHECKOK(ec_GFp_pt_set_inf_jac(rx, ry, &rz));
for (i = d - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
/* compute window ni */
ni = MP_GET_BIT(n, 4 * i + 3);
ni <<= 1;
ni |= MP_GET_BIT(n, 4 * i + 2);
ni <<= 1;
ni |= MP_GET_BIT(n, 4 * i + 1);
ni <<= 1;
ni |= MP_GET_BIT(n, 4 * i);
/* R = 2^4 * R */
MP_CHECKOK(ec_GFp_pt_dbl_jac(rx, ry, &rz, rx, ry, &rz, group));
MP_CHECKOK(ec_GFp_pt_dbl_jac(rx, ry, &rz, rx, ry, &rz, group));
MP_CHECKOK(ec_GFp_pt_dbl_jac(rx, ry, &rz, rx, ry, &rz, group));
MP_CHECKOK(ec_GFp_pt_dbl_jac(rx, ry, &rz, rx, ry, &rz, group));
/* R = R + (ni * P) */
MP_CHECKOK(ec_GFp_pt_add_jac_aff
(rx, ry, &rz, &precomp[ni][0], &precomp[ni][1], rx, ry,
&rz, group));
}
/* convert result S to affine coordinates */
MP_CHECKOK(ec_GFp_pt_jac2aff(rx, ry, &rz, rx, ry, group));
CLEANUP:
mp_clear(&rz);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
mp_clear(&precomp[i][0]);
mp_clear(&precomp[i][1]);
}
return res;
}
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Appendix H. OpenSSL Exponentiation Procedure
Users will find OpenSSL PEPMA in its source code repository (OpenSSL-1, 2014).
Source code containing Elliptic-curve service routines is included only in compressed file
(tar) with Elliptic-curve capability. The OpenSSL PEPMA exponentiation procedure is
coded in the source file "ecp_nistp521.c". By executing the code below, OpenSSL
PEPMA makes 520 calls to the point-doubling and 104 calls to the point-adding function.
An incomplete listing of OpenSSL PEPMA is provided for reference as follows:
static void batch_mul(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out,
const felem_bytearray scalars[], const unsigned num_points, const u8 *g_scalar,
const int mixed, const felem pre_comp[][17][3], const felem g_pre_comp[16][3])
{...
for (i = (num_points ? 520 : 130); i >= 0; --i)
{
/* double */
if (!skip)
point_double(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2], nq[0], nq[1], nq[2]);
/* add multiples of the generator */
if (gen_mul && (i <= 130))
{
bits = get_bit(g_scalar, i + 390) << 3;
if (i < 130)
{
bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 260) << 2;
bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i + 130) << 1;
bits |= get_bit(g_scalar, i);
}
/* select the point to add, in constant time */
select_point(bits, 16, g_pre_comp, tmp);
if (!skip)
{
point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
1 /* mixed */, tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]);
}
else
{
memcpy(nq, tmp, 3 * sizeof(felem));
skip = 0;
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}
}
/* do other additions every 5 doublings */
if (num_points && (i % 5 == 0))
{
/* loop over all scalars */
for (num = 0; num < num_points; ++num)
{
bits = get_bit(scalars[num], i + 4) << 5;
bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 3) << 4;
bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 2) << 3;
bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i + 1) << 2;
bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i) << 1;
bits |= get_bit(scalars[num], i - 1);
ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(&sign, &digit, bits);
/* select the point to add or subtract, in constant time */
select_point(digit, 17, pre_comp[num], tmp);
felem_neg(tmp[3], tmp[1]); /* (X, -Y, Z) is the negative point */
copy_conditional(tmp[1], tmp[3], (-(limb) sign));
if (!skip)
{
point_add(nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
nq[0], nq[1], nq[2],
mixed, tmp[0], tmp[1], tmp[2]);
}
else
{
memcpy(nq, tmp, 3 * sizeof(felem));
skip = 0;
}
}
}
}
felem_assign(x_out, nq[0]);
felem_assign(y_out, nq[1]);
felem_assign(z_out, nq[2]);
}
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Appendix I. Description of Clock() Function
The clock() function provides an elapsed CPU time used by a running process. In
measuring the elapsed processing time, PEPMA calls the clock function clock() at the
beginning and at the ending of the executing interval. PEPMA subtracts the end_time
from start_time to obtain the absolute elapsed_time. It then divides the absolute time by
CLOCKS_PER_SEC. A typical setup in Linux environment is shown below:
#include <time.h>
clock_t start_time, end_time;
double elapsed_time;
start_time = clock();
for (loop_count...;)
{
// do EPM (calling point-adding, point-doubling functions etc.)
}
end_time = clock();
elapsed_time =
((double) (end_time - start_time))/(CLOCKS_PER_SEC * loop_count);
The constant CLOCKS_PER_SEC defines the number of ticks per second. In a Linux
system, CLOCKS_PER_SEC is an integer value normally equates to 1000. The data type
of "clock_t" is equivalent to "long int" which is 64-bit integer in a 64-bit x 86 computing
platform.
The purpose of using "for loop" with loop count is to increase measurement precision.
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Appendix J. Selection of Operational Parameters for P-521
The listing below is an incomplete set of Request-For-Comment (RFC) introducing
Elliptic-curve Cryptography into the cyber-space security system. In the contexts of these
RFCs, the selection of P-521 was analyzed and proposed for which operational
parameters of curve P-521 would be best suited to use or to exclude. Besides the security
requirements, some of the important recommendations for selecting the operational
parameters of P-521 curve were the efficiency and ease of implementation of underlying
arithmetic.
Table 69. Request-For-Comment Related to Selection of P-521 Curve
Request-For-Comment
Year Discussion of
RFC-6637: Elliptic Curve Cryptography
2012 NIST ECC curve P-521 Profile
(ECC) in OpenPGP
RFC-5639: Elliptic Curve Cryptography
2010 Operational parameters of
(ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve
curve P-521
Generation
RFC-3766: Determining Strengths For Public 2004 Choosing parameters for the
Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys
equation
OpenPGP: Email encryption standard, open-source Pretty-Good-Privacy
As stated in RFCs listed above, the AES-256 symmetric key encryption system requires
an asymmetric Elliptic-curve key length around 512 to 576 bits. Since there is only one
unique Mersenne probable prime of length 521 bits, all standards should converge to the
arithmetic using 521 bits. It has been known that the efficiency and easiness of modulo
arithmetic can be obtained with a Mersenne prime (Hankerson et al., 2004, pp. 44-46).
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI), National Security Agency
(NSA), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and Standards for
Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG) authorities published their own selection of curves
and underlying arithmetic. Within the context of security and computing efficiency, they
recommended to the industry what and how to apply operational parameters. The
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publication listing below is an incomplete set of standards recommending the
implementation of underlying arithmetic for P-521 curve.
Table 70. ANSI, NSA, NIST, and SECS Publications
Standards
Year Discussion of
FIPS PUB 186-4: Digital Signature Standard Jul/
P-521 curve, efficiency,
(FIPS PUB 186-4, 2013). NIST
2013 arithmetic approach, and
modulo reduction,
and projective transformation
in depth
NSA Suite B (NSA, 2013)
2013 P-521 curve, efficiency, and
arithmetic approach
SECG: Standards for Efficient Cryptography Jan/ P-521 curve, efficiency,
Group (SEC 1, 2000)
2010 arithmetic approach,
modulo reduction
ANSI X9.62 (ANSI, 2005)
2005 General Elliptic-curves and
arithmetic
The 521-bit Mersenne prime has a unique property that can be written as the sum or
difference of a small number of powers of 2. For example, a 521-bit Mersenne prime has
an integer value of p = 2521 – 1. This unique property offers a fast reduction algorithm on
computing platforms with machine word size = 64 bits; the arithmetic for modulo
reduction requires only additions and subtractions (Hankerson et al., 2004, pp. 44-46).
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Appendix K. Operation of BOCHS
BOCHS is a piece of software to emulate a virtual machine. Virtualization allows
code and data of PEPMA to execute within a newly created and isolated runtime
environment. In this study, BOCHS runs under CENTOS 6.4, a Linux variation
Operating System (OS). Because this CENTOS 6.4 OS runs at the lowest level of a
hardware platform, thus, it is known as the host Operating System. In this study, BOCHS
emulates CENTOS 6.0. Then this OS becomes a guest OS, which provides all necessary
operating system resources to execute PEPMA in a rescue mode. This rescue operating
mode provides a minimum but adequate set of peripheral and working environment. To
start BOCHS, execute the bash script as follows:
/BOCHS/bochs -q -f c6.txt
/BOCH/ is a directory where BOCHS installed and “c6.txt” is the configuration file for
“bochs” program. When BOCHS starts successfully, a welcome screen will appear as
follows:

Figure 40. Virtual Machine BOCHS Main Screen
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Press <ESC> to bring in next screen, and enter “linux rescue” as shown on the screen
below (without entering double quotes).

Figure 41. Virtual Machine BOCHS Rescue Screen
When host OS and BOCHS bring in next screen, the emulation has been going
successfully up to this point:

Figure 42. Virtual Machine BOCHS Language Screen
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When BOCHS asks for enabling the network, enter “no”, enter “skip” for checking
rescue environment, then enter “shell start” at the menu to start bash shell. After this
point, BOCHS loads the terminal and ready for commands. If this terminal screen shows
up with “bash-4.1#” prompt, the virtualization has been completely successful.

Figure 43. Virtual Machine BOCHS Final Screen
To execute PEPMA, enter the commands at bash prompt as follows:
cd /mnt
mkdir f
mount –t ext2 /dev/fd0 /mnt/f
/mnt/f/ectest
/mnt/f/ecp_test
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A typical display from machine emulation is shown in the picture below. This screen
shows the "bash" terminal in virtual machine BOCHS. The texts shown on the screen are
the results from PEPMA exponentiation function calculating the scalar product k×(x, y).
Counting of CPU instructions (MULq, MOVq etc.) are outputted on the host-machine
terminal.

Figure 44. Virtual Machine BOCHS Calculating k×(x, y)
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From the figure shown below, the terminal running on host OS displays selected
software-counters of unit-under-test. Target identification (0001BF75) is located at the
first parameter; and its executing thread is located at the second parameter (00006400).
BOCHS counts the number of MULq and MOVq CPU instructions and displays them at
the third parameter (00001E6D) and the last parameter (0005A362) respectively.

Figure 45. Instruction Software Counters Displayed while Calculating k×(x, y)
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Update Image

To update PEPMA image from host OS, enter the commands at guest OS bash
prompt as follows:
umount /mnt/f
Enter the commands at host OS bash prompt as follows:
cd /BOCHS
losetup /dev/loop0 a.img
mount -t ext2 /dev/loop0 -o loop /mnt/floppy
Then copy OpenSSL PEPMA (ectest) or NSS PEPMA (ecp_test) to the guest Disk
(executing commands from host OS terminal):
cp /O/test/ectest /mnt/floppy/ectest
cp /NSS/mozilla/security/nss/lib/freebl/ecl/ecp_test /mnt/floppy/ecp_test
umount /dev/loop0
losetup -d /dev/loop0
Content of c6.txt

megs: 512
romimage: file=$BXSHARE/BIOS-bochs-latest
vgaromimage: file=$BXSHARE/VGABIOS-lgpl-latest
floppya: 1_44=a.img, status=inserted
floppyb: 1_44=b.img, status=inserted
ata0-master: type=disk, path="c6min.img", mode=flat
ata1-master: type=cdrom, path=./c6min.iso, status=inserted
boot: cdrom
# this simulates /dev/ttyS0 on guest
# com1: enabled=1, mode=file, dev=serial.out
# this simulates /dev/ttyS0 on guest
# com1: enabled=1, mode=term, dev=/dev/pts/0
# com1: enabled=1, mode=term, dev=/dev/tty0
com1: enabled=1, mode=term, dev=/dev/ttyS0
# panic: action=ask
panic: action=report
error: action=report
info: action=report
debug: action=ignore
# ne2k: ioaddr=0x300, irq=9, mac=00:c4:3B:00:C3:00, ethmod=win32, ethdev=NE2000
# default config interface is textconfig.
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#config_interface: textconfig
#config_interface: wx
display_library: x
# other choices: win32 sdl wx carbon amigaos beos macintosh nogui rfb term svga
log: bochsout.txt
mouse: enabled=0, type=ps2
fullscreen: enabled=0
cpu: ips=400000000, ignore_bad_msrs=1
clock: sync=both
keyboard_serial_delay: 250
keyboard: keymap=$BXSHARE/keymaps/x11-pc-us.map
# keyboard_paste_delay: 100000
user_shortcut: keys="f7"
# mouse: enabled=1
#magic_break: enabled=1
#port_e9_hack: enabled=1
#text_snapshot_check: enabled=0
#private_colormap: enabled=0
BOCHS Configuration and Compilation

# ./configure --enable-cpu-level=6 \
#
--enable-smp \
#
--enable-x86-64 \
#
--enable-pci \
#
--enable-disasm \
#
--enable-logging \
#
--enable-cdrom \
#
--disable-plugins \
#
--enable-usb \
#
--enable-usb-ohci \
#
--enable-usb-xhci \
#
--enable-plugins \
#
--enable-vmx \
#
--enable-fpu \
#
--enable-debugger \
#
--with-x --with-x11 --with-term
#
# --disable-assert-checks \
#
--enable-debugger \
#
--enable-debugger-gui \
#
--enable-sb16 \
#
#./configure --enable-cpu-level=6 \
#--enable-ne2000 \
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#--enable-pci \
#--enable-pcidev \
#--enable-pnic \
#--enable-repeat-speedups \
#--enable-fast-function-calls \
#--enable-all-optimizations \
#--enable-fpu \
#--enable-cdrom \
#--enable-x86-64 \
#--with-x --with-x11 --with-term
./configure --enable-cpu-level=6 \
--disable-smp \
--enable-ne2000 \
--enable-pci \
--enable-pcidev \
--enable-pnic \
--enable-repeat-speedups \
--enable-cdrom \
--enable-x86-64 \
--with-x --with-x11 --with-term
#./configure --enable-cpu-level=6 \
#--enable-x86-64 \
#--enable-pci \
#--enable-pcidev \
#--enable-debugger \
# --with-x --with-x11 --with-term
# if this error happens while compiling:
#gui/libgui.a(gtk_enh_dbg_osdep.o): In function `MakeGTKthreads()':
#./build/bochs-2.4.2/gui/gtk_enh_dbg_osdep.cc:2120:
# undefined reference to `pthread_create'
# add this statement -lpthread to Makefile under LIBS (around line 100)
#
# Put text above into bash file RUN.bat
# Compile BOCHS by executing ./RUN.bat
# alias m = "make"
# alias r = "./RUN.bat"
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Appendix L. Operation of PAPI
The Performance Application Programming Interface, PAPI, is a machine
independent set of callable routines that provide access to the hardware performance
counters inside a CPU. It is currently being developed at the University of Tennessee, and
the codes are mostly written in C language. To use PAPI counting services, PEPMA links
to code library "libpapi.a". Compilation of PEPMA must include a PAPI header, papi.h,
declared variables, and the library path to the "libpapi.a":
#include "/usr/local/include/papi.h"
#define NUM_EVENTS 2
#define ERROR_RETURN(retval) { fprintf(stderr, "Error %d %s:line %d: \n",
retval,__FILE__,__LINE__); exit(retval); }
int EventSet = PAPI_NULL;
long long papi_values[NUM_EVENTS];
char errstring[PAPI_MAX_STR_LEN];
int retval;
Then before measuring, initialize PAPI and create counting events with:
if((retval = PAPI_library_init(PAPI_VER_CURRENT)) != PAPI_VER_CURRENT )
ERROR_RETURN(retval);
/* Creating the EventSet */
if ( (retval = PAPI_create_eventset(&EventSet)) != PAPI_OK)
ERROR_RETURN(retval);
/* Add Total Instructions executed to the EventSet */
if ( (retval = PAPI_add_event(EventSet, PAPI_TOT_INS)) != PAPI_OK)
ERROR_RETURN(retval);
/* Add Total Cycles executed to the EventSet */
if ( (retval = PAPI_add_event(EventSet, PAPI_TOT_CYC)) != PAPI_OK)
ERROR_RETURN(retval);
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Start the PAPI measuring instrument by calling function PAPI_start() just before
executing the unit-under-test Exponentiation Function (EF):
if ( (retval = PAPI_start(EventSet)) != PAPI_OK) ERROR_RETURN(retval);
EF()...
Then read the PAPI instrument with PAPI_read() to acquire the results:
/* Read the counter values and store them in the values array */
if ( (retval=PAPI_read(EventSet, papi_values)) != PAPI_OK)
ERROR_RETURN(retval);
/* Stop counting and store the values into the array */
if ( (retval = PAPI_stop(EventSet, papi_values)) != PAPI_OK)
ERROR_RETURN(retval);
printf("\nTotal instructions executed are %lld", papi_values[0] );
printf("\nTotal cycles executed are %lld \n",papi_values[1]);
/* Free the resources used by PAPI */
PAPI_shutdown();
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Appendix M. Configuration and Compilation of NSS
Execute the following commands to compile NSS:
cd /NSS/mozilla/security/nss
# printenv $CFLAGS
# read -p "Press any key to continue"
unset NSS_ENABLE_ECC
unset NSS_ECC_MORE_THAN_SUITE_B
unset ECL_ENABLE_GFP_PT_MUL_JAC
unset BUILD_OPT
unset NSS_USE_COMBA
NSS_USE_COMBA=0
export NSS_USE_COMBA
# NSS_ENABLE_ECC=1
# export NSS_ENABLE_ECC
NSS_ECC_MORE_THAN_SUITE_B=1
export NSS_ECC_MORE_THAN_SUITE_B
USE_64=1
export USE_64
ECL_ENABLE_GFP_PT_MUL_JAC=1
export ECL_ENABLE_GFP_PT_MUL_JAC
# no debug
#BUILD_OPT=1
#export BUILD_OPT
# this flag does not work well yet
#
unset ECL_ENABLE_GFP_PT_MUL_JAC
make clean
NSS_ECC_MORE_THAN_SUITE_B=1
# make nss_build_all USE_64=1 NSS_ENABLE_ECC=1
make nss_build_all USE_64=1 NSS_ECC_MORE_THAN_SUITE_B=1
ECL_ENABLE_GFP_PT_MUL_JAC=1
cd /NSS/mozilla/security/nss/lib/freebl/ecl
alias n="make clean"
alias m="make tests"
alias r="./ecp_test --print --time"

194

Appendix N. Configuration and Compilation of OpenSSL
Execute the following commands to configure OpenSSL for compilation:
./config enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128
#make depend
#make
# add this line in make file
# for PAPI
# EX_LIBS= /usr/local/lib64/libpapi.a
cd /O
alias m="make"
alias r="./test/ectest"
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Appendix O. Test Vector Type A
scalar k =
1EB7F81785C9629F136A7E8F8C674957109735554111A2A866FA5A166699419BFA
9936C78B62653964DF0D6DA940A695C7294D41B2D6600DE6DFCF0EDCFC89FDC
B1
affine coordinate x =
1D5C693F66C08ED03AD0F031F937443458F601FD098D3D0227B4BF62873AF50740
B0BB84AA157FC847BCF8DC16A8B2B8BFD8E2D0A7D39AF04B089930EF6DAD5
C1B4
affine coordinate y =
144B7770963C63A39248865FF36B074151EAC33549B224AF5C8664C54012B818ED
037B2B7C1A63AC89EBAA11E07DB89FCEE5B556E49764EE3FA66EA7AE61AC01
823

The results of function k(x, y) are:
result x =
91B15D09D0CA0353F8F96B93CDB13497B0A4BB582AE9EBEFA35EEE61BF7B7D
041B8EC34C6C00C0C0671C4AE063318FB75BE87AF4FE859608C95F0AB4774F8C9
5BB
result y =
130F8F8B5E1ABB4DD94F6BAAF654A2D5810411E77B7423965E0C7FD79EC1AE5
63C207BD255EE9828EB7A03FED565240D2CC80DDD2CECBB2EB50F0951F75AD
87977F
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Appendix P. Test Vector Type B
scalar k =
7616133442038E27357DB450C353BD11FBA3BCAC8B7B8C3EF76AADB5FE05BE1
DD57A22D42A5444D00DCD018D389170C54FE781CB21C36020F657D001E1CBB41
DD1
affine coordinate x =
BBECF65446053080CC1CF955938C58EB630C84ECAD2756F93B47EBFA9F9BCA3
FA8343539812608CAB2D3A9F8079AB8311A4F269B0A3CD9E0DDD066FC4121D9
2F0E
affine coordinate y =
1DD96DB411AD67997B10D42C76B8510C8A930DFA9A5927AC274B0C5021798690
777B8E77E6AE2648BF513E02F586898E7DAE20D71D19838A9F3175F06B057C5F2
F4

The results of function k(x, y) are:
result x =
1CE3631976395AD8957F367446D6C99308D5B9E8E0C42DE27CA568CFBE6155D01
6F54AF8A4B751F75AA61255FE09340A8F36A5BD61FD45E0A217123362A459D78
A5
result y =
D5AD0E3B4B1BA4C9C462DF92A198067CD4E3176D8F6C710D50B109B3590F7A8
0BCA504D19A2BFAD400713ED774A629EFB6DA24ABB037EFCF4B6040C92BDB4
CAB8D
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Appendix Q. Test Vector Type B

Table 71. Test Vector Type C, Modulus m.
Format
Hexadecimal

Decimal
Number
of Bits
Is m Prime?

m = 2521 – 1, log2(m+1) = 521
000001FF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
686479766013060971498190079908139321726943530014330540
939446345918554318339765605212255964066145455497729631
1391480858037121987999716643812574028291115057151
521
Probably

Table 72. Test Vector Type C, Vector x.
Format
Hexadecimal
Decimal

Number
of Bits
Is m Prime?

x = 2544 – 1
FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE
575860965701529136999748928983805677935321231142645329
036896713294315210325950447400837207821298029715189876
561090674575770658055103270360193089943150740973457244
14
544
Not a Prime
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Appendix R. Computing Platform Type A
A computing platform of type A was used for real-time measurements. The
following figures describe the operating characteristics of this particular computing
platform with respect to its CPU type, memory, and running processes in the system at
the times of measurement.

Figure 46. Computing Platform Type A, CPU and Memory
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Figure 47. Computing Platform Type A, Running/Sleeping Processes
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Figure 48. Computing Platform Type A at Busy State
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Appendix S. Computing Platform Type B
The following computing platform of type B was applied for real-time
measurements:

Figure 49. Computing Platform Type B, CPU and Memory

202

Figure 50. Computing Platform Type B with Running/Sleeping Processes
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Figure 51. Computing Platform Type B, Resource Utilization
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Appendix T. Computing Platform Type C, CPU Resource Busy
A computing platform type C was used for some real-time measurements. Most of
CPU resources were allocated to other running processes at the times of measurement.
The following figure illustrates the characteristics of this particular computing platform
with respect to its CPU type, memory, and running processes in the system at the times of
measurement.

Figure 52. Computing Platform Type C, Resources Busy
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Appendix U. Description of Metrics TOT_CYC and TOT_INS
The metric TOT_CYC measures total number of CPU cycles to complete a software
function. The TOT_CYC metric is just a convenience way to name the total CPU clock
cycles for a program as described generally in (Patterson & Hennessy, 2012, pp. 30-39).
In this research, the TOT_CYC was specifically used to measure the total number of
CPU clock cycles to accomplish a top-level mathematical function k(x, y) with a fairly
known run-time environment (this specific function k(x, y) is to calculate a scalar
multiplication with two affine coordinates x and y). Additionally, this research also
acquired and analyzed the TOT_CYC metric to assess the CPU clock cycles of submodules such as point-adding, or point doubling. Thus, to realize the performance
comparison accurately, the measurement pairs: TOT_CYC for NSS and TOT_CYC for
OpenSSL must be acquired on the same computing platform, and on the same runtime
environment. Then the comparison can be done with each of these measurement pairs.
According to Patterson and Hennessy, the definition of time is called wall clock
time, response time, or elapsed time. These terms mean the whole time to complete a
task, including disk accesses, memory accesses, input/output (I/O) activities, operating
system overhead etc. Thus, the metric TOT_CYC acquired by PAPI measurement
method can only be an approximation of the entire time to complete a task.
The total number CPU instructions in a software function, namely as metric
TOT_INS can be accurately converted to the TOT_CYC according to the computing
clock cycle-time per CPU instruction (see Intel Latency, 2013). Consequently, the
number of clock cycles required for function k(x, y), or for computing sub-modules can
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be written as:
TOT_CYC = Total Instructions for k(x, y) × Clock Cycles per Instruction (see Patterson
& Hennessy, 2012, p. 33).
From the equation above, one must obtain both coefficients Total Instructions and
Clock Cycles per Instruction in order to derive accurately the TOT_CYC. The TOT_INS
metric used in this research is a convenience way to name the Total Instructions for a
program as described generally in (Patterson & Hennessy, 2012, pp. 30-39).
For example, when the following 64-bit multiplication routine
int64_t mul_low_64x64 (int64_t a64, int64_t b64) {
return (int64_t)((__int128_t)a64 * b64);
}
is compiled with compiler optimization option 1,
gcc -O1 -S D.c -oD.asm_opti
the GCC compiler will produce the following assembly codes
.file "D.c"
.text
.globl mul_low_64x64
.type mul_low_64x64, @function
mul_low_64x64:
.LFB37:
.cfi_startproc
movq %rsi, %rax
imulq %rdi, %rax
ret
.cfi_endproc
Thus, BOCHS virtual machine will count exactly one "movq" CPU instruction, one
"imulq", and one "ret" for the arithmetic routine mul_low_64x64 (int64_t a64,
int64_t b64). In that case, the Total Instructions coefficient, TOT_INS, must exactly
equal to 3.
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Since the value of TOT_INS exactly equals to 3, then the following equality must be true
for the function mul_low_64x64():
TOT_INS = MODULE_COST = k1(imulq) + k2(movq) + OHF
where k1 = 1, k2 = 1, and the Overhead Factor, OHF = 1 for the "ret" instruction.
One could convert the TOT_INS to TOT_CYC by referencing the CPU instruction
latency of the target computing platform (see Appendix V for the details of acquiring
coefficients of TOT_CYC).
Note:
The CPU mnemonic MULq used in this research is a representation of imulq instruction.
Thus, the imulq CPU instruction could be a subset of MULq.
The CPU mnemonic MOVq used in this research is a representation of movq instruction.
Thus, the movq CPU instruction could be a subset of MOVq.
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Appendix V. Description of Metrics imulq and movq
The CPU instruction imulq 8 in an x86, 64-bit hardware platform computes an
integer multiplication of two 64-bit operands. The 128-bit result will be stored into two
64-bit registers. In case of the routine
mul_low_64x64 (int64_t a64, int64_t b64),
the target CPU multiplies the content of register RDI (routine parameter a64) to the
content of register RAX (routine parameter b64)
imulq

%rdi, %rax

(machine codes 0x48, 0xF7, 0xEE)

and returns an 128-bit result in a resister pair RDX:RAX, where the register RAX is
designated as low-word of the result.
According to Intel literature (see IA-64-32, 2013), and in a summary paper from
(Granlund, 2014), executing the MULq instruction for Intel Pentium P4 processor will
take exactly ten clock cycles. However, for the Intel Nehalem processors, executing the
MULq instruction will take exactly three clock cycles.
The CPU instruction movq 9 in an x86, 64-bit hardware platform moves the data
between two 64-bit operands. In case of executing the instruction movq with two CPU
registers (no external memory, or cache)
movq %rsi, %rax

(machine codes 0x48, 0x89, 0xF8),

it will take one clock cycle for most of processors (P4, AMK K10 etc.)

8

The CPU mnemonic MULq used in this research is a representation of imulq

instruction. Thus, the imulq CPU instruction could be a subset of MULq.
9

The CPU mnemonic MOVq used in this research is a representation of movq

instruction. Thus, the movq CPU instruction could be a subset of MOVq.
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